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Loss and damage is the impacts of climate change, when adaptation and mitigation measures 
fail the result is loss and damage. The loss and damage agenda aims to hold countries that were 
typically seen as polluters accountable for the yet unknown and undefined damages caused by 
climate change. The idea behind loss and damage is a step forward from the thinking of 
adaptation and mitigation to the idea that regardless of these two actions globally, some 
people/countries will still be affected by climate impacts and that these countries deserve some 
level of compensation/global financial support as compensation (Faruque & Khan 2013). Loss 
and damage is an ever-growing policy matter, political issue and lived reality for many. This 
thesis explores the development of loss and damage policy within Bangladesh, the first country 
to attempt to develop a national level policy, analysing the way in which key stakeholders are 
navigating national level policy development and negotiating loss and damage at the United 
Nations Climate Change Conference of the Parties.  
 
The thesis research took place in two field locations: Dhaka (the Capital of Bangladesh) 
throughout 2018-2019, and the Conference of Parties 24 international meeting on climate 
change held in Katowice, Poland in December 2018. The research was conducted using 
qualitative research methods, including semi-structured interviews, observations of conference 
proceedings and document analysis.  
 
The thesis found the following key results. That the lack of an instituted loss and damage policy 
means that a mechanism for actions and practical steps does not exist. Bangladesh has shown 
a remarkable level of leadership and has the potential through a national level policy to expand 
this leadership role. The role of CSOs and civil society members as advocates has been pivotal 
in loss and damage policy briefing and development at the local level. Developing country 
delegates and civil society representatives have contributed significantly towards the framing 
of loss and damage. Loss and damage challenges the traditional perceptions of Traditional 
Overseas Development Assistance (ODA). The use of constructed ambiguity is one of the 
many tactics used to evade responsibility by the global North. The importance of justice 
arguments are for demanding global North countries be held accountable. The ability to 
develop a framework and funding structure to tackle loss and damage would largely improve 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
 
The effects of anthropogenic climate change and our actions as a collective will define the 
future of the earth and how we live. Industrialisation and globalisation have shaped the 19th 
and 20th century, respectively, and have resulted in the present situation of anthropogenic 
climate change in the 21st century, which we now find ourselves having to combat. Climate 
change will affect everyone to varying degrees, regardless of location, geography or financial 
position. It is how we as people decide to respond to this call to action that will cement the 
future not only for ourselves but for generations to come (IPCC, 2018a).  
 
Considering the nature of climate change, the globalised world in which we live, and the 
collective response required to combat climate change, it is essential that the development field 
understands the role different stakeholders and different countries play. Traditional non-
government organisations and civil society groups, regardless of their field of practice, are 
recognising the need to prepare for climate change impacts on their projects and programmes. 
Climate change is a mainstream issue that needs to be addressed across the field of development 
(Warner et al. 2012) 
 
This introductory chapter comprises a rationale and explanation of the research, both from a 
research perspective and a personal perspective. Following this is a description of the aims, 
objectives, research questions and methodology, a rationale for field locations and finally, an 
outline of the overall thesis structure. 
 
1.1 Research justification: Background and rationale of the study 
 
Behind this research are two forms of justification, one is that from a personal perspective and 
the second is the academic rationale. These are both explored below. 
 
1.1.1 Personal rationale 
 
My interest in this topic stems from my work background in climate change research based in 
New Zealand, as well as my experience living and working in Bangladesh intermittently over 
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the past five years. I have spent some time in Bangladesh working and living in rural 
communities and another period working at the International Centre for Climate Change and 
Development (ICCCAD) as a visiting researcher, based in Dhaka. The two years I have spent 
working at ICCCAD has exposed me to many of the challenges and discussions around climate 
change in the context of Bangladesh, giving me insight into participation, the politics and the 
practitioners working on climate change, particularly the recent development around loss and 
damage. Through my work at ICCCAD I have had the opportunity to attend the United Nations 
Conference for Climate Change held in Katowice, Poland, in December 2018. This opportunity 
allowed me to use the UNFCCC negotiations to explore the context of this research further and 
the UNFCCC Conference of parties 24 to later became one of my field sites. Moreover, my 
post-graduate studies in international development has framed my interests in international 
development processes and in particular given me a more focused understanding of the 
development of international discussions on climate change and the impacts of such 
discussions on national level responses, particularly that of policy development.  
 
1.1.2 Academic rationale 
 
Loss and damage aims to hold countries that were typically seen as polluters (i.e. countries that 
have benefited from the industrial revolution and have been emitters contributing to the rise of 
greenhouse gases) accountable for the yet unknown and undefined damages caused by climate 
change. The idea behind loss and damage is a step forward from the thinking of adaptation 
(taking practical actions to manage the effects of climate impacts) and mitigation (the practice 
of interventions that will directly reduce the level of greenhouse gases) to the idea that 
regardless of these two actions globally, some people/countries will still be affected by climate 
impacts and that these countries deserve some level of compensation/global financial support 
as compensation (Faruque & Khan 2013). 
 
Within loss and damage there are two considerations: 
1) Economic loss and damage: resources, goods or services that will either impact livelihoods 
or on a larger scale, economies, i.e. they can be quantified within the market; and 
2) Non-economic loss and damage: the idea that some things have no economic value, for 
example, languages, heritage, and sacred sites. When a group of people lose their land, which 
results in forced migration, not only their livelihoods are affected, but their communities and 
cultures as well (UNFCCC, 2013). 
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With a general decline in readiness to give traditional Overseas Development Assistance 
(ODA) from many donor countries (UNICEF, 2014) there is growing space and negotiations 
happening around what the role of climate governance structures are for climate change, and 
how loss and damage will be framed in practice. Climate finance aims to addresses mitigation 
and adaptation needs in vulnerable communities and countries. However, this thesis argues that 
the systematic structures used for financing such programmes are a reproduction of traditional 
development structures and the donor/recipient nature of climate finance parallels that of 
traditional ODA relationships. The same could be said of what will become of the practice and 
implementation of loss and damage; however, as of yet there is no climate finance for loss and 
damage specifically. 
 
Loss and damage is one of the most contentious issues within the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) because the aim of Least Developed Countries 
(LDC) is to demand recognition, compensation and liability of the harm caused by the actions 
of developed nations. This research in part aims to respond to a call for research articulated in 
two ‘Action areas’ areas within the Warsaw Mechanism for Loss and damage:  
 
Action area 1: Enhance the understanding of how loss and damage associated with the 
adverse effects of climate change affect particularly vulnerable developing countries, 
segments of the population that are already vulnerable owing to geography, 
socioeconomic status, livelihoods, gender, age, indigenous or minority status or 
disability, and the ecosystems that they depend on, and of how the implementation of 
approaches to address loss and damage can benefit them. (UNFCCC, 2014). 
 
Action area 5: Enhance the understanding of the capacity and coordination needs with 
regard to preparing for, responding to and building resilience against loss and damage 
associated with extreme and slow onset events, including through recovery and 
rehabilitation. (UNFCCC, 2014). 
 
There is a need to theorise this new era of climate change through a development lens, in order 
to gain an understanding of the roles of (traditional development actors) CSOs in the context 
of a changing landscape of development politics. This research uses loss and damage as a case 
study, and aims to do two specific things; firstly, analyse the politics of policy, by looking at 
how a LDCs can develop potentially controversial policy and the relationship with global 
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policy mechanisms. Secondly, using climate change policy as a case study to understand the 
roles of (traditional development partner) Non-Government Organisations (NGOs) in the 
current changing landscape of development politics. 
 
1.2 Research aim, questions and methods 
 
Given the aforementioned this research explores the development of policy on climate change 
loss and damage in the context of Bangladesh to explore how key stakeholders (primarily from 
civil society) are negotiating discourse on loss and damage at the national level, through policy 
development, and at the global level, through their involvement in the Conference of Parties 
under the UNFCCC. In doing so, I look at the roles and opinions of these key stakeholders 
within Bangladesh as they engage with national level policy development and the challenges 
and possibilities enabled by their engagement in international negotiations. Therefore, my main 
aim is to explore how key stakeholders within Bangladesh are negotiating (the climate change-
based) discourse on loss and damage at both the national and the global level. 
 
To fulfil this aim, the research focuses on answering two key questions: 
 
1. How are key stakeholders within Bangladesh negotiating the development of National 
Mechanism for loss and damage? 
2. How are key stakeholders within Bangladesh negotiating the discourse on loss and damage 
at the global level? 
 
To answer these questions, I undertook research in two field locations: Dhaka (the Capital of 
Bangladesh) throughout 2018-2019, and the Conference of Parties 24 international meeting on 
climate change held in Katowice, Poland in December 2018. The research was conducted using 
qualitative research methods, including semi-structured interviews, observations of conference 
proceedings and document analysis. A more detailed description of these methodologies is 
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1.3 Selection of field site 
 
1.3.1 Dhaka, Bangladesh 
 
Dhaka was chosen as a research site because Bangladesh is the first country to propose 
developing a national level policy in response to the Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss 
and Damage. Dhaka is the capital city and largest city of Bangladesh and is the country’s 
economic hub, with a population of 21 million people and a population growth rate of over 3.5 
for the last five years, largely due to climate related displacement (Macrotrends, 2020). In fact, 
Dhaka has the highest population density of any megacity globally, with 41,000 people per 
square kilometre (Demographia, 2019). 
 
Dhaka is also the city in which all government departments are located, alongside the central 
offices of most civil society organisations. As such, the organisations involved in developing 
climate change-based policy work and function within Dhaka. The Ministry of Environment, 
Forest and Climate Change, the Ministry of Planning, the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry 
of Disaster Management and Relief, alongside the Office of the Prime Minister, are the 
predominant Government of Bangladesh ministries involved with climate change-related 
issues within the country. The Ministry of Disaster Management and Relief takes the leading 
role in terms of representation at the UNFCCC negotiations. 
 
1.3.2 UNFCCC, Conference of Parties 
 
The United Nations Framework Convention for Climate Change (UNFCCC) is the 
predominant international environmental treaty, signed in 1992 at the United Nations 
Conference on Environment and Development in Rio de Janeiro and ratified in 1994. The 
UNFCCC was signed in order to “stabilize greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at 
a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system.” 
(UNFCCC, 1992).  The UNFCCC was tasked (under the same name) as the governing body of 
the United Nations in charge of coordinating the international response to climate change. 
Consequently, there have been many agreements/mechanisms agreed to and signed under the 
Convention, including but not limited to, the Kyoto protocol (1997); the Bali Action Plan 
(2007); the Paris Agreement (2011); the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action (2011); 
Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (2013); the Warsaw International Mechanism 
for Loss and Damage (2013); and most recently the Paris Rule Book (2018). The UNFCCC 
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Conference of Parties is the current platform in which climate change is negotiated in the 
international arena. 
 
The Conference of Parties (COP) 19 in November 2013 established the Warsaw International 
Mechanism for Loss and Damage associated with climate change impacts as the primary 
channel under the Convention to promote the development and implementation of different 
approaches to address loss and damage. Addressing loss and damage means dealing with both 
extreme and slow onset climatic events in countries that are vulnerable to the effects of climate 
change (UNFCCC, 2016). LDCs, including Bangladesh, are at the forefront of pushing the 
agenda on loss and damage within the official negotiation tracks at the COP. 
 
Given the central importance of; the UNFCCC to the global governance of climate change 
responses; given it is the major international framework in which loss and damage is discussed; 
and considering this process is the current platform under which negotiations are advanced, the 
UNFCCC negotiations at the Conference of Parties 24, held in Katowice, Poland, 2018, was 
selected as the second field site. This ‘site’ was chosen so that international negotiations could 
be observed and allow for a better understanding of the context in which Bangladesh negotiates 
loss and damage within the international negotiations. 
 
1.4 Outline of thesis 
 
Chapter one outlines the broad background to the research, and an introduction to loss and 
damage ensues. Furthermore, it justifies the rationale both personally and academically, 
followed by the context and positioning of the research landscape. Introducing the research 
aim, questions and methods brings the reader to the outline of this thesis.  
 
Chapter two focuses on the literature surrounding the research and theory of loss and damage. 
This chapter is separated into five main sections: defining loss and damage, the global context 
of loss and damage, the Bangladesh context of loss and damage, ideas of climate justice and 
accountability. 
 
Chapter three introduces the theoretical framework used in this research. In this chapter, I 
argue that a multilayered analysis of the roles of stakeholders is needed to understand the roles, 
relationships and engagement of NGOs both locally and internationally, to explore climate 
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change governance and power structures, and to understand the different, fragmented and 
historically derived systems of global governance. Lastly, this chapter uses a historical analysis 
to explore the notion of power by looking at the embedded struggles of the historically specific 
structures of global order, the class structures that underpin this order and the contention and 
dissent that threaten the stability of this global structure. 
 
Chapter four turns to research design and the methods of data collection and analysis. As such 
an in-depth discussion if ethical considerations, positionality of the researcher, an explanation 
of the methods, and the limitations of the research. A reflection of the fieldwork experience 
and obstacles encountered in the field is also included alongside an explanation of data analysis 
post the field  
 
Chapter five dives deeply into the context of loss and damage in Bangladesh, including the 
NGO sector in Bangladesh; Bangladesh’s climate change vulnerability; and the country’s 
current policies relevant to loss and damage. 
 
Chapter six presents the findings of this research. The first findings section focuses on national 
level policy development. The second section explores the international development of loss 
and damage negotiations. The final section looks at the interplay between the national and 
international level.  
 
Chapter seven discusses the findings and discusses this in relation to current development 
literature, and literature and discussions from previous chapters Finally, this chapter draws 











Page | 8  
 
CHAPTER 2: LOSS AND DAMAGE, CLIMATE JUSTICE, 




This chapter introduces the varied definitions of loss and damage, the global context of loss 
and damage, and the experience of loss and damage in Bangladesh. Ideas of climate justice, 
compensation for loss and damage, accountability, and liability are then explored. Moving 
forward from the previous ideas this then allows for a discussion of the context of loss and 
damage negotiations within the UNFCCC.  
 
2.2 Defining loss and damage 
 
In 1991, the Alliance of Small Island States called for a mechanism that would compensate 
those countries that would be affected by sea level rise (Subsidiary Body on Implementation, 
2012). Over time, more climate vulnerable nations began to recognise they too would be 
affected by climate related events, and it would be beyond their capacity to cope with the 
impacts. The term loss and damage was first used at the Cancun Conference of the Parties, 
(COP16), where initial discussions at a global scale took place, where a loss and damage work 
programme was initiated. This discussion led to a commitment from the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) to establish a role in loss and damage 
discussions and to lead the discussion of loss and damage at the Doha Conference of Parties 
(COP18). In 2013 at the Warsaw Conference of Parties (COP19), the Warsaw International 
Mechanism for Loss and damage (WIM) was established alongside an executive committee, 
solidifying the recognition of loss and damage as a result of climate change (UNFCCC, 2017b). 
The WIM established important work, developing the concept through which loss and damage 
could be negotiated more vigorously. However, it arguably ignored hid from discussions 
around blame, liability and ultimately compensation. Loss and damage was later included in 
the Paris Agreement under Article 8. The contentious nature of loss and damage was fully 
realised at this point, as loss and damage became a sticking point of the Paris Agreement 
discussions. Any recognition of liability and compensation was ruled out of the Paris 
Agreement, as demanded by developed countries (Yeo & Pidcock, 2017). 
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The UNFCCC sets parameters for tackling loss and damage, but currently, there is no agreed 
upon definition of what loss and damage is. The UNFCCC (2012) broadly defines loss and 
damage as “the actual and/or potential manifestation of impacts associated with climate change  
in developing countries that negatively affect human and natural systems” (UNFCCC, 2012 
pg. 3) but only within the context of a scoping paper produced by the working group for loss 
and damage. 
 
The currently undefined status of loss and damage is because the particular wording around 
loss and damage is highly political and vigorously debated.  The UNFCCC (2017a) defines the 
functions of the Warsaw Convention for Loss and Damage and how it aims to address the 
impacts and the varying approaches for its implementation, as described below: 
 
1. Enhancing knowledge and understanding of comprehensive risk management 
approaches to address Loss and Damage associated with the adverse effects of climate 
change, including slow onset impacts. 
2. Strengthening dialogue, coordination, coherence and synergies among relevant 
stakeholders 
3.  Enhancing action and support, including finance, technology and capacity-building, 
to address loss and damage associated with the adverse effects of climate change, to 
enable countries to undertake actions pursuant to decision 3. 
(3/CP.18, paragraph 6, UNFCCC, 2017a). 
 
The UNFCCC has a mandate in which it will manage “anthropogenic interference with the 
climate system”, meaning that it will manage the human-induced effects of climate change, 
(UNFCCC, 1992, pg. 4). As policymakers support developing nations in their struggle to cope 
with loss and damage from climate change, there is a need to be aware of the potential impacts 
of climate change, which has currently been somewhat neglected. However, the WIM implies 
that it will deal with both current and future changes as a result of climate change and that it 
will also manage the associated risk attributed to climate change (James et al., 2014).  
 
Currently the WIM is straightforward in the development and functionality, although it lacks 
accountability, consensus and explicit language about liability for addressing the reduction of 
greenhouse gases and resolving the related impacts of climate change events through 
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compensation (Johnson, 2017).  The lack of clarity in definitions, including within the 
committee of the WIM, has allowed for the WIM to be developed and implemented as a 
technocratic and bureaucratic exercise that focuses on data collection, knowledge sharing and 
policy recommendations, rather than addressing the inherently political nature and challenges 
faced and the varying perspectives between different ‘non-state’ actors (Johnson, 2017). 
Within the current literature there are various conceptualisations of loss and damage. These 
include simple definitions such as “damage from weather disasters” (Durand & Huq, 2015, pg. 
2.) to more descriptive definitions such as “loss and damage is incurred when the costs of 
adaptation are not recuperated; or when adaptation efforts are ineffective, maladaptive in the 
long term or altogether impossible” (Durand & Huq, 2015, pg. 2). There is a strong tendency 
for definitions to highlight the exchange between adaptation, mitigation and loss and damage 
and that when adaptation and mitigation fail to deal with these climate effects, loss and damage 
will be the result.  The UNFCCC paper defining loss and damage highlights the inherent need 
for one definition and for the current major differences in definitions to be clarified (UNFCCC, 
2016). Clarification is required to address the major differences in representations of what loss 
and damage means, what impacts are included (whether these are slow-onset or sudden-onset 
events), the differences between ‘losses’ and ‘damages’, discussions about attribution, the 
irreversible nature of impacts, and understandings of the limits of loss and damage (Vulturius 
& Davis, 2016). 
 
2.3 Dynamics of Loss and Damage 
 
The global agenda of loss and damage is hugely important at the national level in terms of 
climate change policy and practice (Roberts & Pelling, 2016). The difficulties of attributing 
anthropogenic climate change to both slow or rapid onset events, is in part due to a lack of 
understanding and direct evidence. Moreover, the challenge for policymakers is to be able to 
implement suitable measures in order to reduce the impacts of such events on vulnerable 
communities and nations. Attribution plays a major role in the implementation of policies and 
action at a global level (Roberts & Pelling, 2016).   
 
Bangladesh is a country well aware of the effects of both slow onset and rapid onset climatic 
events. (The Bangladesh context is more discussed in detail in Chapter 5).  Bangladesh is the 
largest river delta in the world, and the country frequently experiences natural calamities, such 
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as floods, cyclones, tornadoes, tidal bores, combined with the effects of deforestation, soil 
degradation, erosion, salinity intrusion and now sea level rise and increasing strength and 
variability’s in such events (Huq,  Kabir, Khan et al. Personal Communication, 2017). As it 
stands, the Government of Bangladesh (GoB) has been taking an active role in pre-disaster 
adaptation and mitigation and, as a result, has reduced the impacts of climate change disasters 
so far. However, with the increased occurrence and intensity of both rapid and slow onset 
events, the argument of loss and damage due to climate change comes into discussion. The 
GoB has been taking a proactive role in both national-level debates and global discussions of 
loss and damage. One of the actions Government has made is to initiate movement, in light of 
the current global context, to draft a National Mechanism on Loss and Damage. This draft 
policy includes an in-depth summary of the national context as well as legal mandates and 
institutional frameworks associated with loss and damage climate change. These include 
related environmental policies, disaster management, mitigation and adaptation policy and 
practices (Huq, Kabir, Khan et al., 2017. Personal Communication.) 
 
Establishing and expanding on current policy would create a foundation from which new 
policies and programmes can be developed. This action will require input from a broad range 
of stakeholders including different ministries, academia, development sector and civil society 
to address the challenges of impacts not seen before. Recommendations for furthering the 
process of national development mechanism for loss and damage include performing a needs 
assessment looking at communities and individuals most vulnerable and developing a 
consortium to enhance collaboration and best practice between those working in different 
regions and also different countries (Roberts, Huq, Hasemann & Roddick, 2013). There is a 
need for long-term capacity building regarding research and knowledge of loss and damage 
cases, and for pilot projects on loss and damage to be undertaken in the field in order to 
understand different strategies of managing and coping with loss and damage events (i.e. 
insurance, management strategies, migration assistance) (Roberts, Huq, Hasemann & Roddick, 
2013). 
 
There is an inherent need for research to identify and develop suitable approaches for loss and 
damage. In the case of loss and damage, those exposed to the impacts of climate change most 
commonly are not included in such discussions, reflecting the extensive characteristics of 
structural imbalances and inequity of climate governance, in particular, between different 
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actors, including those responsible, liable, and affected by both the action and inaction of 
climate change discussions (Serdeczny, Bauer & Huq, 2017). Expanding the narrative on loss 
and damage in the global context and moving towards more comprehensive national action is 
going to be paramount for governments. 
 
2.4 Ideas of climate justice 
 
Climate justice is the theoretical basis from which political and ethical perspectives of climate 
change, particularly loss and damage are argued. It extends the argument of climate change 
beyond that of solely an environmental and physical nature (Lyster, 2017). Merging ideas of 
justice and climate change gives those most vulnerable a ‘legal’ platform on which ideas of 
equality, human rights, collective rights, international principles of ‘no harm’ and historical 
obligations can be discussed. The fundamental understanding behind climate justice is that the 
most vulnerable are also those who are least responsible and those who will feel the effects of 
climate change most readily (Lyster, 2017). 
 
However, opinions regarding climate justice vary, decision-making and negotiation derived 
from climate justice arguments can be used to create a standard for measuring value. Using a 
holistic outlook, there are three perspectives of climate justice from which a platform of 
understanding can be established (Cao, Wang & Cheng, 2016). Firstly, Human rights 
protection, the right of every human, both individually and collectively, to the fundamental 
principles laid out by the United Nations Human Rights Council. Secondly, the traditional 
concept of distributive justice (the allocation of resources in a socially just manner) and 
corrective justice (that those liable are held responsible for the injustice inflicted); these already 
understood legal platforms allow for formal frameworks to be built. The third and final aspect 
of climate justice is the principle of ‘no harm’, in which the violation of trans-boundary 
agreements violates state responsibility. Using these three aspects of climate justice, three 
remedial approaches are proposed; state responsibility, human rights, and international 
environmental law. However, the difficulties, advantages and disadvantages of all three 
approaches must be acknowledged, as no single approach will solve or resolve the issues of 
climate change loss and damage. The functionality of state responsibility is limiting in its 
complexities, and global environmental regulations do not allow for accountability for non-
economic loss and damage. Regardless of the approach used, the framing of climate justice for 
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loss and damage will only continue to be a struggle to establish responsibility allowing those 
responsible to avoid liability (Cao, Wang & Cheng, 2016). 
 
Within climate justice arguments, there is recognition of the imbalances of the impacts of 
climate change. The wealthiest countries have benefited most from the use of global resources, 
while poorer nations continue to suffer (Dundas, 2016). Given the stronger focus on mitigation 
in wealthy countries, it is also those countries who have the most resources available to adapt, 
despite the fact they are the least likely to experience severe impacts. It is important to identify 
the inequality, lack of recognition, disenfranchisement, and exclusion deeply rooted in climate 
change injustice. Broadly speaking, the undermining of basic needs, capabilities, agency, and 
the functioning of individuals and communities are all explored within climate justice 
arguments. Climate justice is the call for a process of mutual respect, self-determination, 
participation, and justice in the procedural process, particularly demanded by countries and 
communities most affected by climate change (Dundas, 2016). 
 
The climate justice movement highlights the need to produce research, policies, and 
interventions that address both the ethical and human rights dimensions of climate change. 
Large-scale attempts at international, national, and state level policy development, and the 
responses attached to these processes, must address the capitalistic and political systems that 




In relation to climate justice, accountability is a term used to describe the relationship between 
two actors or groups, in which one group can hold the other responsible for adhering to a set 
of pre-determined standards. This term is also used to assess whether such standards have been 
upheld and to impose some form of sanctions if it is perceived that these responsibilities have 
not been met. Underlying accountability is the presupposed relationship in which one party has 
the power and the other party has the ability to hold the other accountable. According to Grant 
& Keohane (2005) accountability is also used to frame and reveal mistreatments including the 
unauthorised and illegitimate exercise of power, with the decisions made from this use of 
power viewed as unjust. Within the political realm, the notion of accountability also means that 
there is transparency within the process through which power holders can be held accountable, 
generally through some forms of sanctions. 
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Two mains ideas need to be considered when thinking about accountability and loss and 
damage. The first that the polluting countries have contributed the most to climate change and 
should be held accountable within the global context of climate change negotiations and action. 
However, the question of who is most accountable comes down to definitions and timelines of 
the already contributed greenhouse gases (GHGs). The second concept is the capacity of the 
earth’s ability to absorb greenhouse gases should be used and “distributed” on an equitable 
basis. Historical notions then need to be considered, as those who have benefited in the past 
from the emitting of greenhouse gases differ from those nations that have later industrialised 
and are now globally high emitters (Johnson, 2017). Underlying these discussions is the 
question of whose standards and norms are used to judge the actions and decisions of those in 
power. Initial discussions around loss and damage created discourse about equity, 
accountability and responsibility, with negotiations now focusing more on language around 
financial commitments from developed nations, removed from any form of responsibility. 
Political bureaucracy and technocratic exercises seem to dominate global negotiations, and 
accountability and moral notions no longer appear to play a role (Johnson, 2017). 
 
Accountability refers to the notion that there are authoritative actors, those in power, that need 
to justify their actions, their decision-making and outcomes. The other side of this is those 
affected whose role is to evaluate and then endorse the sanctions of those in power. 
Accountability is reflected as the relationships between decision-makers and takers. There is 
the need for these discussions of decision making to be conceptualised more in the context of 
global discussions, particularly around climate justice (Kramez & Park, 2017).  Accountability 
should be a means through which environmental governance should be viewed. Rights and 
responsibilities of actors are also an essential feature of accountability. Within the system of 
accountability, there is a need to raise questions of the different purposes and roles of different 
stakeholders. However, accountability in itself is not enough. It is only a reflection of the 
politics underlying global discussions around climate change and climate justice. The 
dimensions of these politics need to be considered in the relationships’ accountability and need 
to be viewed in all manner of upward, downwards and horizontal relations, between the global 
North and the global South. The obligatory political dimensions need to be understood and not 
taken for granted or based on prior assumption and need to provide true insights into the 
operations of accountability and an input-oriented focus of climate change discussions 
(Kramez & Park, 2017). 
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Those in power often avoid accountability since it affects the autonomy of the nation state. The 
idea of external accountability is described as a situation where one nation is accountable to a 
set of people outside that nation and when people external to a given nation are impacted by 
another nation practices. The question of when one nation is accountable to another nation, or 
communities is interesting and largely relevant to loss and damage discussion. If it is assumed 
that they are accountable, can accountability be achieved, or is there an accountability gap? 
(Keohane & Grant, 2005). Whether the nation or entity is being seen to be accountable or not 
depends on their intention. Within a global context, it is then difficult to ask who you are 
accountable to: is it the global audience or only to those who voted for you? Those who are in 
power or are viewed as powerful will only give a thought to accountability if it is aligned with 
what they are trying to achieve. Hence, a lack of external accountability is rather a question of 
power—the ability to not be held responsible reflects a level of power. There is a need to 
recognise that external accountability varies a lot due to imbalances in global politics and 
practices, meaning that inter-governmental organisations and smaller, fragile or dependent 
states are most easily held accountable. Secondly, in order for powerful states to be held 
accountable, there needs to be more effective mechanisms for multilateral governance. 
Moreover, there is a need to recognise that powerful nation states impose most negatively on 
the notion of accountability in world politics, including in the contest of loss and damage 
(Keohane & Grant, 2005). 
 
As previously stated, the nations which are most vulnerable to climate change impacts are 
undeniably less economically stable and lack the resources to adapt and mitigate the effects of 
climate change. LDCs suffer a double injustice in light of climate change, as it will only 
continue to affect their ability to meet social and economic development goals,  argued to be 
the result  developed nations, who have organised the global economy around the extraction of 
resources and the use and trade of fossil fuels since the onset of the Industrial Revolution 
(Adelman, 2016). Climate justice theorists argue that developed nations that have benefited 
from activities such as colonisation and resource extraction have an ethical obligation to 
compensate for loss and damage in LDCs (Adelman, 2016). 
 
In summary the notion of accountability is inherent in climate change discussions, especially 
in the idea that those in power need to be responsible for their decisions and actions, and the 
results of such choices, which includes the adverse and harmful effects of these impacts 
(Johnson, 2017). Climate justice scholars focus on the idea of accountability as a basis from 
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which they build their arguments (Hyvarinen, 2015). From a procedural perspective, 
accountability entails concepts of responsibility, appropriate behaviour, global sanctions, 
standards, organisational processes and the underlying implications that there will be some 
form of consequences if this understanding is violated (Johnson, 2017). Who is accountable 
for the impacts of climate is a question of responsibility, underlying which is the ability to 




Arguments around climate justice and accountability have the support of some previously 
developed international frameworks on which they can find both a theoretical basis and, 
ultimately, a legal imperative on which a climate justice argument for loss and damage can be 
built. This includes the International Human Rights Framework, the “No Harm” Principle, the 
Polluter Pays Principle, the Paris Agreement on Climate Change, and the Warsaw International 
Mechanism for Loss and Damage. 
 
The International Human Rights Framework is a resource from which legal imperatives and 
moral complexities can be framed in the hopes that appropriate responses to climate change 
impacts are developed. This uses human rights as an argument for climate change, rooted in 
ideas of equality and justice (Hyvarinen, 2015). The United Nations Human Rights Council 
has recognised the impacts climate change will have on human rights. Resolution 7/23 of 
human rights and climate change stated that climate change “poses an immediate and far-
reaching threat to people and communities around the world and has implications for the full 
enjoyment of human rights” (Human Rights Council, 2008, pg.1). 
 
On the other hand, the “No Harm” principle is a notion to which states must ensure that 
activities within their jurisdiction do not cause significant cross-boundary environmental 
damage. Ideas of accountability are expressed in the “no harm” principle as a cornerstone of 
international environmental law, where it is being used as one of the currently standing 
international laws from which climate justice can be argued (Mayer, 2016). The sense of the 
no-harm principle is widely understood; however, the modalities of the principle are widely 
contested, particularly around the levels of obligation to prevent any cross-boundary harm. 
Moreover, the no-harm principle asks for nations to regulate their activities but does not extend 
to being held responsible for the resulting damages (despite the result to prevent damages). 
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Cases that invoke the no-harm principle typically apply across physical borders; this is one of 
the issues when considering the use of the no-harm principle in the context of climate change. 
Furthermore, damages from climate change are not the result of a single activity of a single 
neighbouring state, but rather the results of various activities by many contributing nations over 
decades.  
 
Given these factors, the application of the no-harm principle is difficult in the context of climate 
change as it is the accumulation of activities by multiple actors over time that has and will 
result in harm. The historical failures of states to prevent damage from the actions that result 
in greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions ultimately does not compose a violation of the no-harm 
principles. Moreover, it is uncertain the obligation nations have in foreseeing the specific 
damages that may occur (Cao, Wang & Chen, 2016). 
 
Moreover, the application of the Polluter Pays Principle is allowing for civil society and 
developing nations to argue for liability and ultimately compensation through the UNFCCC 
process. Polluter Pays Principle (PPP) is an economic, legal and ethical instrument that argues 
that polluters should pay for the environmental and social impact costs associated with climate 
change, including mitigation and adaptation efforts and the impacts of loss and damage. PPP 
reflects the most fundamental principles of justice and liability. Article 3.1 of the UNFCCC 
recognizes that; 
 
“The Parties should protect the climate system for the benefit of present and future 
generations of humankind, on the basis of equity and in accordance with their common 
but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities.” (UNFCCC, 1992, p.4) 
 
This implies the provision of a market-based system to deals with the impacts of climate 
change, for which the PPP could be applied (Khan, 2015). PPP is considered by many to be a 
rational approach to deal with climate change both in an economic sense but also in a policy 
sense. CSOs and developing nations are pushing for the adoption of the PPP and is on the 
agenda of many countries as an equitable approach, including some of the largest emitters. The 
legal interpretation of the PPP holds that both nationally and at the local level governments are 
jointly liable for environmental damages caused by both private and public actions. Meaning 
both the polluter and the regulatory bodies are responsible for the generation of pollution. 
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The inclusion of Goal 13 within the Sustainable Development Goals, ratified by all nations at 
the United Nations, calls for immediate action to combat climate change and its impacts. As a 
result of the inclusion of this document, the Paris Agreement on Climate Change was adopted 
at COP21 in 2015, which followed the signing and commitment by all nations to not exceed  
two degrees of global warming. Article 4 of the Paris agreement states: 
 
Each Party shall prepare, communicate and maintain successive nationally determined 
contributions that it intends to achieve. Parties shall pursue domestic mitigation 
measures, with the aim of achieving the objectives of such contributions. In 
communicating their nationally determined contributions, all Parties shall provide the 
information necessary for clarity, transparency and understanding in accordance with 
decision 1/CP.21. (United Nations, 2015, pg. 5). 
 
While the Paris agreement does not address ideas of liability and compensation, it certainly 
calls for nations to be accountable for their own commitment to a reduction of emissions in 
order to achieve the global goal of not exceeding two-degrees. 
 
In sum, the external frameworks mentioned above are a mode through which climate justice 
arguments can be built and framed, particularly for loss and damage discussions. The repeated 
argument for accountability from those who have caused climate is being challenged through 
previously existing international frameworks and as a result accountability is often paralleled 




Ideas of accountability (or liability) have been excluded from global level policy on loss and 
damage. However, calls for compensation are synonymous with the need to recognise loss and 
damage. Attempts by the global North to de-politicise loss and damage discussions have been 
successful, through calls to enhance knowledge and understanding of approaches to address 
loss and damage; strengthen dialogue, coordination and coherence among relevant 
stakeholders; and enhance action and support to address loss and damage, as suggested by the 
Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage (UNFCCC, 2014). However, what is 
not included in this list of actions is any explicit recognition of culpability or requirement for 
financial compensation, accountability or liability at the international level.  When these issues 
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have been raised, they have quickly been sidelined. There are also similar discussions focused 
at the national level. Governments are encouraged within international frameworks establish a 
national level policy to compensate communities or individuals. This has been framed in a 
manner that evokes ideas of state responsibility as discussed in the Rio Declaration of 1992 
(Faruque and Khan, 2013) which states that “States shall develop national law regarding 
liability and compensation for the victims of pollution and other environmental damage” (The 
Rio Declaration, 1992, pg. 3). 
 
This discussion of the development of a national policy on loss and damage is shortly followed 
by conceptually difficult questions, such as: Who will compensate? Who will be compensated? 
What is compensated for? (Faruque and Khan, 2013). The idea of compensation is particularly 
problematic because of how loss and damage is understood or misunderstood and how it is 
dependent on concepts of valuation and market values. Measuring a value of something which 
will be or has been lost or damaged is based not only on market value, but also on emotional 
state, connection, and people’s perceived perceptions or interpretations of what has value 
(Morrissey and Oliver-Smith, 2013). It cannot be assumed that all societies have placed the 
same value on certain things, different models and relations of production are produced from 
varying ways of thinking. An understanding of the role things play in social and material 
reproduction in any society is paramount in the negotiations of climate change discussions 
(Morrissey & Oliver-Smith, 2013). 
 
The current de-politicisation of climate change arguments within the global context only allows 
for the underlying historic reasonings that have made Bangladesh vulnerable to climate change 
to go unspoken and for the people and interventions that have taken place to ignore 
accountability for past actions (Paprocki, 2017).   The political implications of attributing the 
current environmental and ecological changes purely to climate change is problematic. 
Bangladesh has a long history of intervention through colonisation and at the hands of 
development interventions, dating back to the 1970’s, which had led to what Paprocki (2017) 
describes as an NGO-state nexus; in this context, she sees the current focus on climate change 
discourse as just a new framing in which the development sector avoids accountability and fails 
to address the structural conditions that reinforce poverty and inequality. Apolitical solutions 
to climate change impacts only undermine the political linkages to local and international 
power imbalances.  
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It can be argued that placing the imperative for compensation in the hands of national level 
governments, like Bangladesh, has both positive and negative implications in the context of 
loss and damage. In a positive sense, it gives individual nation states the authority to enable 
their own action, processes, and procedures around loss and damage, as Bangladesh is doing 
with the development of a National Mechanism for Loss and Damage. However, treating loss 
and damage as a national policy exercise erases the historical notions that sit behind the effects 
of climate change, and removes any obligation or moral imperatives from those who have 
caused it (Faruque & Khan, 2013).  However, for nations such as Bangladesh, which sees 
climate change as not something on the horizon but rather something lapping at their shores, 
giving greater priority to developing national policies and legal norms to deal with loss and 
damage has been perceived as far more productive than waiting for agreed outcomes from 
UNFCCC or for debates on accountability and compensation to play out on global platforms 
(Faruque & Khan, 2013). 
 
2.8 Identities within the UNFCCC 
 
One of the central arguments used by developing countries within the negotiations at the 
UNFCCC is a climate justice argument. The arguments below explore the relationships, power 
dynamics and the historical underpinnings of climate change. A central idea within climate 
justice is the idea of climate debt.  Climate debt is an attempt to reshuffle the imbalance of 
power and to compensate for past action, through recognising the historical causation and 
associated responsibilities underlying the effects of climate change felt today. Ciplet, Roberts 
& Khan, 2015).  The climate justice argument is founded on not only environmental issues but 
the recognition that environmental issues are implicitly linked to both social issues and 
economic issues, and the causality of climate change is underpinned by unjust economic 
distribution, lack of ethnic rights, gender inequality, uneven and western-driven development 
practices and unequal global trade policies. Climate debt is a form of restorative justice 
(Warlenius, 2017). 
 
More practically, climate debt is the idea that those countries from the global North owe a debt 
to the global South for their share of the over-consumption of the absorption ability of the 
carbon sinks of the world, referred to as ‘atmospheric space’. Climate justice argues that this 
atmospheric space is a global common, and as such the current system has allowed for the 
appropriation of national and world commons by the global elite. This domination is the 
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colonisation and occupation of the ‘atmospheric space.  Almost two-thirds of the atmosphere’s 
ability to absorb greenhouses gases has already been spent, which means that the global North 
has used more than their share of this atmospheric resource. This debt as such should be repaid 
to the global South (Warlenius, 2017). 
 
There are three ways in which this debt can be repaid (Warlenius, 2017). The first is an 
emissions debt, that would be the reduction of emissions by the global North to below their per 
capita share, reducing the levels of greenhouse gases to a level in which the global South is 
then able to use their share of the total atmospheric carbon sink in order to forward their 
development. This decolonisation of atmospheric space would come as a restorative debt to the 
global South. The second form of debt comes as an adaptation debt, that is the idea that 
financial and technological resources are moved from the North to the global South, to support 
adaptation and mitigation processes in the global South financially; a compensatory debt for 
the share of the current emissions that are unable to be repaid by the global North. This 
adaptation debt would facilitate the same level of ‘development’ as the North for the South, 
however without the emissions attached to it.  The last form of debt is paying for the injustice 
of climate change impacts felt within the global South. This additional form of financial 
payment from developing nations to the global South would pay for the impacts experienced 
as a means to deal with, prevent and minimise the damages. This third area of compensation 
stands firmly within the arguments for loss and damage (Warlenius, 2017). Climate debt is an 
attempt to address the unjust histories, of industrialisation and climate change that originate in 
colonisation. The framing of climate debt brings into questions the power relations and 
identities held by the global North and the global South. 
 
Different identities are assumed within the UNFCCC negotiations, as such there are three 
distinct ways in which postcolonial identities are manifested: from a legal stance, an economic 
perspective and through emissions discourse. Different countries press for climate justice 
within the UNFCCC, through assuming differing identities as ‘developed’ or ‘developing 
countries’ (Rajao et al., 2018).  The global South views environmental issues as more closely 
linked to social and economic issues and the treat these pose on their sovereignty.  
 
The global South views the climate negotiations as an arena in which the power imbalance 
between the North and the South can be inverted. That, however, is not to say that each 
sovereign state has the same interests, scientific grounding, technical capacities nor the same 
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domestic resources. The emissions discourse within the UNFCCC is a central discourse, and 
this as a platform for the manifestation of postcolonial identity. The negotiations highlight the 
causation of climate change, demand responsibility from the global North and also demands 
the sharing of remaining atmospheric space. The global South nations re-establish their identity 
as fundamentally different to that of the global North in the negotiation process and in doing 
so they use their positions as ‘developing’ to reaffirm this identity, enabling them to demand 
commitments from the global North to tackle climate change. Through this identity, they can 
deconstruct development, undermining the story of ‘developing’ in order to forward their 




The development of loss and damage has been ineffective so far as wealthy countries do not 
want to take responsibility for their role in causing climate change and have turned it into a 
technocratic exercise (Ojha, Ghimire, et al. 2016). However, there is promise in the ideas of 
climate justice advocates – particularly the need for accountability. 
 
With all the discussions and debates around loss and damage and climate justice, it is crucial 
to explore the ways in which stakeholders are negotiating and defining the new issues within 
climate change. Including the ways in which national responses and international responses are 
taking place and are being shaped, ideas of political representation, accountability and climate 
justice are theoretical and legal standpoints on which discussions are evolving. The ways in 
which national level policy development will lie alongside and influence the global context is 
evolving and developing. The context of this research aims to represent the policy development 
within Bangladesh and provide insight into the local level development and the interplay with 
international negotiations.  
 
Arguments around climate justice and accountability provide theoretical and some legal 
provisions on which discussions can take place. The reality of climate change and the 
vulnerable people it will affect, is that years of discussions have not led to significant action. 
Global agreements to the reduction of emissions and the commitment to assist least developed 
nations and small island developing nations only translate into well-meaning outcomes if there 
is some level of ownership and action by those who are accountable for climate change. 
Bangladesh is at the forefront of global discussions, and national level policy development is 
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important for them as a nation. Arguments on definitions, five-year working plans, and inaction 
from the West only means waiting for further potential failings of development. The theoretical 
nature of current loss and damage debates, including climate justice debates and ideas of 
accountability, are paramount in challenging Western nations and furthering global 
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CHAPTER 3: CIVIL SOCIETY ORGANISATIONS’ ROLES AND 






A different optic has emerged in the development nexus, that of climate change (McMichael, 
2008).  Development has had an ecological blind spot and it’s only in the last decade that this 
blind spot is being overcome. Climate change threatens the stability of nation-states, the ability 
to reduce poverty and global economic stability, increases the risk of disasters, and has the 
potential to ingrain pre-existing inequalities further. Having climate change recognised within 
international agreements such as the sustainable development goals acknowledges that in order 
to eradicate poverty and achieve equality, it is essential to address climate change and the 
associated impacts. The inclusion of climate change challenges optic within the development 
nexus makes it crucial to understand the different roles of CSOs, both traditionally and moving 
forward, what NGOs represent concerning civil society, how CSOs engage within global 
political institutions and how CSOs engage and respond to international power structures. This 
research goes on to explore the engagement of civil society actors, as a voice of the poor and 
the most vulnerable, in the context of Bangladesh, in their representation at the UNFCCC 
COP24 and as the representatives of Bangladesh respond to and negotiate the climate change 
issue of loss and damage. 
 
This chapter introduces analytical approaches to understanding the role of NGOs in 
international negotiations and the influence they have in this context, and the structures in 
which they are situated. In the second part of this chapter, I build on this exploration of NGOs’ 
roles to contextualise climate change loss and damage discussions within development theory, 
and to develop a specific theoretical framework for my research. 
 
3.2 The role of NGOs in development 
 
The growth of the 20th-century post-war development sector has spawned much discourse over 
both the successes and the failures of traditional overseas development aid, the development 
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landscape and previous changes and continuing changes within it. Non-Governmental 
Organisations (NGOs) have played a crucial role in forming and implementing development 
policy since the 1950s. As such, they have played a significant role in the global political 
economy of today. NGOs have acted as an alternative model of development in many cases, 
fulfilling the functions of government and distributing traditional overseas development 
assistance. NGOs rose in popularity with their ability to access the poor, problem solve, and to 
be adaptable in their administrative roles and the context in which they can work. They are 
viewed as more cost-effective (than governments) (Desai, 2014), and generally considered 
reliable, with their ability as non-state actors to work outside the rules and frameworks of 
governments and their autonomy from the state, the market and donor nations (Desai, 2014). 
NGOs are also considered to represent the most vulnerable at the grassroots, evoking ideas of 
representation, advocacy, empowerment and participation (Desai, 2014). However, these ideas 
have also been challenged, the are many scholars who have critiqued NGOs claims. NGOs 
have been critiques for their performance and actual effectiveness, issues around accountability 
issues, autonomy, the practice of the commercialisation of NGOs, and the ideological and/or 
political interpretations of the rising influence of NGOs (Reimann, 2005). 
 
Korten (1987) describes three generations of NGOs and how they engage with development 
practices. The first generation of NGOs engages in relief and welfare work as immediate 
service providers, often relating to situations of disaster or in the context of war. This 
generation of NGOs works on the scale of individuals or at a family level. The second 
generation of NGOs engages in small-scale self-reliant local development; these projects base 
their work at the community level, their activities often parallel the activities of the 
government, where government services are lacking. Their strategies do not attempt to address 
the causes of the inadequacy of services, the larger institutional issues or the policy context of 
the NGOs own activities. The third generation is called sustainable systems development, 
NGOs that work in addressing institutional and policy constraints. These NGOs work at a 
regional, national or international level. These NGOs realise the need to exercise greater 
leadership in addressing dysfunctional aspects of the policy and institutional issues. They are 
involved with a variety of government, public and private organisations that control resource 
and policies. NGOs engaged with climate change discussions, policy development and 
negotiations generally work at a third generational level (Lewis, 2010). These NGOs engage 
with other institutions working to inform policy and working for structural change, and one of 
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the significant roles they play is that of advocates, which is addressed further in the next 
section. 
 
3.2.1 NGOs as advocates 
 
A pertinent role of NGOs is that of advocacy, particularly when looking at NGO engagement 
with climate change discussions. Advocacy defined by The Advocates for Human Rights 
(2015, pg. 97) is "a set of organised actions aimed at influencing public policies, social 
attitudes, or political processes”. Further explained by UN Women (2012) advocacy is 
"designed to change systems…systems advocacy means efforts to change policy and practice 
at the local, national or international level; to change the situation for groups of individuals 
who share similar problems.  While systems advocacy works to improve the system to the 
benefit of individuals, it is a long-term approach to problem-solving requiring sustained effort." 
Southern Voices in Climate Change (2011) define advocacy as " a process of influencing 
selected people or institutions in order to achieve desired policy, practice, social, behavioural 
or political changes that will benefit particular groups." 
 
Within this role NGOs seek social change; whether it be in people's attitudes, the reform of 
state services or as they strive to inform policy and advocate for change at either a national or 
global level (Betsill & Corell, 2001. Desai, 2014). NGOs who engage with climate change 
discussions work predominantly as advocates, whether they are acting as representatives of 
national civil society, indigenous groups, minority groups, specific negotiating blocs or 
women's groups. In their role as advocates, particularly in policy development, NGOs work to 
shape attitudes, practices and policies of those who have influence or power. Particularly those 
NGOs involved in public interest politics, which rely heavily on the power of ideas and in their 
ability to disseminate information, as they try to promote positive change.  Whether that change 
be in government or the development network, these NGOs are ultimately striving for broader 
structural change (Desai, 2014). 
 
Non-government organisations have the power as advocates to mobilise large groups, 
connecting networks and build alliances that when active, stand as models of bottom-up 
democracy. Bottom-up democracy can then prompt top-down political change (Desai, 2014). 
More recently, NGO influence in the international environmental negotiation field shows that 
they can affect the development of domestic policies on natural resources and the negotiation 
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of international treaties, slowly changing the perceptions of environmental problems (Betsill 
& Corell, 2001). 
 
When working as civil actors representing civil society, NGOs can work autonomously, 
bringing different actors into the political sphere, although their role to separate ties between 
government and donors is a point of contention. Moreover, the role NGOs can play when 
representing civil society ultimately allows for public opinion to be represented more broadly, 
including more voices in conversations. By encouraging and demanding good governance there 
is the ability to build social capacity, genuinely creating linkages and discussion between local 
levels, public voice and government (Betsill & Corell, 2001). 
 
However, one challenge researchers face when seeking to understand the role of NGOs and 
CSOs has been the inability to document their role in politics, mainly focused on environmental 
issues such as climate change, is due to a lack of literature. There is a range of reasons why it 
is difficult to draw conclusions from the current literature, particularly in the field of 
environmental based NGOs. The first reason is that all studies related to the environment and 
NGOs are often treated as a single body of research. Secondly, there is a lack of understanding 
about what ‘influence' means and how to understand and identify the influence of NGOs. 
Lastly, there is no explanation of the mechanism that causes linkages between NGOs and the 
outcomes of international negotiations (Pandey, 2015). There is a need for understanding the 
specific roles of NGOs by distinguishing the distinct positions they hold and the political areas 
they operate in. Moreover, there is a need to define what influence means, and to understand 
what mechanisms NGOs use to influence international negotiations. 
 
This section has examined the roles of NGOs particularly that of NGOs as advocates. The 
discussion of advocacy highlights three main functions of NGOs. The first being the changes 
they seek both in policy and understanding, as they desire to engage and influence those with 
the power to shape policy. The second area is NGOs understanding the influence that large 
numbers of people can have, and their ability in mobilising large groups to create pressure and 
deepen the voice of civil society. Thirdly, NGOs aim to engage civil society groups in political 
discussions. This discussion has asserted, that there are holes in the literature surrounding 
climate change and the role of NGOs. Understanding the role of NGOs allows us to position 
NGOs not only in the context of development literature but also to understand the vast roles 
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NGOs have within development practice and their engagement with civil society, which is 
further examined in the following section. 
3.2 NGOs and civil society 
 
Civil society represents a broad and varying range of groups and individuals made up of a 
network of organisations, communities and networks of people that stand between the 
individual and the modern state. NGOs are just one type of organisation within civil society 
(Banks, Hulme, 2012). Although ‘civil society' is commonplace in the lexicon of development, 
there is broad, often overlapping understanding of the meaning of the term, considering who 
the different actors are within civil society and who represents civil society. ‘Civil society' was 
used by Gramsci in his Prison Notebooks released in the 1950's in his definition of the term 
state, claiming that the state was made up of political society and civil society (Katz, 2010). 
The term civil society has increasingly been used in global processes and international 
negotiations, as civil society groups seek to represent themselves in global discussions (Lewis 
& Kanji, 2009). 
 
NGOs often claim to represent civil society or a particular group within civil society. 
Depending on the role individual NGO assumes, their connections to the groups they claim to 
represent and how they relate and interact with broader civil society varies. This variation 
occurs depending on the historical roots, their core focus and the locations in which they have 
grown (Banks, Hulme, 2012). NGOs in their activities support specific groups. When NGOs 
focus their intentions on ‘demand-side approach' rather than as service providers, there is an 
ability to empower groups of people, giving a platform from which the voices of the people 
can be heard, allowing for individuals to articulate their perspectives and positions. When 
NGOs act in this way, it allows for NGOs to be real actors of civil society (Fowler, 2000).  
 
Ciplet, Roberts, Khan (2015a) describe three different types of civil society actors that exist 
within climate change negotiations: NGOs and academics, social movements and NGOs, and 
grassroots groups. NGOs and academics typically engage with the state in negotiations in order 
to achieve incremental change and are often pragmatic concerning their approach and the 
outcomes they aim to achieve. Social Movements and NGOs have a more radical agenda; 
however, they cannot often work with governments and lack ties to power in order to achieve 
change. The third and final group are those connected to the grassroots; these actors work at a 
locally rooted level with locally rooted strategies and lack involvement in negotiations. 
Page | 29  
 
Traditional overseas development assistance has allowed NGOs to expand their reach, through 
the groups and communities in which they engage, ultimately expanding the space which they 
occupy within civil society. However, this has been in a manner that has not always facilitated 
the pathways through which marginalised communities can engage with political and economic 
processes or challenge for more significant structural change.  Banks, Hulme, & Edwards 
(2014) conclude that while there needs to be a recognition of the broad range of voices from 
civil society, whether by donor nations or other organisations, that despite the intense focus on 
NGOs, their lack of ability to fully represent civil society has led to difficulties. Regardless of 
the ability for networked transnational NGO's to build capacity and accountability in response 
to both social and environmental problems that are outside the realm of national control, these 
groups are also limited in their function by nation states and are often side lined in the policy 
process (Derman, 2012). 
 
The UNFCCC formed the Marrakech Partnership for Global Climate Action  after the 
Conference of Parties 22, in order to support and promote collaboration between state actors 
and non-state actors, including  a large variety of groups: civil society, the private sector, 
financial institutions, cities and other subnational authorities, local communities and 
indigenous peoples. This development is a recognition by the UNFCCC of the role all civil 
society actors have to play in climate change negotiations, acknowledging the global scope of 
climate change and the role everyone has in tackling the issues both present now and in the 
future. This approach further recognises that policymakers alone do not have the answers to 
solve climate change and that the scope for civil society engagement is broad, whether it be in 
framing climate change negotiations or in NGOs’ role as knowledge experts (Ciplet, Roberts, 
& Khan, 2015c). Exploring the role NGOs have in current climate change discourse allows us 
to see how they are engaging in different ways.  In the next section, I extend this analysis to 
look at how NGOs engage with political institutions and the structures in which they function, 
as seek to effect change. 
 
3.3 NGO engagement with political institutions 
 
Development and development actors have long been an apparatus of the state. The colonial 
ideologies of the enlightenment era have shaped both postcolonial practices and ideas. In the 
aftermath of World War Two, development was a new tool promoted and used by western 
nations, intended to reduce poverty and encourage economic growth in the LDCs. The policies 
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and economic underpinnings of western nations were forced on developing nations, as the way 
to ‘develop'. Ideologies exemplified western nations as normal, and therefore seen as a target 
model for any development and non-western nations as ‘other' and were the dominant 
underpinnings of the development rhetoric. Moreover, both ‘whiteness' and western nations 
symbolised authority, expertise and knowledge, a notion that still exists today (Craggs, 2014). 
 
NGOs vary in how they engage in political discussions. Some NGOs engage directly with the 
national government through Ministry’s, Ministers and government representatives. While 
others engage in political discussions indirectly, through community knowledge dissemination 
or public awareness raising campaigns. What these activities result in is how political an NGO 
may be perceived to be (Ghosh, 2009). NGOs like many other political institutions may 
compete or engage with other political actors in order to negotiate as intermediaries between 
the state, civil society and citizens in their activities (Ghosh, 2009). 
 
A robust civil society plays a role in strengthening democracy. If NGOs have the ability to 
increase participation in the public realm, then there will be increased political engagement, 
especially for marginalised groups. Blair (1997) believes that the very presence of an NGO 
within a given nation shows a sense that there is a desire to be more democratic in their 
activities or outlook. However, the notion that despite what development discourse represents 
and strongly advocates for, development practices ultimately become a depoliticised process, 
removed from the political nature of interventions. Instead, the process of development has 
become a process of simple solutions, avoiding politicisation, treating the process of 
development as purely technocratic. Ferguson argues that the overall effect of the development 
agenda has been to "de-politicise" the ideas and arguments behind development and strengthen 
bureaucratic power in the process (Ferguson, 1990).  
 
NGOs operate in two distinct aspects of the political context in which they operate. The first is 
the way an NGO mobilises the resources it has access to, how they use these resources to 
sustain themselves and the political context in which they work and how this determines the 
relationships they have with both donors and social movements. Secondly, how the promotion 
of democracy is a result of the relationships NGOs foster between the state and civil society. 
Through the encouragement of participation, NGOs seek the engagement of both civil society 
and the state, and as a result, promote democracy and political engagement (Ghosh, 2009). 
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There are two reasons why NGOs fail to meet their desired goals. Firstly, due to the funding 
ties they have with donors, they are often restricted from being able to challenge the 
governments or the institutions which fund them. In this process their autonomy as independent 
actors is diminished, meaning there is less room for them to be political institutions of change. 
Secondly, due to their close ties with donors and governments, they are often side-lined in 
development processes, being purely viewed as implementors and only capable of technocratic 
aid processes. This process ultimately results in depoliticised NGOs who are unable to 
represent the communities or positions they set out to represent in the beginning (Banks, Hulme 
& Edwards (2015). 
 
Ciplet, Roberts, Khan (2015a) believe there are three main reasons why NGOs have failed 
while representing civil society groups in their responses to address climate change. The first 
being a lack of resources and links to those who have the power. Large international NGOs, 
who approach climate change discussions with a reformist approach do have the ties to those 
with power. However, due to their positioning, they have limited leverage in which to push 
governments or negotiators. They have not shown a commitment to change or to alter political 
notions nor do they challenge existing power relations, often acting as ‘norm entrepreneurs' 
without the power to create transformational norm changes. They also are seen to take a soft 
approach to negotiations and make weak demands. Secondly, Ciplet, Roberts, & Khan (2015a) 
believe civil society has failed when trying to create either a viable or a coordinated strategy 
for building any strength in their approach. When any moment where they could be of 
significant influence has arisen, civil society has fallen short due to a lack of coordination. 
Lastly, they believe civil society has failed to acknowledge and engage with alternative 
governance frameworks, instead only focusing on United Nations climate processes, 
neglecting other potential actions for climate change. 
 
This section has described how NGOs engage with political institutions. The way in which 
NGOs work is inherently political and as such they are political institutions in their own right. 
To further the understanding of NGOs engaging with political institutions the following section 
focuses on understanding power and the power structures that bind the functions of political 
and international institutions. 
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3.4 NGO engagement with power structures 
 
Any discourse within the development nexus involves the idea of power, whether discussing 
partnerships, empowerment, accountability, global order or the historical notions that underlie 
such discussions. Relationships formed within the development nexus are vast and complex, 
and many actors are involved, playing various roles, fulfilling a diversity of needs and 
embedded within complex hierarchies of power. A lack of symmetry within aid discourse has 
been foundational, whether discussing political, economic or cultural power. The structures of 
economics, politics and culture on which international development aid are formed determine 
the processes and institutional framework that govern the international development sector. 
 
Betsill and Corell (2001) highlight the difficulty in defining the terms ‘power' and ‘influence', 
both of which are crucial and intertwined concepts when discussing the role of NGOs, 
particularly in the instance of global political negotiations. How influence relates to power, and 
how these words are both perceived varies depending on perspective, also given the context 
and the manner in which influence or power is used and expressed. 
 
Power is most commonly described and initially linked to the power of the nation state, 
including both the power one nation-state has over another nation-state, but also the idea that 
the state has power over its people and civil society. Gramsci (1999), describes a complex and 
developed perspective of power, and its relation to the state and civil society, which he 
describes as hegemony. This relationship between the state, civil society and hegemony are 
complex and multifaceted. Hegemony is the idea that power is expressed through the process 
of political domination through ideological domination. This dominance is achieved by the 
people who have the most power, using the state, culture, media, education and religion to 
reinforce the ideologies which support their position, reinforcing their position of power. This 
concept is further explained by Katz (2010) who discusses the cyclical reinforcement of power, 
“within this relationship civil society plays a dual and dialectic role, as an agent of government 
and the hegemonic forces that control the state, which on the one hand is used as an instrument 
to maintain the current relations of power in society”(pg. 2). The role that NGOs play in civil 
society can either maintain the hegemonic dominance or as described by Katz (2010) can 
become a place of counter-hegemonic movements, as "civil society is the arena of creativity 
where counter-hegemonic forces develop alternatives to the hegemonic ideologies and 
practices, and from where, under specific conditions, reformist processes can emerge” (pg. 7). 
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The ideas of Gramsci (1999) are predominant in the notion of power politics and are heavily 
used in the field of international relations. Goddard & Nexon (2016) define global power 
politics as “involving politics based on the use of power to influence the actions and decisions 
of actors that claim, or exercise, authority over a political community” (pg. 6). Further defining 
the study of power politics as, “in its primary form, an inquiry into the mechanisms, 
instruments, and logic by which such actors enhance their influence in global politics." (pg. 6). 
States continue to expand their dependence on international institutions and law to examine 
their conflicts and pursue their interests, whether these interests be economic or political. 
Hierarchies condition the dynamics of global power politics, and at the centre of power, politics 
are processes of collective mobilisation (Goddard & Nexon, 2016). Collective mobilisation as 
it involves collective action focused on expanding influence at the detriment of a given other. 
Secondly, as it involves the relations, transactions, decisions and practices of actors, they exude 
or exercise authority over a political community. 
 
The definitions and concepts taken from the international relations lexicon are interesting given 
the ways in which international negotiating blocs, nation-states, civil society and development 
actors respond and represent themselves in international negotiations. While the lexicon used 
in negotiations softens the framing of such debates, the inherent notion of hierarchy and power 
is just as prevalent. When reflecting on these broader ideas concerning development and the 
representation by NGOs, Nair (2013) discusses dominant representations within the aid-
development nexus. Often what development claims to achieve, through dominant policy 
criteria and in its purpose and goals, with such terminology as ‘good governance' or 
‘empowerment' power asymmetries are often reproduced. The danger is that in efforts to 
empower people regenerate inequalities of power, particularly representational power between 
that of donor and recipient. This idea describes the way in which ‘authority' is prescribed to a 
particular side of the aid binary of donor and recipient when defining the problems of aid and 
determining solutions. Ideas around the various modalities of aid and the structures of aid, 
particularly that of representation, highlight how power is regenerated ultimately reproducing 
a hegemonic aid discourse. 
 
McEwan (2014) draws on the literature on power and hegemony in development specifically 
the nature of power relations in the process of development, stating that through the discourse 
of development, representing specific ideas while excluding others "The texts of development 
contain silences" (McEwan, 2014, pg. 138).  The question at hand is why and how are such 
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voices are silenced? By taking a postcolonial lens on such questions, the discourse of 
development is framed and shaped in such a way it reinforces the dominance and power of 
ideas. The products of development are circulated in text, reports and policy briefs, 
perpetuating the expressions of development literature into practice, promoting and justifying 
real-life interventions that have real-life outcomes for those affected. 
 
By which mechanism does one gain the power or authority to represent or speak for someone 
else or to make decisions for someone else. Who creates the platform on which one can stand 
and speak for another, is western hegemony consuming the voices of the other in order to insert 
it into a western narrative? It is no longer acceptable to represent the other, to view the other, 
the global South as passive, unable to speak or represent themselves McEwan (2014). There 
has been a significant leap in the inclusion of a diverse field of voices in both policy and 
practice through grass-roots movements and participatory development, but as always there is 
still room for more. 
 
In examining the role of NGOs, and how they engage with civil society, political institutions 
and power structures embedded in international relations and negotiations, I continue to look 
at a proposed framework that approaches analysis of climate change negotiations. 
 
3.5 Approaches to climate change negotiations 
 
In the following section, I build on the discussions on the role of NGOs, NGOs engagement 
with civil society, NGOs engagement with political institutions and NGOs engagement with 
power structures. I discuss three elements of a Strategic Power Analytical Framework 
proposed by Ciplet, Roberts, Khan (2015a) in which I take a strategic view, a layered view and 
an historical view of global climate change governance structures, from which I discuss the 
application to the role of NGOs engaging in these structures.  
 
3.5.1 Framing power in climate change governance structures 
 
Ciplet, Roberts, Khan (2015a) propose taking a strategic view in analysing climate change 
governance power structures among the varying actors of civil society, the state and the market. 
The authors look at how transnational hybrid coalitions compete as they engage both in the 
preservation and challenging of ideas and operations and the resulting organisation of society 
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and analysing the dominance of alliances and the assertion of dominance through ideological, 
economic or military forces. This analysis breaks down both the legitimate and coercive forms 
of power by which coalitions interact strategically to either exert or challenge social change 
(Ciplet, Roberts, Khan, 2015b). This approach draws heavily on Gramsci's concept of 
hegemony, urging us to recognise how the governing ruling coalitions can reinforce themselves 
by shaping and defining what the accepted spectrum of reasonable solutions to climate change 
politics are (Gramsci, 1999). 
 
This idea is further broken down by Nasiritousi, Hjerpe & Linner (2016) in the identification 
of the sources of power used by non-state actors in international negotiations. Recognising that 
non-state actors lack traditional forms of political power, they do however have alternative 
forms of power, from which they can exert influence/power. Nasiritousi, Hjerpe & Linner 
(2016) draw on the fundamental skills and resources culminated to form alternative sources of 
power within international institutions and climate change governance structures, that build 
their intellectual, membership, political or financial bases. Nasiritousi, Hjerpe & Linner (2016) 
build on this by outlining critical sources from which NGOs base their power, ultimately 
allowing them to gain authority in international global governance systems. These include 
symbolic power (legitimacy/moral claims), cognitive(knowledge/expertise), social (access to 
networks), leverage (access to those with legitimate forms of power and the decision making 
processes) and material (access to resources and positionality in the global economy).  They 
argue similarly to Ciplet, Roberts, & Khan, (2015b) that the range of use of these alternative 
power sources varies depending on the actor, and that there is a need to differentiate between 
different non-state actors, as they play a diverse range of roles as they engage with global 
governance structures and work within the coalitions they form. 
 
3.5.2 Exploring systems of global governance 
 
Ciplet et al’s second level of analysis is a layered view and is used to analyse the different, 
fragmented and historically derived systems of global governance (Ciplet, Roberts, & Khan, 
2015b). It is these structures that have enabled both distinct forms of social mobilisation and 
varying institutional approaches used in addressing or constraining global problems. This 
section of the analysis breaks down how the power struggles, identified in the strategic view, 
interact with the current global governance structures (Ciplet, Roberts, & Khan, 2015b) 
focusing on how competing coalitions identify themselves and define their interests and how 
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these coalitions navigate the global governance structures and the different institutions which 
they engage,  by looking at how they reproduce, secure or challenge the relationships which 
perpetuate dominance and inequality in the international system. Nasiritousi, Hjerpe & Linner 
(2016) express the need for more research based in this area, examining which non-state actors 
are successful in employing agency in global governance systems, and how different non-state 
actors are more or less successful as authorities across global governance activities. This 
analytical framework puts a heavy focus on the definitions of influence, which they propose 
can be used as a guide for gathering clear evidence about the influence of NGOs. 
 
Non-state actors, particularly NGOs, influence as opposed to exert any formal power. NGOs 
influence comes through their ability to persuade, and any other formal expression of power, 
other than influencing, would lead to exclusion from negotiations. Often an NGOs’ biggest 
strength is their ability to build specialised knowledge and become experts in specific areas 
related to specific negotiations (Betsill & Corell, 2001). As experts, it is NGOs who have the 
ability to frame an issue, shape the agendas, construct the language used, persuade the 
negotiators and ultimately form the outcomes of negotiations, when they are successful. NGOs 
work within and outside of the coalitions they form, to analyse how they gain any intentional 
transmission of information and whether they attain any of their goals by looking at the 
outcomes achieved by the NGO within the international governance structures (Betsill & 
Corell, 2001). 
 
3.5.3 Historic global order structures 
 
Lastly, the historical analysis, proposed by Ciplet, Roberts, & Khan (2015a) explores the notion 
of power by looking at the embedded struggles of the historically specific structures of global 
order, the class structures that underpin this order and the contention and dissent that threaten 
the stability of this global structure (Ciplet, Roberts, & Khan. 2015b). This section of the 
analysis looks at how historic structures of dominance and world order are constructed and 
conditioned, and how they are conditioned by the coalitions and the struggles that surround 
them (Ciplet, Roberts, & Khan, 2015b). In this, I consider an unequal ecological exchange, 
whereby pollution and environmentally destructive production are concentrated in the poorest 
countries, where the extraction of resources and labour power are used for the promotion of 
global capitalism benefitting the power of the elites and hegemony of predominantly western 
nations. These historically engrained conditions of inequality play a crucial role in shaping the 
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power relations of nations in the negotiation of global environmental discussions (Ciplet, 
Roberts, & Khan, 2015b). This power struggle exemplifies the global governance structures 
and the effective way they shape the forms of climate governance, particularly within the 
UNFCCC. Looking at the structures of the UNFCCC, and the official categorisation of both 
countries and non-state actors into negotiating blocs or constituency groups allows for the 
exploration of the forming of coalitions, on the basis they have been formed and accepted and 




The last section discussed three theoretical concepts for analysing the role of NGOs in 
international negotiations and the influence they have in this context. Considering the above 
approaches, can inform the development of a framework to explore the context of loss and 
damage policy development and discussions. Understanding the international context of 
negotiations allows for a more informed discussion of influence of both NGOs and civil society 
actors, when developing policy in response to international negotiations. An integrated 
approach to understanding the role of NGOs, civil society, politics and power inform the 
conditions under which negotiations take place and the resulting national policy. Drawing from 
the three-part analysis of Ciplet, Roberts, & Khan, 2015b, and the other literature covered in 
this chapter, I now propose a theoretical framework. 
  
Table 3.1: Analysis framework for national level policy, international climate 
negotiations and the interplay between them 
 
Focus Concept Specifics 
Analysis of National level 
policy development 
The expression of ideas, 
actions and operations, that 
are promoting social 
change.  
1.1 The roles different 
stakeholders take on in local 
level discussions  
1.2 Representation by 
stakeholders and their 
organisations in the roles they 
play 
1.3 Ideas stakeholders represent   
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Analysis of International 
level negotiations 
Interaction with global 
climate change governance 
structures; how 
Bangladesh/ coalition 
groups identify themselves 
and define their interests.  
2.1 The roles different 
stakeholders take on in 
international negotiations 
2.2 Ideas stakeholders represent   
2.3 Alignment of stakeholders 
within international negotiations  
2.4 Messages stakeholders try to 
send/ represent within 
institutional frameworks  
 
 
Analysis of the interplay 
between national level 




global climate change 
governance; analysis of 
how historically engrained 
conditions of inequality 
play a crucial role in 
shaping the power relations 
and how these are being 
challenged 
3.1 How the maintaining or 
reshaping of any historical 
underpinnings of the current 
negotiations and coalitions is 
reflected 
3.2 How power plays a role in 
reshaping arguments of 
traditional ODA in the context of 
loss and damage.  
 
 
Source: Author          
                                             
The above table presents a framework for the analysis of national-level policy development, 
international level negotiations and the interplay between the two. CSOs present at 
international meetings and are involved in negotiations, as members of civil society or as 
observers. CSOs are often the actors who play the same role of influencers, advisors, advocates 
and implementors when it comes to national-level responses to climate change policy 
development in their given country or countries of work. Moreover, it is essential to understand 
both the national and international context and the actions of the CSOs taking place and 
understanding the positionality of Bangladeshi stakeholders involved in the development of 
loss and damage national level policy. Through exploring the interplay of local level 
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development, I reflect on the current status of international negotiations and how Bangladeshi 
stakeholders are influencing the international discussions, through local level policy 
development and what this means in the international climate change landscape. 
 
Given this discussion on NGOs and CSOs and the broad range of actors from civil society I 
have engaged with throughout this research. I will now solely use the term CSO, which 
encapsulates better the range of civil society members, including academics, negotiators, 
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The purpose of this research is to explore the context of how key stakeholders within 
Bangladesh are negotiating (the climate change-based) discourse on loss and damage at both 
the national and the global level.  Explaining the research design and methods gives an 
understanding of the considerations made and the planning and process that took place. 
Presentation of this chapter is in five parts. The initial discussion focuses on the ethics of 
research.  
 
4.2 Ethical considerations 
 
The research has undergone a Development Studies in-house ethics process and has been found 
to comply with the ethical principles required by Massey Universities Human Ethics 
Committee.  
 
Various considerations need to be made in line with ethical principles when undertaking 
research. The primary ethical principles are “Autonomy, Avoidance of Harm, Benefit, Justice, 
Special Relationships, Whakapapa, Tika, Manäkitanga,  and Mana” (Massey University, 2017, 
pg. 6-7). Following the Massey Code of Ethical Conduct, ethical considerations need to be 
addressed with any research and are of most importance when dealing with human participants. 
There is a need to respect both participants and researchers in this process. The researcher's 
role is to allow for a platform where respect is upheld, alongside other fundamental principles 
from Massey’s Code of Ethical Conduct for Research, Teaching and Evaluations Involving 
Human Participants (Massey University, 2017). 
 
Individuals involved in the process of the research need to be informed about the reasoning, 
purpose and nature of the study and the role they play in the research. This is the reasoning 
behind informed consent; participants are not obliged to be involved in any way and have the 
right to choose not to be involved at any point. Researchers must ensure the participants are 
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both informed, comfortable with the nature of the research and what the outcomes of the 
research may include (Scheyvens, 2014). 
 
In the context of researching foreign countries, a researcher needs to be well aware of the 
cultural differences, including the differences in systems, politics, privilege, positionality, and 
positions of power (Stewart-Withers, 2016). Researchers need to allow for alternative realities, 
worldviews and perspectives, creating a comfortable and safe environment for those 
participating; this includes traditions around formalities and process. All voices need to be 
allowed to be voiced and listened to, not just allowing for hearing dominant voices (O'Leary, 
2004). 
 
Privacy and confidentiality will also play a role in the ethical considerations required in this 
research. Maintaining confidentiality is crucial as a participant my entrust the researcher with 
sensitive information (Stewart-Withers, 2016).  The identification of a person who relays such 
information may not want to remain anonymous as it may impede on their workplace, position 
or safety, particularly in the context of this discussion and the political nature of loss and 
damage. However, other participants may want their voice and positioning voiced (Scheyvens, 




Positionality is the recognition of the role and background the researcher plays in conducting 
the research, how that may influence the type of data collected and the interpretation of the 
research. There needs to be a recognition by the researcher of their positionality, which can 
include their race religion, class and life experiences, as this can also influence how participants 
choose to engage with the researcher. Being aware of your own positionality as a researcher 
and acknowledging this does not weaken the research as long as it is recognised (Stewart-
Withers, Banks, McGregor & Meo-Sewabu, 2014). Being aware of my own positionality and 
taking a self-reflective and critical perspective on my position, the relationships I already hold 
with participants within Bangladesh will allow for a more sound and deeper interpretation of 
the research. 
 
I am a 30-year-old white female raised in New Zealand, a developed’ nation. My upbringing 
has been a middle-upper class, agnostic/atheist background. I have had the privilege of both 
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coming from an educated background and have had the experience myself to gain previous 
postgraduate qualifications. In the context of Bangladesh, I am considered young, however as 
a foreigner the treatment I received in comparison to someone local and a female of my age is 
vastly different.  
 
I have spent the last four years living in between Bangladesh and New Zealand. During my 
time in Bangladesh, as mentioned in the introduction, I have lived in both rural Bangladesh 
and the capital Dhaka. I have been learning Bangla during this period and have gained a 
relatively good understanding of both the language and culture within Bangladesh. I have 
worked with and for the International Centre for Climate Change and Development (ICCCAD) 
for the past year and a half. International Centre for Climate Change and Development 
(ICCCAD) is one of the most active research and capacity building organisations working on 
climate change and development in Bangladesh. I have also worked for five years as a 
technician in New Zealand’s largest Agricultural research centre in New Zealand, in which I 
worked in the climate change research team. Moreover, I have spent some years studying for 
a science degree in ecology and geology. Given my background and having had experience in 
this field and the context of Bangladesh, I believe I have a sound knowledge base for research 
based on climate change discussions based in Bangladesh. 
 
4.4 Qualitative research 
 
This research aims to gain a greater understanding of the context of policy development around 
loss and damage in Bangladesh. Research questions posed in order to explore further the 
perspectives and opinions of those involved and those representing themselves or an 
organisation, this ultimately helps to find a more in-depth interpretation of the subject matter 
(O’Leary, 2010).  
 
Qualitative research focuses on the experiences and opinions of people, seeking an 
understanding of people’s attitudes, interpretations, value systems and concerns. Qualitative 
research occurs in a naturalistic setting; this speaks to undertaking fieldwork.  Fieldwork aims 
to collect data that explains and gains an understanding of the perceptions and experiences of 
an individual or a group, through understanding people’s values, concerns, hopes, motivations, 
culture or lifestyle (Stewart-Withers, Banks, McGregor & Meo-Sewabu, 2014). 
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Roulston and Choi (2017) explain qualitative research as trying to represent the perspectives 
and outlooks of the participants in the research. Qualitative research explores the conditions 
within which people live and gain insight into the research context, by understanding concepts 
that frame or explain human social behaviour. Qualitative research focuses on using multiple 
evidence sources. 
 
The techniques used in qualitative research aim to produce and build on current theory and 
literature, rather than test a hypothesis (Stewart-Withers, Banks, McGregor & Meo-Sewabu, 
2014). Loss and damage is a new discussion within climate change research and theory, in the 
minds of many it is a topic of the future, it is in this context this research aims to build some 
understanding and explore the social and international structures that bind the development of 
this process. Qualitative research methods are employed to examine the development of policy 
around loss and damage, hearing and exploring a variety of voices, and considering the lives, 
cultures and livelihoods of those affected. 
 
4.5 Sampling and data collection methods 
 
Employing a range of methods throughout the research period generated a range of data that 
can be used later for analysis. The methods used included document analysis, semi-structured 
observations, semi-structured interviews and a reflection journal. Defining each of these 
methods and a justification for their selection and use within the field is given below. Snowball 
sampling and triangulation in pursuance of well-rounded and verified data are also used. 
 
4.5.1 Document analysis 
 
Document analysis is a way of understanding the participants through examining the texts that 
they produce (O'leary, 2010). These reproduced documents are generated for a general 
audience rather than for the researched.  It is the researcher's role to find and collect the relevant 
documents to review. Through examining different documents, different stakeholders produce, 
and present will enable some level of understanding of their positionality, understanding the 
person or the institution that person represents, and uncovering any bias they may have 
(O'leary, 2010). Document analysis is a central element of the process of triangulation which 
cross-references the observations and the interview data collected. UNFCCC documents, 
decision texts, alongside publications and newsletters from NGOs were all used to verify 
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certain statements, happenings and timelines reported by participants or about specific texts or 
documents referred to by participants. 
 
4.5.2 Semi-structured observation 
 
Structured observation is a systematic data collection method, which requires the researcher to 
continuously negotiate their own bias and understand that in certain circumstances potentially 
impact the participants (O’leary, 2010). In semi-structured observations, the researcher is 
looking for presumed or predetermined criteria, whether that be issues, behaviour, actions or 
people. However, it allows for observation and recording of unplanned or unexpected 
observations (O’leary, 2010). 
This research applies semi-structured observations to the UNFCCC climate change 
negotiations. The UNFCCC climate negotiations are a complex and multifaceted environment. 
At any point during the negotiations, more than six open meetings are being held, numerous 
closed meetings, various group meetings and civil society side events taking place. Throughout 
the two weeks attending COP24, my ability to understand the different platforms taking place 
increased. During the negotiations, my ability to arrange where my time would be spent best 
throughout this time improved, enabling improved exposer to the most relevant streams to 
follow in terms of meeting the requirements of my research. As a result, there is no claim that 
the observations were entirely systematic nor comprehensive. However, the observations that 
took place were exploratory in manner, paralleling the nature of the negotiations; dynamic, 
everchanging, coincidental and overlapping. Access to attend COP24 was dependent on having 
access to a badge, in my case an “observer” badge, which means that plenary sessions and 
informal meetings, classified “open meetings” were able to be attended. However, informal-
informal meetings and other unannounced meetings are closed to those with “observer” badges. 
All and any meeting can be announced as closed at any stage as per the request of negotiators. 
 
4.5.3 Semi-structured interviews 
 
A semi-structured interview is a method in which the researcher has a set of specific questions. 
However, the questions were not used in the interview in a manner that constrained the 
conversation or manipulated points of discussions. Semi-structured interviews are considered 
to be flexible, allowing for a more natural style of communication and for any interesting 
tangents that may take place to be pursued (O’Leary, 2010). The use of semi-structured 
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interviews allows for some questions not to be asked, given the context and flow of the 
conversation (Laws, 2003). The interviews used in this research were on a one-on-one basis, 
this allowed people to express their opinions freely and for the researcher to guide the process 
of the interview (O’Leary, 2010). Given this, I had a preset list of written questions, that could 
guide the flow of the interviews. Some questions were added or subtracted depending on how 
relevant they were to an individual, given their position and their level of engagement with loss 
and damage nationally or internationally. Also depending on the answers given by participants, 
alternative questions were asked in order to gain clarity or expand on a point that had been 
made by a given participant. All participants gave verbal consent to being and were asked if 
they would want to remain anonymous. Given the small circles and the political nature of loss 
and damage, as a researcher, I decided at the conclusion of the semi-structured interviews to 
keep all participants anonymous so that there was no risk of damage to an interviewee’s 
reputation or position.  
Table 4.1: List and Description of Participants 
 
Interviewee list  Description 
Participant one (P1) 
 
P1 is an advisor to the LDCs during the negotiations, an active 
member of civil society, and academic who has published 
multiple papers on loss and damage and someone who have 
lived and worker in Bangladesh working on climate change 
research.  
Participant two (P2) 
 
P2 is a Bangladeshi advisor to the LDCs and an advocate for 
loss and damage, from an academic and development 
background and a member of an NGO.  
Participant three (P3) 
 
P3 is a Bangladeshi delegate for the COP negotiations, a well 
published academic on climate change and a member of an 
NGO 
Participant four (P4) 
 
P4 is an academic who has been following a tracking loss and 
damage in the negotiations as an observer for the past 5 years. 
P4 is a published academic and has lived and researched in 
Bangladesh for many years.  
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Participant five (P5) 
 
P5 is a Bangladeshi figure who works for an NGO and is a 
member of the Bangladeshi delegation. P5 is well versed on all 
climate change matters and is an academic.  
Participant six (P6) 
 
P6 is an advisor to the LDCs for loss and damage negotiations 
and has worked extensively on loss and damage in an academic 
capacity 
Participant seven (P7) 
 
P7 is a well-known advocate for LDCs and is a member of the 
CAN network. P7 has written extensively on loss and damage 
and is a civil society member engaged with loss and damage as 
an observer at the negotiations.  
Participant eight (P8) 
 
P8 is a member of the UNFCCC on loss and damage.  
Participant nine (P9) 
 
P9 is a well-known advocate for LDCs and is a member of the 
CAN network. P9 has written extensively on loss and damage 
and is a civil society member engaged with loss and damage as 
an observer at the negotiations. 
Source: Author          
 
4.5.4 Journal of reflection 
 
A reflection journal is a way to ensure a reflective approach in the research process; this helps 
in the process of acknowledging the positionality of the researcher. Rather than attempting to 
manage the values of the researcher or assumptions, a reflection journal consciously aims to 
recognise the values and positionality of the researcher (Ortlipp, 2008). Keeping a reflective 
journal allows for the practice of reflexivity during the process of the research, it provides for 
reflection on the researcher's experiences, including the encounters that take place and the 
relationships that develop throughout the field research (Stewart-Withers, Banks, McGregor & 
Meo-Sewabu, 2014). 
 
The reflection journal became a useful way of organising my time while at COP24. Every day 
I would set out the sessions I would aim to get into, work out whether these were open or 
closed, or whether these meetings would later be opened or closed to observers. Every morning, 
I attended the RINGO (Research and Independent Non-Governmental Organisations 
constituency to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change) meeting which laid out 
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the different meetings of the day, allowed for researchers to make connections and work out 
where smaller organisation meetings would be held. Through this connection, I was then able 
to attend the daily CAN (Climate Action Network) Loss and Damage meetings, which provided 
daily feedback from observer organisations related explicitly to loss and damage. This meeting 
provided an excellent overview, insight and reflection from multiple people regarding loss and 
damage negotiations and side events that I was then able to reflect on within my reflection 
journal. Another daily meeting I would attend at the end of the day, was the Bangladeshi 
delegation meeting. This meeting allowed for Bangladeshi delegates to reflect on the different 
streams each member attended. The delegation members opened these meetings to any civil 
society members representing Bangladeshi NGOs. This opportunity gave me insight into the 
delegation members and the coordination of the Bangladeshi delegation. 
 
4.5.5 Participant recruitment and snowball sampling 
 
Snowball sampling is a technique used by asking one participant to refer you to the next 
respondent, whom they think is a suitable participant for the research. Snowball sampling is 
also known as “chain referral sampling” or “respondent driven-sampling” (O’Leary, 2010). As 
I had previously worked with the International Centre for Climate Change and Development 
(ICCCAD), I had some understanding and knew ICCCAD worked in the field of loss and 
damage. ICCCAD had already been involved with policy recommendations around loss and 
damage. For this research the chain of referral began with ICCCAD and this arose because I 
was aware that they were active in the field of loss and damage policy development. 
Recommendations from ICCCAD participants then let me understand the building of networks 
and coalitions, both within Bangladesh and Internationally. These participants recommended 
further participants, creating a snowball effect of participants for the research (O’Leary, 2010). 
 
The chain of referral led to introductions to members of civil society who were engaged with 
loss and damage both nationally and internationally through people I had already made contact 
with or interviewed. This process was particularly useful for making contacts during the 
negotiations. Due to the busy nature of the negotiations, it was useful for someone to introduce 
me to people who are relevant to loss and damage negotiations, as it is easier to grab someone’s 
attention and be remembered if you have a point of reference. Especially as there was little 
time to interview people during the negotiations, it was helpful to use this with follow up email 
requests for interviews. 




The use of multiple data points, known as triangulation, is a recommended strategy when 
conducting qualitative research (O’Leary, 2010). Triangulation aims to make a stronger and 
more robust piece of research, through the use of multiple lines of actions, which describes the 
use of various data sources, various methods, multiple theories and in some cases numerous 
researchers. Triangulation is not merely the use of multiple data sources, but rather the attempt 
to relate the different sources of data, to validate the data collected (Berg, 2007, pg. 15). In this 
research, triangulation of the findings took place through the use of multiple data sources and 
methods described above, and different theoretical underpinnings (described in the previous 
chapter). 
 
4.6 Limitations, constraints and bias 
 
There is a need to acknowledge the limitation, constraints and biases of the research, and how 
these can influence the results from the fieldwork and shape the factors considered during 
analysis.  
 
4.6.1 Limitations and constraints 
 
As globalisation brings us all closer together in the context of the climate change issue that will 
affect us all, there is a need for discussions and qualitative research that is both linguistically 
and culturally representative. The recent 2018 Bangladesh elections hampered my ability to 
interview government members/ ministers. In some sense, this is because of the political 
instability surrounding the elections, but also because members of the government are busy 
and focused on the elections. Moreover, questioning by a researcher at a politically sensitive 
time was not welcomed. 
 
Following the elections, members of ministries changed, specifically the Ministry of Disaster 
Management and the Ministry of Environment and Climate Change, who are involved at the 
national level and international level for climate change negotiations. New ministers have not 
necessarily been briefed or engaged in the specifics of loss and damage, which presented 
difficulties in interviewing them about the specifics of the proposed national mechanism. 
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In terms of the International negotiations, as described above, navigating such a vast and varied 
platform for the first time, meant that my ability to attend and capture all relevant information 
and meetings proved somewhat tricky. Meaning the meetings and events attended were 
reflective of the negotiations but in no way entirely systematic nor comprehensive. 
 
Loss and damage is a highly complex discussion, however the range of actors at the 
international level is relatively small. Not only are those involved a small group but the 
literature addressing loss and damage is also relatively limited. Overall loss and damage would 
be considered a limited field; however, it is growing, and more people are engaging in a more 
serious manner within the negotiations and within the literature.  
 
4.7 Reflecting on fieldwork experience and data collection 
 
The first and most apparent bias experienced during the research was my previous association 
with ICCCAD, the International Center for Climate Change and development. ICCCAD is one 
of the leading research centers on loss and damage within Bangladesh. While they have no 
specific programme working on loss and damage, members of ICCCAD are some of the most 
active and most visible civil society members pushing loss and damage national level policy 
development. My role at ICCCAD is the role of a Visiting Researcher and my association while 
beneficial to my research in regard to access to participants, conferences and attending COP24 
as a member of the ICCCAD observers’ group, definitely creates bias, both positive and 
negative. 
 
During COP24, I attended with an “observer” badge under a Bangladeshi organization, 
ICCCAD, that meant I was welcomed to attend the Bangladesh delegation meeting. These 
meetings were closed to all other people. Despite the fact the information discussed in these 
meetings was in a confidential context and under “The Chatham House Rule” 1 , the exposure 
to these meetings no doubt gave me as the researcher insight I would not have gained otherwise. 
 
1 “The Chatham House Rule is used throughout the world as an aid to free discussion of sensitive issues. It provides a way for 
speakers to openly discuss their views in private while allowing the topic and nature of the debate to be made public and 
contribute to a broader conversation. The Chatham House Rule reads as follows: When a meeting, or part thereof, is held under 
the Chatham House Rule, participants are free to use the information received, but neither the identity nor the affiliation of 
the speaker(s), nor that of any other participant, may be revealed.” Chatham House, (n.d) Chatham House Rule. Retrieved 
from https://www.chathamhouse.org/chatham-house-rule 
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Secondly, as I had an “observer” badge, I was only able to attend particular meetings within 
the negotiations. Meaning that closed meetings, that can be attended by delegation members 
and some other badges are not open to those with an “observer” badge. 
 
Lastly, as a member of an association under the RINGO, I was able to attend RINGO 
coordination meetings, these are morning briefing meetings, which allows coordination both 
online and off-line for organisations associated with RINGO. Also, some meetings during 
COP, with high observer attendance require a ticketing system, that allows for a set of members 
from groups such as RINGO, to attend. Attending the RINGO meeting allows for RINGO 
members to gain access to these ticketed meetings. RINGO also allows for online access to 
meeting notes from those who attended, for those who were unable to attend, offering a great 
source of documentation for RINGO members. 
 
4.7.1 Dhaka, Bangladesh reflections  
 
During the process of my masters, I lived and worked in Dhaka, which gave me a lengthy 
period to familiarise myself with the people, associations and groups working in the climate 
change space, specifically loss and damage. Having these connections, made it a lot easier to 
identify people who would be relevant to the research. This level of knowledge and connections 
worked both in my favour and against me. In some cases, people I had met knew both my 
association with ICCCAD or because they have seen me at conferences, within Dhaka, felt that 
I was as informed or more informed as them on loss and damage and as a result chose not to 
respond to an interview request. On the flip side, other people who were familiar with me and 
knew my name and association, readily agreed to be interviewed, which may not have 
happened as quickly if they had not known me. 
 
I did, however, face obstacles in trying to get interviews with government officials, this was 
due in some ways to the dynamics between ministries and ministry members (discussed in the 
findings section), alternately this was due to my interview period being both before and after 
the 2018 election period within Bangladesh. Due to the political tension around the elections 
and the subsequent change in ministry members, specifically within the Ministry of Disaster 
Management and the Ministry of Environment, it became impossible to manage interviews 
during this period. Despite ministry members agreeing to interviews in person, they later did 
not reply to my emails, which is unfortunate. 
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4.7.2 COP24, Katowice, Poland reflections  
 
Attending COP24 was an amazing research experience. Being an observer at the negotiations 
truly solidified the understanding of the interplay between national level policy development 
and the UNFCCC international negotiations. It allowed for the process and the outcomes of the 
negotiations to inform my research findings and allowed me to make contact with international 
negotiators, members of the UNFCCC and civil society members engaged in loss and damage, 
who later became key participants in this research. 
 
The difficulty with trying to interview people at the negotiations is that people are busy, 
whether they are contributing to side events, attending meetings or negotiating themselves, 
everyone has their agenda, making it difficult to ask people for interview times during COP. 
My tactic soon became to introduce myself, my research and follow this up readily with an 
email, requesting an interview after the closure of the COP. Most people were more responsive 
to this approach, and alternatively, those who seemed uninterested during the COP were the 
same people who later did not respond to interview requests. Participants I met at COP24, and 
who agreed to be interviewed all allowed me to contact them and interview them later through 
online meetings. 
 
4.8 Data analysis 
 
The process of data analysis started with a one-page reflection of my findings, highlighting key 
points. I followed this by creating a diagram of the findings I had highlighted. I arranged this 
diagram in a manner that reflected my research questions. I printed out all of my transcriptions, 
and highlighted quotes and allotted them into the sections, responding to the research questions, 
highlighting relevant and interesting quotes, slowly building a storyline both in response to the 
national and international context. From this, for each section, I created diagrams explaining 
the different themes found in each section and how they related to each other. This process 
helped in formalising the sections and sub-sections within the findings, allowing for analysis 
that aligned with the aim and the research questions and enabled me to be familiar with both 
the data and the overall outcomes of the data before I began formal analysis of the data. 
Following the above process allowed for the research questions to be central to the design of 
the findings.  
 




This chapter outlined the justifications, reasoning and methodology used throughout the 
research. The application of methodologies framed understandings and allowed for a practical 
understanding of the research that took place.  The researcher’s experiences during the research 
were outlined including the positionality of the researcher and the ethical considerations that 
were made throughout to ensure optimal ethical outcomes. The data handling and processing 
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CHAPTER 5: FLEEING FLOODS, DROUGHTS AND RISING SEA 
LEVELS: BANGLADESH CONTEXT; NGO’S, DEVELOPMENT AND 





Historically, Bangladesh has been heavily dependent on overseas development aid and NGO 
presence, and the country’s development has been significantly affected by these external 
factors. The relationship between NGOs and the Government of Bangladesh has influenced, 
and to some extent constrained, both Government and NGO responses to the impact of climate 
and climate change. In the past, Bangladesh has been vulnerable to both flooding and drought, 
and these climate challenges are exacerbated by climate change, including rising sea-levels, 
and extreme weather events, such as cyclones and storm surges. The government has been 
proactive in its response to both current and potential impacts of climate change, and its policies 
and actions reflect the particular vulnerability of Bangladesh to climate, as well as the influence 
of external players. These contextual features also frame discussion and plans on how best to 
address loss and damage both nationally and internationally. 
 
This chapter is the first chapter that engages directly with the Bangladesh context. The 
beginning of this chapter explores the Bangladesh context, its history, particularly as a country 
historically heavily dependent on overseas development aid and the presence of NGOs, thereby 
gaining a better understanding of the rooted historical dependence and the role external 
influence has had within the country. The second section explores the idea of the political 
engagement of NGOs within Bangladesh, particularly the engagement with the Government of 
Bangladesh. In the third section, Bangladesh’s exposure to climate change impacts are 
outlined, framing the current and potential impacts of climate change on the country to then 
understand the importance of loss and damage discussions to this truly vulnerable country. In 
the fourth section, I reflect on the policies related to climate change and where loss and damage 
policy development stands today. 
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5.2 Bangladesh NGO development history 
 
Since gaining independence in 1971, Bangladesh has been both heavily dependent on and 
influenced by International NGOs and their development agendas. The international 
development sector has played a considerable role in the development of the country over the 
past 50 years. At the end of the Liberation War of 1971, the new Bangladesh, that had 
previously been East  Pakistan under the political administration of West Pakistan (modern-
day Pakistan), lacked infrastructure and economic stability, and its state institutions were weak 
and fragmented, Bangladesh had suffered through nine months of the war, the genocide of 
millions of Bengalis, including the eradication of the educated elite of the country, and this was 
quickly followed by a post-war famine (Lewis, 2009).  Those who had previously held military 
and bureaucratic power and positions returned to West Pakistan, leaving a vacuum in the skills, 
experience, and resources needed to provide the basis for the new government. Formal 
government power now rested in a very different set of hands, the hands of the farmers, small-
scale entrepreneurs and industrial trade unions. The challenges faced by the new government 
were vast, and included: the need to  grow what had been a decade-long stagnation of the 
economy; rebuilding of infrastructure; development of government processes and agencies; 
reestablishment of law and order, and the need to refocus armed liberation fighters as peaceful 
citizens of a new Bangladesh (Lewis, 2011). This created the space and need for external 
support from NGOs working within Bangladesh, alongside a heavy dependence on Overseas 
Development Assistance (ODA), in order to rebuild the country from the ground up. So began 
the trajectory of Bangladesh as one of the world’s most NGO/development aid saturated 
countries (Lewis, 2011). 
 
International NGO presence in the 1970s grew in response to the need to provide immediate 
relief and basic social services including medical relief for those who were freedom fighters; 
assisting those displaced as a result of the war; and developing necessary infrastructure (Islam, 
2016; Zohir, 2004). This kind of response is what Korten (1987) would describe as ‘first-
generation’ NGO activities – the provision of immediate relief. While this is what is described 
as an appropriate response to the given situation, it does not function as a development strategy 
that has long term sustainability, nor does it solve any structural problems. 
 
Moving into the mid-1970s and the 1980s, NGOs began focusing on rural communities and 
the development of agriculture, supporting a move away from external dependence, and 
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focusing on development strategies that would contribute to independence. Micro-finance 
programmes were a feature of this approach (Islam, 2016, Zohir, 2004). The 1980s saw a 
gradual growth both in micro-finance and the growth of local NGOs, particularly with the 
success of Grammenbank. However, development aid was still mostly provided by external 
agencies, and this further entrenched the dependent nature of donor-recipient relationships 
(Islam, 2016; Zohir, 2004). The early 1990s saw many local institutions emerge, which focused 
on the provision of social services, and the continued support for micro-finance schemes. A 
significant number of micro-finance institutions emerged, cementing the role of micro-finance 
structures, still largely used in Bangladesh today. NGOs in the 1990s were largely membership-
based structures, but there was an increasing focus on the empowerment of women, extreme 
poverty and indigenous rights. The movement away from immediate relief towards self-reliant 
focused development practices is described by Korten (1987) as ‘second-generation’ activities. 
This entails working at the village level with specific groups of people, and often parallels or 
supplements the activities of government. 
 
The political influence of NGOs also grew during the late 1980s and into the 1990s as the 
country moved from a military-bureaucratic state into formal ‘democracy’. NGOs played a 
significant role in this process, particularly through the work of Association of Development 
Agencies in Bangladesh (ADAB), the largest coordinating organization of local NGOs in the 
country. This group was based on large grassroots memberships and embraced an ideology of 
freeing people from oppressive and subordinate relationships (Devine, 2006). The ADAB and 
other NGOS were very active in applying political pressure, with vocal support for particular 
parties, and mass demonstrations of their members. These actions by NGOs resulted in the 
dissolution of the ruling Jatiya Party, the removal of Ershad as Prime Minister in 1990, the first 
democratic elections in 1991, and the introduction of the caretaker government leading up to 
the 1996 elections (Devine 2006, Islam, 2016). 
 
The increasing presence and strength of local organisations has been accompanied by a 
decreasing dependence on Overseas Development Aid (ODA) over the decades, and although 
the volume of ODA is increasing, ODA as a share of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) has 
steadily declined (Hasan, 2011). Whereas Bangladesh was primarily a state dependent on ODA 
when independence was established, it is now classified as a low middle-income country with 
hopes of progressing to a middle-income country by 2025. 
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NGOs, and the balance between international and local agencies has changed, and they will 
continue to adjust their mandates of work, building on what they have previously done and 
incorporating new goals into their work, following the needs of the people they work with and 
in response to the environment in which they work (Haider, 2011). 
 
5.3 Bangladesh NGO engagement with government 
 
The engagement of NGOs with Government within Bangladesh is complex and needs to be 
understood in the context of culture, structure, style and emphasis. While the Government of 
Bangladesh works alongside development agencies, the two groups have differing priorities. 
The government tends to adopt a relatively top-down approach with an emphasis on control 
and authority, and both view the role of NGOs primarily as a means of implementing 
development projects. Government also works more directly with local government, politicians 
and local elites, rather than listening and responding to grassroots needs and interests. More 
specifically, the Government’s focus is on infrastructure projects, agriculturally based 
initiatives, and improving facilities with an emphasis on economic growth.  
 
In contrast, NGOs emphasise engagement with practices of social inclusion, rights-based ideas, 
and capacity development, particularly when focusing on political and administrative 
processes. As a result, attempts by NGOs to engage with the Government is often complicated 
due to their differences in approach, practice and structure (Jamil, 2000). NGOs and civil 
society groups are dependent on the state in order to function, and they require government 
support to implement development programmes. This means that there is a tendency for the 
state to co-opt or pressure NGOs to align themselves with government policy and programmes. 
At the same time, however, the state in turn relies on NGOs for the delivery of their 
programmes and the support of large numbers of local constituents. The result is that the two 
groups are mutually dependent and rely on each other to reproduce themselves and their 
functions (Karim, 2001). 
 
In terms of political direction, NGOs have been encouraged by the government to address 
issues of poverty, but this has sometimes been at the cost of fully supporting the rights and 
interests of indigenous and minority groups (Devine, 2006). This has meant that NGOs have 
tacitly accommodated the current political situation rather than challenging the status quo. 
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Karim (2001) describes the relationship between NGOs and political parties in Bangladesh by 
explaining that NGOs are protected by, and aligned to, a given national level party in exchange 
for the extensive access to rural votes that the NGOs ‘control’. In essence, NGOs receive 
government support in return for strengthening party support. This ‘clientelism’ effectively 
stymies the opportunity for NGOs to encourage or engage in the politics of collective action 
but is required if they are to run programmes that have a positive material benefit for their 
communities. In describing this lattice of overlapping interests, Devine (2006) argues that 
Bangladesh clientelism continues to be the basis for understanding the matrix of social, 
political and cultural relationships within the development networks of NGOs. These practices 
are often unequal, hierarchical and exploitative and may be at odds with the ideological goals 
that NGOs would prefer to support but are ‘required’ for NGOs to both function and be 
productive within the realm of their work (Devine, 2006). 
 
In turn, the Government of Bangladesh functions within a broader international context of 
agreements and protocols. In relation to climate change and disaster risk reduction, the 
Government has been signatory to international agreements such as the Bali Action Plan, the 
Sendai Framework, the Paris Agreement, and the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), 
which all include mandates for partnerships between civil society groups and governments. 
These multilateral treaties focus on the role of civil society organisations not only as 
implementors, but also as researchers, decision-makers, representatives, advocates, and 
overseers or regulators (Long, nd.) 
 
As such, these international agreements have some potential to provide space for NGO/CSOs 
supported collective action which might be more in line with the promotion of social justice 
goals that NGOs and CSOs express. Lopa et al. (2016) argue that CSOs and/or NGOs involved 
in policy and advocacy work need to form coalitions, and build networks based on particular 
themes, or similar areas of work, particularly in the climate change arena.  However, there is a 
lack of formal cooperation which limits the voice of NGOs, and minority groups on national 
issues. 
 
Despite this, climate change initiatives offer the potential to reflect broader interests. Because 
of the urgency and scale of the threat posed by climate change to Bangladesh, it is important 
that the Government is seen to be promoting policies and practices that are in line with these 
broader international commitment to inclusion, partnership and social justice. In line with this, 
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climate change-based NGOs are generally invited to consultation workshops regarding climate 
resilience, disaster risk reduction or migration issues which involves the engagement with 
multiple ministries, particularly the Ministry of Environment and Climate Change and the 
Ministry for Disaster Management. This engagement with multiple stakeholders focuses on 
issues of climate resilience, migration, disaster response and adaptation measures, development 
planning, capacity building, policy reform and can include investment planning in line with the 
Sustainable Development Goal’s and the Paris agreement and other international agreements 
(USAID, 2011). 
 
5.4 Climate change vulnerability 
 
Most of Bangladesh lies within the world’s largest delta: the Ganges-Brahmaputra-Meghna 
delta (GBM delta). The formation of deltas occurs through the interaction of rivers and tidal 
processes, resulting in rich sedimentary deposits, which provide fertile land for agriculture and 
access to the coast, rivers and waterways, which support fishing, transport and trade. Resource 
availability and life support functions have contributed to the development of the GBM as the 
world’s most populous deltaic area (Brammer, 2014). Bangladesh has a population of 
approximately 164 million people nestled within 147,570 sq km, earning it a designation as 
one of the most populated countries in the world (UNDESA, 2017). 
 
Bangladesh’s geographic location, with most of the country situated in low-lying lands and 
crossed by hundreds of rivers and waterways, means that it is at the forefront of the impact of 
climate change (Haque et al., 2019) and, as of 2019, it ranks ninth on the Climate Risk Index 
which refers to the extent to which countries have been affected by weather-related loss events 
(Germanwatch, 2019). The results of climate change include rising sea levels, extreme and 
repeated flooding events, increasing numbers of cyclones and storm surges, tidal surges, 
salinity intrusion and disturbances to aquatic ecosystems (Haque et al., 2019). Such climate 
change related events can in turn result in loss of life; significant loss of property and 
infrastructure; and detrimental impacts on soil formation, primary production, food supply, 
water quality and disease regulation. 
 
The Asian Development Bank Report (2014) estimates the yearly decrease of annual GDP in 
Bangladesh will reach 2% by 2050, increasing to over 9% by the end of the century. Single 
catastrophic events, such as Cyclone Sidr of 2007, caused an estimated 2.6 per cent decrease 
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of the GDP or $1.7 billion in damages. Devastating economic impacts and non-economic loss 
and damages further confirms the need and desire to address climate change impacts 
immediately (World Bank, 2016). While other countries stall in taking action to combat climate 
change, Bangladesh is well aware of the desperate need to plan and prepare for the future. The 
impacts of climate change and the need for urgent planning are the country’s most significant 
challenges. The government and communities are aware of the effects of both slow onset, and 
rapid onset climatic events, and of the ever-changing climate (Huq, Kabir, Khan et al., Personal 
Communication, 2017; Ghosh 2016). 
 
The 2018 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) special report on 1.5°C global 
temperature change details the stress the GMB delta is likely to incur as the impacts of climate 
change increase (IPCC, 2018b, pg. 232). The IPCC states with high confidence that at both 
1.5°C and 2°C degrees, “impacts associated with sea level rise; changes to the salinity of 
coastal groundwater; increased flooding and damage to infrastructure; are projected to be 
critically important in vulnerable environments, such as small islands, low-lying coasts and 
deltas.” (IPCC, 2018a, pg. 181). The particular vulnerability of Bangladesh’s coastal and 
agricultural communities is confirmed by the IPCC report which states that: “Populations at 
disproportionately higher risk of adverse consequences with global warming of 1.5°C and 
beyond include disadvantaged and vulnerable populations, some indigenous peoples, and local 
communities dependent on agricultural or coastal livelihoods (high confidence).” (IPCC, 
2018a, pg. 11). 
 




Bangladesh’s location and its subtropical monsoon climate mean that it annually experiences 
high levels of rainfall both within the country and upriver, generating regular floods. These 
floods have broad ranging effects on the economy, development, and the levels of poverty, and 
effect almost every sector of the country (Shaikh, et al., 2015). According to the Ministry of 
Environment, in an ‘average’ year one quarter of the country is inundated due to flooding, with 
flooding affecting up to 60% of the country every four to five years. Communities living in 
flood prone areas have adapted in the past by raising the level of areas of land and raising their 
houses using stilts but, these measures are increasingly ineffective, with flooding causing loss 
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of life and increasingly negative impacts on homes, livelihoods, agriculture, and infrastructure. 
Most commonly the poorest communities are most vulnerable to these effects (MoEF, 2009). 
 
Drought 
Ironically, Bangladesh also suffers from droughts. Droughts have broad ranging effects on 
agriculture, domestic water supplies and economic activities dependent on water. Prolonged 
periods of little or no rainfall result in ground water depletion, shortages of surface moisture 
and, in combination with high temperatures results the depletion of soil moisture levels, 
causing plants to experience moisture stress due to the lack of available water. Clearly, these 
affect both crop yield and vegetative growth, and has an impact on agricultural systems. 
According to Shaw et al (2013) Bangladesh is expected to experience more heat waves and hot 
days, extended dry spells and, as a result, is more likely to experience droughts, especially in 
susceptible areas which will be warmer and drier than the previous 50 years. After long periods 
of sustained droughts, the economic, social and environmental impacts can be devastating 
(CEGIS, 2013). 
 
The communities who suffer from the impacts of droughts have undertaken a range of methods 
and practices thus far allowing them to continue with their livelihoods. These have included 
diversifying crops, changed cropping systems, and moving from traditional agriculture to 
becoming fruit farmers. Some households have become involved in a range of income 
generating activities, such as establishing businesses, engaging in paid labour, offering services 
in construction and other non-agricultural farming-based activities, while others have chosen 
to seasonally migrate to cities such as Dhaka for employment (CEGIS, 2013). 
 
Cyclones and storm surges 
The Ministry of Environment, Forest and Climate Change, reports a severe cyclone hits 
Bangladesh every 3 years on average (MoEF, 2009). This most commonly occurs during or 
either side of the monsoon season and is associated with the movement of warm air over the 
Bay of Bengal. Storm surges are coastal floods caused by the rising of water, associated with 
a low-pressure weather system. In coastal Bangladesh— due to the wide and shallow 
continental shelf, and a coastal shape which funnels cyclones into the low-lying land— storm 
surges are common and cause devasting effects. Storm surges typically reach of up to seven 
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metres causing loss of life, and extreme damage to houses and agriculture in these coastal 
communities (MoEF, 2009).It is expected that climate change will increase the frequency and 
the intensity of cyclones, meaning an increase in the frequency  and height of storm surges. As 
such, these storm surges pose an ever-increasing threat to coastal Bangladesh (Ali, 1996, Karim 
& Mimura 2006). 
 
Sea level rise 
Sea levels are expected to rise as the climate changes, particularly in low lying delta areas 
(Hamilton, 2010; Dudgeon, 2012). This will increase coastal flooding, inundation, rates of 
erosion, and saltwater intrusion in both surface waters and groundwater systems. These 
changes will have ongoing economic, stability, health and livelihood implications for the 
communities living in these areas (IPCC, 2018a). Reduced dry season flows are expected to 
cause a drop in groundwater levels, this can often results in land subsidence, which then 
increases exposure to coastal flooding, inundation and sea level rise. Deltaic urban 
environments in Asia, already vulnerable to anthropogenic subsidence issues, are at higher risk 
of further subsidence and flooding (Nicholls et al., 2008). Saltwater intrusion is expected to 
effect arable land, and therefore food supply chains.  In Bangladesh, rice production in the delta 
area is particularly threatened by rising sea levels (Wassmann et al., 2009). 
 
Sea level rise will affect the livelihoods of those who are involved in freshwater capture 
fisheries and aquaculture production in river deltas (De Silva & Soto, 2009). As Bangladesh is 
largely an agriculture and fisheries-based economy, these impacts have already had a 
devastating impact on rural livelihoods. 
 
5.5 Loss and damage 
 
Despite, or possibly because of, the long lists of the negative impacts of climate change 
experienced within Bangladesh, it is known as one of the best examples of countries 
proactively tackling these impacts. It had recognized potential problems in advance and has 
established comprehensive disaster risk management policies and practices (Habiba, et al., 
2013). Proactive risk management approaches have reduced the levels of mortality and further 
prepared the country for the continuing impacts of climate change. 
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5.5.1 Current Bangladesh climate change related policy 
 
 
The National Adaptation Plan of Action (NAPA, 2005) 
The National Adaptation Plan of Action (NAPA) (2005) acknowledges the Bangladesh 
Government’s recognition that climate change is a crucial issue for the country, and it was the 
first country to create such a plan, as a response to the decision of the Seventh Session of the 
Conference of the Parties (COP7) of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change (MoEF, 2005). The NAPA attempts to address potential responses and measures for 
reducing the impacts of climate change in order to prevent and help secure the development 
planning process (MoEF, 2005).  While Bangladesh has had a long history of long exposure 
to, and recovery from extreme climatic events, the increase in frequency of such events (floods, 
cyclones and storm surges) has shortened preparation times for events and depleted respective 
budgets for managing impacts. As a result, disasters can result in conditions such as extreme 
food shortages which have severe impacts on the well-being of vulnerable countries and 
communities. NAPA outlines 15 adaptation strategies which include reforestation, access to 
fresh water, capacity building, the promotion of research and dissemination of information, 
and the implementation of adaptation measures in agriculture and fisheries (MoEF, 2005). 
Policy mainstreaming and development as well as the exploration of insurance and other 
emergency preparedness measures to cope with enhanced climatic disasters are also on the list 
of actions. 
 
Bangladesh Climate Change Strategy and Action Plan (BCCSAP, 2009) 
Following the development of the NAPA, and in response to the Bali Action Plan which came 
out of COP13, the Government of Bangladesh developed the Bangladesh Climate Change 
Strategy and Action Plan (BCCSAP) (2009). Much like the Bali Action Plan, the Bangladesh 
Climate Change Strategy and Action Plan (BCCSAP) is built on ‘pillars of action’. These 
pillars include: 1) food security, social protection and health; 2) comprehensive disaster 
management; 3) infrastructure to ensure that existing assets are retained; 4) research and 
knowledge management; 5) mitigation and low-carbon development; and 6) capacity building 
and institutional strengthening (MoEF, 2009). The BCCSAP intends to meet the needs of 
economic growth and social development resiliently and progressively, despite the expected 
turbulence associated with climate change. The focus on a pro-poor strategy means that the 
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poor and vulnerable, including women and children, will be prioritised in all activities 
implemented under BCCSAP. It includes a range of immediate, short, medium and long-term 
programmes and outlooks (MoEF, 2009). The Bangladesh Climate Change Trust Fund 
(BCCFT) and the Bangladesh Climate Change Resilience Fund (BCCRF) were two funds 
established to support the implementation of the BCCSAP. The BCCTF was a fund set up for 
the purpose of distribution of internal government funding and the BCCRF is funded by and 
managed by the World Bank (BCCT, 2016. Haque, 2019). 
 
5.5.2 National Mechanism on Loss and Damage 
 
Both NAPA and BCCSAP reflect the Bangladesh Government’s willingness to address climate 
change head-on, with ambitious and far-reaching adaptation and mitigation processes in place. 
The next phase for the Government of Bangladesh is to develop its response to issues of loss 
and damage. A number of research publications and policy briefings focus on the need to 
address loss and damage at a national level in Bangladesh. These include, for example: Loss 
and damage: From the global to the local (Roberts et al., 2013); Early Lessons from the 
Process to Enhance Understanding of Loss and Damage in Bangladesh (Roberts et al., 2013); 
and Loss and Damage from the Local Perspective in the Context of a Slow Onset Process: The 
Case of Sea Level Rise in Bangladesh (Nishat et al., 2013). Each of these papers explores loss 
and damage in the local context of Bangladesh and highlights the necessity of addressing and 
developing a national level response, despite the lack of international agreements on these 
issues. Reflecting the Bangladesh Government’s proactive stance in response to climate change 
issues, it has already taken steps to develop, and plans to implement, a national mechanism for 
addressing loss and damage (Roberts et al. 2013). Thus, although the government’s active role 
in pre-disaster adaptation and mitigation should have reduced the impacts of climate change 
disasters so far, it is inevitable that the increased level of both rapid and slow onset events will 
necessitate measures to address loss and damage in the future. 
 
The draft National Mechanism on Loss and Damage was in part a response to international-
level discussions, which have currently stalled in a quagmire of debates about compensation 
and liability for losses and damages. In reflecting on the early lessons of loss and damage, 
Roberts, Huq, Hasemann & Roddick, (2013) outline the need to develop a National Loss and 
Damage Mechanism. Roberts et al. (2013) suggests that the Government of Bangladesh, 
alongside other stakeholders, should develop a working group for loss and damage. The agenda 
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for such a working group would include more research, needs assessment and the 
implementation of pilot programmes. Using current policies as a base of expansion and with 
input from a broad range of stakeholders including different ministries, academia, the 
development sector and civil society, new policies and programmes could be developed to 
address the challenges of impacts not seen before.  
 
Further recommendations for on-going development of the National Mechanism on Loss and 
Damage include performing a needs-based assessment focused on the most vulnerable 
communities and individuals (Roberts et al., 2013); and developing a consortium to enhance 
collaboration and best practice and sharing the knowledge between those working in different 
regions or different countries. There is also a need for long-term capacity building regarding 
research capability and knowledge management around loss and damage cases (Roberts et al., 
2013). 
 
The proposed National Mechanism includes an in-depth discussion of the national context of 
loss and damage associated with climate change, as well as existing policy and institutional 
approaches to loss and damage in Bangladesh. These include related environmental policies, 
disaster management, and mitigation and adaptation policy and practices. It also explores 
potential pitfalls and restrictions, and the potential to overcome these issues (Huq, Kabir, Khan 
et al. (2017). Personal Communication). Pilot projects for loss and damage are planned to be 
field-based, as a way to understand different strategies of managing and coping with loss and 




Understanding the history of development and of NGOs within Bangladesh, their role and the 
relationships they hold with the Government of Bangladesh allows for a more comprehensive 
understanding of the environment in which the research was undertaken. The current national 
level policy frames the situation in which a National Mechanism for Loss and Damage is being 
developed. Understanding the threat climate change poses to Bangladesh further explains the 
space in which and frames why a National Mechanism is relevant to Bangladesh. Moving 
forward in Chapter Six we now have a better understanding of the context and relevance of a 
loss and damage national level policy alongside an understanding of the potential difficulties 
those advocating for a National level policy may be facing. 
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This chapter explores the perceptions and opinions of those involved in loss and damage 
discussions both within Bangladesh at a national level and internationally. The first section 
examines the stakeholders involved in the national level policy discussions within Bangladesh, 
exploring the strengths and drivers of national level development, followed by the second 
section which analyses the obstacles faced at the national level. The third section examines 
those engaged in the international negotiations, including those who work alongside 
Bangladesh stakeholders at the UNFCCC conference of parties, and focuses on the drivers and 
strengths of loss and damage negotiations within the UNFCCC. The fourth section then 
explores the obstacles being faced by those arguing for loss and damage development within 
the international negotiations. Through the use of semi-structured interviews and conference 
observations, I draw a picture of the activities both nationally and internationally and explore 
the interplay between a national level policy development and the happenings in the 
international sphere in the final section. 
 
6.2 Stakeholders and drivers of the national mechanism on loss and damage 
 
The first section of this chapter will explore the different stakeholders and organisations who 
are engaged with loss and damage and how these actors and the given context has situated 
Bangladesh to be a leader primed to drive loss and damage policy development. The initial 
discussion will look at the first emergence of loss and damage discussions and research in the 
context of Bangladesh. It is followed by an analysis of the range of stakeholders who are the 
current drivers of loss and damage discussions and policy development. Thirdly, the historical 
context of the presence of NGOs is explored.  
 
Loss and damage was first raised, by Bangladesh specifically, as an issue at COP17, held in 
Durban in 2011, through the launch of the ‘Loss and Damage in Vulnerable Countries 
Initiative’. This initiative was launched in response to a request by the Government of 
Bangladesh as a way to understand the emerging issue of loss and damage and was the first 
civil society response. The initiative funded by Climate and Development Knowledge Network 
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(CDKN) appointed various organisations, including Germanwatch, United Nations University-
Institute for Environmental and Human Security (UNU-EHS), International Centre for Climate 
Change and Development (ICCCAD) and Munich Climate Insurance Initiative (MCII), to build 
a basis for a common understanding of loss and damage and what it meant for vulnerable 
countries (CDKN, 2012). P1, a member of civil society engaged with the start of research in 
Bangladesh through the Loss and Damage in Vulnerable Countries Initiative, outlines their 
experience of the emergence of the topic within Bangladesh: 
 
“I had no idea what Loss and Damage was nor did anyone else, none of us knew what 
it was. It was not until the Bangkok session on UNFCCC, which was in September of 
2012. At the beginning of September, there was a session in the UNFCCC their 
workshop of loss and damage and I basically manipulated the secretariat to get as 
many of our people from Bangladesh invited to the workshop in different capacities. 
Different groups started to see ‘oh this could actually be a really interesting agenda to 
work with,’ so from then they started to engage more.” (Participant 1: Bangladesh Civil 
Society Member, Researcher).  
 
In Bangladesh the Vulnerable Countries Initiative involved at the start individual research-
based organisations who began to explore what loss and damage was, how it was affecting 
people, and how this will continue in the future. Context-specific research allowed for 
Bangladesh to begin building knowledge of the importance of loss and damage, both nationally 
and internationally. Different members of civil society became involved from this point 
onwards. 
 
This early engagement of CSO actors has been significant in development of Bangladesh as a 
knowledge leader on loss and damage. Early international academic publications focused on 
the potential impacts of loss and damage in Bangladesh, it has also meant that CSO members 
have engaged with loss and damage since the emergence of the topic (Roberts et al., 2013); 
(Roberts & Huq., 2013); (Nishat et al., 2013). Bangladeshi CSO members and Bangladesh as 
a nation within the UNFCCC process now have a robust and informed stance as a knowledge 
leader on loss and damage. Bangladesh now has a strong presence at the negotiations and can 
argue and bargain in a manner that has given them more leverage in discussions both in official 
tracks within the UNFCCC and the civil society spaces at COP. The significance of Bangladesh 
being involved with loss and damage from such an early stage has allowed for loss and damage 
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to become a leverage point through which Bangladesh has begun to engage with an issue that 
has the potential to change and challenge traditional aid relationships.  
 
There have been multiple stakeholders engaged from an early stage across the broad range of 
aspects involving loss and damage; this early engagement and the depth of knowledge 
associated with the large range of involved actors is a unique situation, which has allowed 
Bangladesh to be engaged with loss and damage developments to an extent where they are now 
viewed as leaders on the issue. For example, P2, a member of civil society and vocal in the loss 
and damage discussions outlines the breadth of perspectives on loss and damage.  
 
“In Bangladesh broadly speaking there are the negotiators, that is a very narrow set 
of discussions under very tight conditions. There are discussions with operational 
discussions on the ground, who have to deal with the impacts of climatic events, disaster 
managers for example, volunteers, Red Cross people like that. That’s on the practical 
side. Then there is general public, public awareness, people learning about it. Then 
there is the scientific community, scientists who are working on attribution on loss and 
damage, and so unfortunately the scientific investment on the issue of loss and damage 
as a new emerging issue has been very-very poor.” (Participant 2: Bangladesh Civil 
Society Member). 
 
The range of actors involved is vast, as described within the above quote, whether these are 
actors responding to the impacts of climate change, those involved in the collection of data and 
the framing of the issue or those engaged in advocacy and awareness raising around climate 
change issues such as loss and damage.  
 
Despite the initial interest by the Bangladesh Government in furthering understanding of loss 
and damage, this work is now being driven by CSOs and the Government has to some extent 
backed away from a leadership role. For example, P3 spoke about the current situation and 
those involved whereby dialogue around loss and damage, both nationally and internationally, 
is driven by members of civil society, through conferences, publications and engaging 
government on the issue.  
 
“In the national discussion, loss and damage is not a very kind of topical issue. At the 
NGO level its very, very active. NGOs, we are trying to buy the minds of the 
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government. We [civil society] are actively trying. But in loss and damage, there is not 
much money. But government gradually is trying to be on board, still not fully on loss 
and damage issues.” (Participant 3: Bangladeshi Delegate, Researcher, Loss and 
Damage Advocate). 
 
The idea that there is a need to ‘buy the minds of the government’, leaves a powerful image 
and truly encapsulates the drive of the CSOs involved. CSO members, have the perception that 
in order to gain traction at the local level on loss and damage, as Government members are 
reluctant to initiate the draft policy, there is some convincing or persuading of government 
members to do. CSOs believe it is in their interest and those they seek to represent, to encourage 
the Government the to accept the loss and damage within the realm of existing climate change 
policy.  
 
Despite the lack of associated funding for loss and damage (further explored in the next 
section), certain CSOs have an overwhelming drive to forward loss and damage development, 
engaging with arguments of justice and accountability. The long-standing involvement of 
CSOs in Bangladesh with their emphasis on the importance of development, social justice and 
human rights has meant that these ethical concerns have been especially influential in the 
understanding of loss and damage in Bangladesh. This idea is further explored by P2:  
 
“Bangladesh has a very strong NGO tradition, as you know, but within the NGO 
tradition, as the NGOs overlap with the climate change arena, quite a lot of 
development NGOs now do climate change, so that area is overlapping. Within that 
there is a very strong paradigm of justice. Loss and damage that is the issue that is 
closely linked to climate justice or injustice. Climate injustice is loss and damage.” 
(Participant 2: Bangladesh Civil Society Member). 
 
The different groups engaged, and the long-standing tradition of NGOs within Bangladesh 
means that the strength of networks and groups involved in loss and damage discussions and 
disaster response is in some ways unique to Bangladesh. Bangladesh, as described in previous 
chapters, is not new to responding to disaster situations, CSOs have long been engaged in 
disaster risk practices on the ground. CSO actors and development practitioners understand 
climate change in this context as explored above in this section, the early engagement of actors 
involved in loss and damage discussions has primed Bangladesh to be an early leader on this 
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issue. Moreover, justice arguments play a significant role in the paradigm of climate change, 
as stated above? by P2. CSOs have historically used justice arguments across a broad range of 
development issues. As such, CSOs are not new to arguments of justice in the context of 
Bangladesh, nor are they new to what are now impacts exacerbated by climate change. This 
history situates Bangladesh in a prime position to be engaged in both responses to loss and 
damage but also in developing a policy which informs the justice-based arguments for loss and 
damage. Considering the history described above and the ideas that are engrained within loss 
and damage discussions, P4 emphasizes this in describing the perception of Bangladesh and 
the role they represent in the international negotiations.  
 
“I think generally within the UNFCCC they [Bangladesh] are similar to the island 
nations, who are seen as a moral actor. They are seen as one of the most vulnerable 
countries in the world so what they are saying is because, any statement they say is 
because they are so deeply affected by it. I think they are kind of seen as a leader on 
loss and damage in an intellectual sense.” (Participant 4: Researcher and advocate for 
loss and damage). 
 
Thus, the position Bangladesh has as one of the most vulnerable countries to climate change 
and how deeply affected they are has shaped them as an authority on loss and damage. 
Bangladeshis from civil society and from government engage in loss and damage negotiations 
because they see and are experiencing the effects of loss and damage already, it is a lived 
experience for many and arguing the injustice of the reality of loss and damage is in the interest 
of Bangladesh.  
 
6.3 National level challenges 
 
In this section, national level challenges are discussed, seen to be the cause of stagnation of 
national level loss and damage policy development. Challenges to the development of loss and 
damage policy at the national level include funding and government engagement. These two 
issues are interconnected and the first difficulty in funding policy development is directly 
linked to the government’s lack of engagement.  
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6.3.1 Funding as compensation 
 
Ultimately, it is clear that funding for loss and damage measures will need to come from the 
international community. However, CSO representatives in Bangladesh argue that the case for 
applying and receiving funds could be strengthened by the development of a transparent and 
well-thought out policy to ensure the most appropriate and constructive response to loss and 
damage and clear pathways to compensation. To date, the Government has tended to withdraw 
from engagement. P2, a member of civil society involved with developing the national policy 
draft, expressed frustration with the lack of government engagement.   
 
“The national mechanism we [Bangladesh] are going to do it ourselves. He 
[government representative] feels, if we are going to do it ourselves then we are getting 
no money. So, his ill principle, principle argument is that better not do anything 
ourselves. We need to ask for money, we won’t ask for money. If we start doing 
something ourselves, we won’t be able to ask for money or we won’t get money.” 
(Participant 2: Bangladesh Civil Society Member). 
 
The difficulty in government not funding the national mechanism means that it has led to little 
action moving the draft policy forward. If government representatives does not see the 
importance of having a national level policy and therefore government do not fund the national 
level policy it is difficult for the Bangladesh to pressure and to show a functional level policy 
and associated funding channels when pushing for international funding (Hijioka, et al. 2014). 
Also, it means that any action CSOs wish to implement have limited funding options. A 
massive step in challenging traditional aid relationships and pushing for compensation would 
be by showing the international community that despite inaction at the international level, 
Bangladesh is going to keep moving forward with loss and damage development at the national 
level. P2 argues that government involvement is essential if international support is to be 
gained and that in any case inaction in the case of climate change and loss and damage is not 
an option.  
 
“My [civil society] counter-argument is that, which I haven’t convinced him yet, is if 
we demonstrate with our own money, what we can do and show that its feasible and 
transparent good idea, then we will get a lot of money. The money will come if we 
initiate it ourselves rather than say, you know, we need money, if we don’t get money, 
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we don’t move to anything. That’s not a feasible argument that we won’t do anything 
if we don’t get funding. So, let’s see, I haven’t given up.” (Participant 2: Bangladesh 
Civil Society Member). 
 
Despite the overall lack of funding internationally (further discussed in following sections), 
CSO’s continue to pressure government to push the national mechanism forward demanding 
compensation from the global North through the UNFCCC process. P3 additionally describes 
how, regardless of whether the government develops a national mechanism, that ultimately, 
the government will approach the international community for funding in order to compensate 
those affected by loss and damage.  
 
“Nowhere [does] the compensation comes from? It may come from the national 
government because they have direct interaction with the international arena, so the 
GCF and this facility. So, the national government will approach, obviously the 
international community.” (Participant 3: Bangladeshi Delegate, Researcher, Loss and 
Damage Advocate). 
 
All CSO participants argued for greater government involvement and the development of a 
National policy but all also emphasised the need for loss and damage action to be supported by 
the international community in relation to both liability and compensation rather than just 
another vague addition within a model of development in which wealthier countries decide on 
how aid should be managed and distributed. P4, for example further builds on this argument.  
 
“Bangladesh isn’t really awash with resources, for throwing solutions at people, or 
compensating them. It's also really difficult because a lot of loss and damage is ideally 
is a form of compensation, the solution to it is some form of compensation from 
countries that have caused climate change. Industrialized countries are not just 
throwing money at countries who are experiencing loss and damage. There is no 
liability.” (Participant 4: Researcher and advocate for loss and damage). 
 
The need for compensation is closely linked to the idea of liability (see chapter two), and the 
need for compensation to come from the global North, is due to the fact that loss and damage 
is explicitly linked to the carbon emissions and the subsequent development of the global 
North.  However, the global North has refused to take any liability in the causation of loss and 
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damage and as such at the point refuse to give any monetary compensation. However, 
compensation is something developing nations are continuing to push for within the UNFCCC 
process.  
 
A crucial factor in understanding how loss and damage might be developed in Bangladesh is 
that those whose livelihoods and well-being are most likely to be negatively impacted by 
climate change are also those who are most economically disadvantaged and who are least 
likely to be able to access compensation if it were available. P3 raised one specific form of 
compensation discussed within the UNFCCC, that of insurance and the role of the private 
sector. However, where an insurance mechanism for loss and damage fails is that it does not 
constitute compensation because the premiums are funded by the vulnerable individuals or 
governments of climate vulnerable countries, meaning that the idea of compensation is not 
addressed by insurance mechanisms which are the most spoken about response to loss and 
damage.  
 
“The most impacted communities who are poor are not covered by the insurance sector. 
Because insurance is a profit-making scheme and they are not insurance worthy. The 
poorest people are not insurance worthy. But a little bit of thinking is already there and 
getting into their consciousness and they are expanding their insurance net to cover the 
low-income farmers.” (Participant 3: Bangladeshi Delegate, Researcher, Loss and 
Damage Advocate). 
 
The above quote illustrates that any form of compensation needs to be relevant and useable for 
those who are most vulnerable to loss and damage. Insurance is often identified as integral to 
processes of compensation for loss and damage. It is clearly unreasonable to expect that those 
countries peoples who have in fact benefitted least from the causation of climate change 
through industrialisation, should be required to insure themselves against the impacts of 
climate change and loss and damage.  While insurance has been identified as a solution, this 
only shifts focus away from liability and compensation. While the involvement of the private 
sector includes insurance is perceived by some as a possibility, there is little evidence that this 
is likely to be a source of funding in the foreseeable future.  
 
Moreover, while Bangladesh continues to push for compensation the difficulty in advancing 
any actions in the country and the mechanism through which funding might be channelled is 
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further explored by P5. P5 describes that any form of compensation mechanism as a result of 
funding could be problematic, because those most in need would probably not get access to 
these funds. 
 
“Now if you talk about compensation, looking into the governments structure of the 
country, I don’t think it is going to be a good thing. Money will go to the muscle man 
of the political people. Common people, the most effected people would not benefit 
unless say they specify the “Char” [fragile sedimentary islands] people would get the 
money.” (Participant 5: Bangladesh delegation member). 
 
Once again, P5 suggests that unless any national level mechanism truly provides a legitimate 
structure and a well thought out process that all those affected are able to access, there is the 
potential for funding for loss and damage to not help those most in need. Ideally if a mechanism 
was developed early in the process, Bangladesh could provide a transparent pathway for 
funding to those most vulnerable. Firstly as described, a national mechanism will help 
Bangladesh to establish a case for receiving funding, Secondly, if an implemented policy takes 
place prior to international funding mechanisms, there is potential for a Bangladeshi driven 
funding pathway that is both  transparent and an appropriate response to be in place.  
However, to develop such a mechanism does require a certain level of initial funding from 
government, and until such funding becomes available it is difficult to have any coordinated 
action of any form. 
 
6.3.2 Government Engagement 
 
The civil society representatives I interviewed shared a general feeling of frustration at the 
government’s lack of engagement with addressing loss and damage.  Climate change has many 
facets and involves engagement across a broad range of ministries. However, as P4, an 
international academic engaged in national level research surrounding loss and damage notes, 
there is often a lack of communication channels between certain ministries. 
 
“I don’t know if at the national level there a commitment is to figure out loss and 
damage. There is a lack of communication between ministries and departments, that 
100% true, people say that to me in interviews.” (Participant 4: Researcher and 
advocate for loss and damage). 
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The perceived lack of government commitment on the issue of loss and damage is only the 
start of a conversation about the difficulties civil society has in engaging the government in 
loss and damage discussions. It is not just a general lack of commitment, rather it has many 
political undertones which I will explore further below. P1 begins by addressing the perceived 
confusion over which ministry has ‘ownership’ over the proposed national level policy.  
 
“One of the things is there is a bit of a turf warfare between some on the ministries. 
Some of the people in the MOEFCC think it is in their per view or portfolio. and MODM 
have been working on loss and damage in a DRR sense for decades, so it’s a turf war 
for who’s in control.” (Participant 1: Bangladesh Civil Society Member, Researcher). 
 
To explain this ‘turf war’, we need to understand how climate change funding is changing the 
landscape of Bangladesh. As the country moves towards middle income status, climate change 
funding represents a new source of monetary flow for different ministries, which in turn means 
a given ministry can gain more power. The difficulty in this is that the Ministry of Environment 
and Climate Change views climate change within their work mandate, and from an 
environmental perspective this may appear true. However, the perspective of civil society on 
loss and damage is that the Ministry of Disaster Management is better suited to engage with 
loss and damage as they have been dealing with disaster risk response for decades, as explained 
by P2. An exemplar of the said “turf-war” played out at COP24 where there was meant to be 
an official launch of the National Mechanism for loss and damage.  
 
At COP24, CSOs and the Ministry of Disaster Management had planned to launch the draft 
policy on loss and damage developed jointly. However, because the Ministry of Environment, 
Forest and Climate Change are the official representation of Bangladesh at COP the launch 
was essentially vetoed. In the eyes of CSOs at COP24, the “official launch” became the 
“unofficial launch”. At the Bangladeshi delegates meeting prior to the “unofficial launch”, 
CSO participants met with the reps from both ministries (Ministry of Environment, Forest and 
Climate Change and the ministry of Disaster management). As one of the CSO participants, 
my role was to partake in helping ensure that all Ministry officials were successfully ushered 
into Ubers and transported to the event, in the hope that a collective event might assist in 
furthering discussions and actions back in Bangladesh. Before we were able to accomplish this 
all of the Ministry of Environment, Forest and Climate Change representatives left the 
delegation meeting saying they would not or were unable to attend the meeting. The CSO 
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participants felt and it was perceived that the Ministry derailed the event because the Ministry 
resented their lack of control and participation in the development of the policy. 
 
The events at COP24 provide a specific example of the conflict between ministries and gives 
a perspective on the complex dynamics around discussion and action in climate change policy 
development. The above incident reflects not only the conflict between ministries but also on 
the challenges faced by CSOs negotiating across different ministries. This is further 
exacerbated by the ways in which changes in government shift power and personnel within the 
ministries. P2 further explains that the recent elections resulted in further stagnation of national 
mechanism. 
 
“What happened after COP24 December, is [Bangladesh] hit the election, so 
everything got put in cold storage for the election. Now we are back into normal 
business, certain balls are being picked up again and this ball will be picked up now.” 
(Participant 2: Bangladesh Civil Society Member). 
 
The recent elections meant a change in minsters, secretaries and deputies, those expected to 
engage with policy development. The continued changes in the ministry, due to elections but 
also due to the continued rotation of ministry members (a policy in Bangladesh used to avoid 
corruption) means civil society is continuously having to engage new people on loss and 
damage, which includes presenting them with the idea of a national policy, educating them on 
what loss and damage means, the international politics of the issue and what it entails for 
Bangladesh. However, with new members to engage with, some civil society members now 
believe there is more room for movement moving on from the elections. P2 continues by 
explaining the National Mechanism moving forward, under a new Secretary post-election. 
 
 “So if he [Secretary of Disaster Management] wants to do it he can make it [national 
mechanism] happen, and he has the political clout to do so, that the Environment 
[Ministry] doesn’t. So I am pretty sure they can manage it before COP25, so then we 
can launch it there.” (Participant 2: Bangladesh Civil Society Member). 
 
Not only is there a new Secretary of Disaster Management, but he is seen to have more political 
strength to move the National Mechanism forward. Civil society members require political 
buy-in by those in power to move the National Mechanism forward. Due to a lack of 
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engagement from those in power thus far, the current draft policy has sat in its current state 
since the middle of 2017. Civil society members drafted the policy with encouragement from 
the then Secretary of Disaster Management and due to a change in leadership, there has been 
no movement forward to enacting or further developing the policy. However, as described 
above, P2 is optimistic about the ability with the current change in leadership to move things 
forward. P1 acknowledges the momentum shifts as there are changes in the ministry, the 
perceived lack of leadership and engagement is again raised as an issue as to why there is a 
sense of stagnation in relation to loss and damage at the national level. 
 
“I have definitely seen a change not only in the momentum but also in the ministry. I 
think the biggest thing really is the change in leadership at higher levels, you just don’t 
have the same tripartite leadership from the minister really driving things because that 
was important definitely.” (Participant 1: Bangladesh Civil Society Member, 
Researcher). 
 
As loss and damage has been raised as a potential space for new policy development within 
Bangladesh, those from civil society have seen three separate sets of ministers across their time 
of engagement, and yet, there has still been little movement to solidify a National Mechanism 
for loss and damage. While P2 remained more optimistic post the recent election, they 
recognise that initially the desire to move the process forward quickly was apparent, but now 
there is a sense of stagnation surrounding loss and damage at the national level.  
 
“From the Government, honestly there is not any champions within the government. 
It’s really being approached, its standing at a block. I know that he’s [MOEF 
representative] is not necessarily someone like the ex-Deputy Secretary [MOEF] who 
was very dynamic, who pushed things, so I think things are stagnating.” (Participant 2: 
Bangladesh Civil Society Member). 
 
The difficulty in engaging multiple rounds of people at the ministry and the lack of tripartite 
leadership between the two involved ministry and civil society has greatly affected the 
movement and development of loss and damage national level policy development. The sense 
of ownership of policy is highly problematic alongside the change in leadership and a 
subsequent lack of engagement makes it very difficult for CSOs to continually engage with 
government on loss and damage policy development.  
Page | 77  
 
6.4 Stake holders in international negotiations 
 
6.4.1 Differences in framing between global North and global South 
 
The most vulnerable countries are often developing countries, who have contributed least to 
climate change. They claim that developed countries (the global North) are liable for the loss 
and damage they are now facing and the likelihood that this loss and damage will continue.  
P6, a member of civil society tasked with working with LDC countries on loss and damage, 
expands on this point.  
 
 “Since from the very beginning it was about who pays basically, who is responsible 
for the damage that emerges. […] We require support from you to deal with the 
consequences of your emissions. It is in their [vulnerable developing countries] interest 
to have the resources to keep surviving.” (Participant 6: Advisor to LDCs on loss and 
damage). 
 
P6 also recognises the reluctance of the global North to enter into discussions of liability.  
 
“At the same time, on the other side it is in the interest of countries who would 
potentially have to pay. To say, no.  First of all its hard to say what is loss and damage 
and you should manage your resources way better. Secondly, they also say it is 
unethical to already give up and we need to put all our resources all our efforts into 
avoiding and minimizing impacts. So I think, I’m convinced that it is politically 
motivated. Each country in the political space are speaking from self-interest.” 
(Participant 6: Advisor to LDCs on loss and damage). 
 
By questioning developing nations on their use of resources, and having their approach be 
focused on mitigation and adaptation practices as opposed to responding to the question of loss 
and damage, negates discussions of compensation and liability. It is true, while mitigation and 
adaptation play a massive role in responding to anthropogenic climate change, the question of 
whether loss and damage will take place is not really negotiable in the minds of people in 
developing nations, who are already experiencing loss and damage, and those who are 
experiencing it do not have adequate resources to respond to it.  
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This political nature of the positions countries hold transfers into the narrative around loss and 
damage and how it is understood under the UNFCCC. P6 discusses the idea of constructed 
ambiguity, meaning the use of particular language is used in an ambiguous way, often to frame 
a sensitive or political issue, like that of loss and damage. This tactic has been used by 
developed nations to avoid discussions of liability and compensation. The global North and 
countries who both have been major emitters in the past and countries who continue to emit 
today frame and discuss loss and damage in a manner that allows them to avoid conversations 
about accountability for damages and to avoid discussions about direct funding for loss and 
damage (Hoffmeister& Roberts. 2016).  The way in which it has ultimately been framed and 
how different parties view this framing is further complicated due to the lack of a concrete 
definition and evidence for loss and damage:  
 
“So within the UNFCCC you have this whole thing around constructed ambiguity 
where different parties mean different things. You have the risk framing where all 
potential impacts of climate change are loss and damage, and the goal of policies is to 
avoid these impacts, so sort of the adaptation kind of framing where loss and damage 
is always something in the future, it’s a risk, we are always looking forward, and we 
are putting all our efforts into minimising those risks.” (Participant 6: Advisor to LDCs 
on loss and damage). 
 
By looking at loss and damage as something that is always in the future and something to be 
avoided directly negates the reality of vulnerable people who are already experiencing loss and 
damages. P6 continues by explaining the counter argument.  
 
“There are other stakeholders who say, no hang on we have waited too long, it is 
already materialising, we also need to look back, it’s already happening and there 
needs to be resources in place to help countries who are affected, where it hasn’t been 
minimised and avoided, so the risk have materialised into impacts. The affected and 
vulnerable countries will be drawing attention to that. (Participant 6: Advisor to LDCs 
on loss and damage). 
 
Developing nations who are already experiencing the effects of loss and damage and who are 
arguing for compensation and resources to address the impacts are looking for actors to take 
accountability for past actions and respond in a manner that would facilitate climate justice for 
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those facing the impacts of loss and damage. The different narratives from the global North 
and the global South on how to frame and therefore respond to loss and damage discussions is 
complex and the reality of accessing loss and damage only adds to the ambiguous nature of the 
discussion. P6 continues on by explaining a lack of scientific knowledge and base line data is 
often missing in developing countries. This lack of scientific knowledge is problematic. This 
lack of knowledge can lead to an inability to have targeted solutions in certain areas or sectors, 
an ability to understand the adaptive capacity and how this may develop over time. These 
knowledge gaps can contribute to an inability to have pointed discussions, as the background 
basis for such discussions relies on having this data. 
 
“So there is some knowledge gaps if you like, that also impede substantive discussion 
sometimes. Including due to data lag, developing countries are often hit unprepared. 
You don’t actually have the climate data, if you don’t have a proper evaluation of your 
assets, if you don’t really have the data to create your risk profiles, there is hardly 
anything you can do to prepare for unprecedented climate change. So I think nationally 
capacity in developing countries are so under developed. Which gives many developed 
countries an easy way out, saying you don’t even know what you need, so what are you 
asking of us.” (Participant 6: Advisor to LDCs on loss and damage). 
 
The above gives one example of how constructed ambiguity is used in a manner that derails 
discussions.  In order to access loss and damage, baseline data and assessments are needed to 
construct risk profiles or access loss and damage, without such data it is difficult for any 
practical discussions about the required resources or appropriate responses to loss and damage 
to take place. However, without any funding for loss and damage, countries with limited 
resources would find it difficult to produce any of the data and create risk profiles. The lack of 
this data also allows developed nations to avoid having discussions about compensation 
(Hoffmeister& Roberts. 2016). 
 
The ambiguity of what one country or negotiating group means is a continuous theme in 
reference to loss and damage. This was evident in the Subsidiary Body for Implementation 
(SBI) formal and informal consultations on the report of the Executive Committee of the 
Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage associated with Climate Change 
Impacts, at COP24, where I sat and watched the negotiations over multiple days. The opposing 
positions of parties and the process of the negotiations means that all decisions and actions 
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have to be agreed on by everybody. Every sentence, every word has to be decided on by every 
delegate in the room, which later then needs to be approved by the Ministers of each country. 
From watching the negotiations take place, I often found the process tedious.  
 
It is often in some country’s interests to stall and make arguments around particular wordings 
in a sentence, reducing the time for, what might be considered, more important discussion 
topics to take place. Meetings can be extended, sometimes for hours, over wording that to an 
observer might seem inconsequential. The whole document is ‘bracketed’, meaning up for 
negotiation, until the entire document is agreed on. This goes for any document negotiated 
under the UNFCCC COP. Watching this process, I observed the dynamics between the 
different negotiators, some of whom were working together (AOSIS, LDCS, African Group) 
and some of whom were working against the proceedings (China and Saudi Arabia). Given 
that the topic was a series of recommendations to the COP on the work of WIM task force and 
was not highly contentious or problematic in any way, the behaviour was surprising to observe. 
The overarching tensions around loss and damage means that anything labelled with loss and 
damage ultimately becomes something contentious. The different wordings suggested by 
different countries/ negotiating groups, slightly altering the sentence structure or the use of 
words that a previous country/negotiating groups had recommended highlighted the way in 
which a simple change in the wording swayed the meaning of a sentence, often opening up a 
given area to be interpreted in a number of ways.  
 
6.4.2 Alliances and coordination 
 
I attended several Bangladesh delegation meetings during my time at COP24. The delegation 
met every evening at 6pm and allowed civil society representatives from Bangladesh to attend. 
Some of the delegates are academics or specialists and others are ministry members. They 
would go over the meetings each person attended and give feedback on the progress of the 
Agenda items, SBSTA and SBA meetings from the day. Delegates on some days would come 
and report, then immediately return to the negotiation meetings that were running beyond time, 
which is typical of COP meetings. The delegates spoke openly about the politics taking place 
within the meetings and were aware of the proceedings of each other’s works streams. I was 
surprised by the cohesion in the room, considering my prior understanding of some of the local 
level politics within Bangladesh. All members respected what each other had to say and gave 
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feedback or varying perspectives. There was a general sense of coordination and cohesion 
among the group of delegates. 
 
One of the Bangladesh delegates is the lead co coordinator for loss and damage. P7, an active 
member of the Climate Action Network (CAN), explains there is a range of themes in the 
negotiations and introduces the coordinators for loss and damage under the COP who represent 
the LDCs. The role the coordinators take on representing the LDCs is crucial. Often countries 
from the global South like Bangladesh do not have the resources to send large numbers of 
delegates to COP. So, the overarching coordination of groups such as that of the LDCs plays a 
pivotal role of these countries being represented in a manner that they feel as appropriate. 
Countries are free to speak as individual nations in any track, however a lack of representation 
present at the COP can mean one individual may be assigned to multiple tracks, meaning they 
need to be present in multiple negotiation rooms at a given time. P2, a Bangladeshi academic 
and vocal advocate, explains that the LDC group for loss and damage has a coordination 
meeting every year, in order to draw up their collective strategy for the negotiations. They 
invite experts to come and contribute to the discussions, later involving other negotiating 
groups: 
 
“In between this from the 16th to the 18th of May the LDC group are having an LDC 
meeting in Bhutan, chaired by Bhutan, Hafijj will brief them on what to do, from an 
LDC perspective. Hafijj is the LDC negotiator in the loss and damage track. This is all 
his official activities. He will try and get the LDC chair, the LDC group to support our 
strategy going forward. Have a meeting in June have the chair come, be ready with a 
game plan for COP25.” (Participant 2: Bangladesh Civil Society Member). 
 
P2 explains that there is a strategy going into COP; LDCs coordinate across all negotiating 
tracks and ready themselves for the negotiations as a group. They identify what is important to 
them, how they are going to negotiate given agenda items and have a clear plan of where they 
are flexible and where they draw their bottom lines, and they may draft texts prior to the 
negotiations on certain points. This level of coordination allows for a cohesive argument to be 
built, alignment between different countries within a negotiating group and sometimes different 
negotiating groups and for a consistent message to be repeated coming from the global South 
about their expectations and requirements.  
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P2 further explains how the LDCs engages with other countries from the global South through 
pre-cop coordination meetings and the inter-sessional meetings. Through this coordination the 
collective group then has the ability to arrive at the COP with prepared plan, with draft 
documents and a strategic way of moving forward as a collective. 
 
“Now within the inside track negotiations, which we [Bangladesh] are involved, with 
Hafij on behalf of the LDC group. Reaching out to AOSIS, AILAC and the GAFS. LDCs 
have already established within COP24 a good working relationship, with the pre-COP 
workshop, so we are going to do that again. The four groups have got a game plan, this 
is what we want to do to work together on this. Our success was quite good at doing 
that in the past.” (Participant 2: Bangladesh Civil Society Member). 
 
This coordination allows for the countries represented within these four groups, to form a 
collective. It allows one person to represent a huge number of countries. When a resounding 
number of people stand up repeating the same message, there is a greater impact. 
 
6.5 International obstacles 
 
In this section, international level challenges are discussed, that are causing stagnation of loss 
and damage within the COP process. Challenges to the development of loss and damage 
include a lack of knowledge or understanding and funding issues.  
 
6.5.1 Lack of knowledge or understanding 
 
P8, a member of the UNFCCC engaged with loss and damage negotiations, explains that a lack 
of understanding of what loss and damage is leads to a lack of consensus around a definition 
for loss and damage. People also do not know what climate change and its impacts mean for 
the people experiencing the effects. P8 further explains that people tend to act after having an 
understanding of a given situation. However, this approach may lead to missed opportunities 
to tackle climate change and loss and damage. Waiting for further understanding may mean 
that the potential to act now and change the given situation will only diminish with time as the 
opportunities to react accordingly to loss and damage and to prevent loss and damage are 
reduced.   
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“I think that one of the biggest challenges is we don’t really understand what loss and 
damage means. People tend to act once they understand, and by the time we understand 
the consequences of our communal choices as humanities, a lot of the changes will be 
locked into the system. Our biggest challenge is we are too slow, we don’t understand 
the consequence, by the time we do we will have missed those windows.  We are going 
to have new windows of opportunity, but we are going to head into a new world and 
this beautiful planet we live in, we may not have those kinds of chances in the future.” 
(Participant 8: Member of UNFCCC). 
 
P8 explains that people generally move slowly or cautiously, wanting to understand the entire 
context and the potential outcomes of a given intervention. However, with this hesitation, there 
is less time to act, meaning that the potential to prevent loss and damages through actions 
implemented now diminishes. People want to make informed decisions, however on the flip 
side this is also used as a reason to stall processes and prolong action. While loss and damage 
is politically charged and in some circumstances dealing with very sensitive issues, for example 
the loss of lives, there are certain responses in the broader context of climate change that are 
clear solutions to current problems, such as the immediate reduction of carbon emissions. As 
further expanded on by P8 further below.  
 
“We are so short sighted in our decision making and the decisions that we are making 
basically by default, a hesitancy to act boldly in reducing emissions and changing our lifestyles. 
A lot of time it’s not rocket science. We know the right things to do. We don’t do them and we 
are going to, we already feel the consequences. I think a lot of those consequences will result 
in loss and damage, even though we don’t have a strict definition and we don’t know how to 
measure loss and damage. The negative consequences of our hesitancies are just getting 
started. I think that’s the biggest challenge for loss and damage.” (Participant 8: Member of 
UNFCCC). 
 
As described in the previous section and as highlighted in the above quote, the lack of 
knowledge around loss and damage is being used by some as a reason for inaction. However, 
the continued hesitancy in the process of addressing loss and damage, ultimately means there 
are no processes for compensation and genuine action plans for loss and damage being 
implemented. Rather a process of learning is taking place. P9, an active member of Climate 
Action Network, clarifies that although things are moving slowly there is the recognition that 
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loss and damage needs to be addressed and as such there has been research conducted under 
the Executive Committee of the WIM. Despite this, P8 would like to see loss and damage 
moving at a faster pace. 
 
“I can see that the issue of loss and damage is slowly coming up, not in the way that 
we want but the issue is now there right at centre in the international context and 
nobody can disagree. Things are moving there; I would say a little bit slowly. Let’s say 
there are many task forces under the Warsaw International Mechanism that are moving 
forward. Like non-economy losses, like task force on displacement, things are moving 
ahead, maybe in a slow level, but not at the pace that we want.” (Participant 8: Member 
of UNFCCC). 
 
Civil society members generally have a desire for discussions to move forward within the 
UNFCCC, and while they acknowledge that there is always room for learning, exploring 
examples of loss and damage, and disseminating knowledge surrounding loss and damage, 
civil society members engaged in loss and damage discussions would like to see some form of 
mechanism to deploy resources for dealing with the impacts of loss and damage, for example 
the transfer of technologies and funding for loss and damage. Civil society has played a massive 
role in framing loss and damage, bringing lessons and the stories of those effected by loss and 
damage, and understanding the potential impacts certain countries or people may face to the 
forefront of discussions within the UNFCCC.  
 
6.5.2 Funding issues 
 
The concept of loss and damage, and in particular the way in which it might be addressed in 
Bangladesh, always comes back to the need for funding and support. All the interviewees in 
this research made it clear that they believed that those countries who had benefitted most 
through practices that have contributed to climate change, have a legal and moral responsibility 
to offer compensation through funding, technology transfer and expertise to those countries 
who were facing the repercussions of climate change most severely. The basis for this demand 
is reflected in international law: including concepts of ‘polluter pays’, human rights and the 
principle of ‘no harm’ (Setzer and Byrnes, 2019), (Khan, 2015), (Lyster, 2017).  P7 summarises 
this view: 
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“Obviously rich countries have an obligation to pay for loss and damage, because they 
are the ones who have caused the majority of climate change. The loss and damage 
that is being suffered stems from essentially their development. They got rich off the 
back of fossil fuels, which have gone on to cause climate change but now they don’t 
want to pay for the damage they have caused, in order to develop their economies and 
get rich. So, they have an obligation to pay for loss and damage, morally but also in 
international law if you cause damage, to another state you have got an obligation to 
provide restitution.” (Participant 7: CAN member and advocate for loss and damage). 
 
The establishment of WIM and the Paris Agreement (Article 8) reflect a very general notion 
that loss and damage should be addressed. However, both stand back from demanding 
accountability, liability and compensation from wealthier countries, and this has allowed 
discussions to become bogged down in vague recommendations about the potential role of the 
insurance industry or ideas about support that avoid any implication of accountability. This in 
turn is reflected in UNFCCC documents which acknowledge the need for ‘enhancing action 
and support’ which may include the need for finance, but fail to identify the fundamental issues 
of who should be paying for loss and damage, and discussions of liability and accountability. 
In this way funding is identified as ‘aid’ rather than ‘compensation’. P4 notes that:  
 
“I think the number one biggest obstacle is that it brings elements of liability and 
compensation that countries especially the US, but what would be industrialized 
countries have been avoiding since the UNFCCC was created. The notion of liability 
has been completely stricken out of every UNFCCC document for the last three 
decades. I just think they just don’t know what to do with that.  So, I think you can’t get 
any clear language on it because anything that is definitive gets really close to 
compensation of liability and that just something, definitely the US and other developed 
countries don’t want in there, and they will just strike it.” (Participant 4: Researcher 
and advocate for loss and damage). 
 
P5 comments on the limitations of WIM to have provide any firm basis for action or results: 
 
“The developed countries put three conditions – no historical emission business; no 
reference to compensation; and no reference to a global insurance mechanism. If you 
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take these three out, then where are the teeth and nails of a loss and damage 
mechanism?” (Participant 5: Bangladesh delegation member). 
 
For the participants in this study the lack of action in progressing issues of liability are a source 
of considerable concern. They perceive rich countries as deliberately obfuscating and avoiding 
the issue. In essence it is a Pandora’s box that they wish to avoid opening, but this means that 
not only is funding not forthcoming, but the immediate consequences of loss and damage are 
not addressed either, so that the most vulnerable countries and communities are left to deal 
with the issues without any support. P7 summarises the issue: 
 
“I think this is really one main obstacles, people create other ‘obstacles’ in inverted 
commas in order to hide the main one. The main one is that rich countries do not want 
to pay. In my opinion it is the middle, the beginning, and the end of the argument or the 
objections/obstacles. So, they come up with all sorts of extremely tortuous reasons 
about why we can’t discuss this or why we can’t discuss that, because they are trying 
to avoid paying for loss and damage [….]By talking about enhancing action and 
support, setting that as a mandate, as one of the elements of the mandates of the WIM. 
Then that was reinforced in the Paris Agreement where they talked about providing 
finance on a collaborative and facilitative basis. So, they have agreed over and over 
again to provide support for loss and damage, but they keep (they, being rich countries) 
keep putting all the blocks in they possibly can, slowing all the talks down, making sure 
the WIM has no money to actually do much. So instead of talking about finance we end 
up talking about financial instruments and insurance in particular. So, they can help 
their friends in the insurance industry. So, there are multiple blockers on multiple 
fronts, in order to ensure they don’t have to pay for the damage they have caused by 
allowing climate change to unfold.” (Participant 7: CAN member and advocate for loss 
and damage). 
 
Although discussion of who is accountable and who should pay has been blocked or avoided, 
there is extensive literature and associated discussions exploring different financial 
mechanisms and insurance for loss and damage. However, as P7 emphasises in this quote, 
without conversations about accountability, compensation and funding none of the proposed 
mechanisms can move forward. P6 emphasised the crucial role that NGOs are playing in trying 
to move discussions along so that more innovative ideas of who should pay can be explored: 
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“The question is more where the funds will come from and here you know particularly 
NGOs, not only NGOs, but the loudest, we are calling for implementation of the polluter 
pays principle so a carbon levy or a share of financial transaction tax going into loss 
and damage, things like that.” (Participant 6: Advisor to LDCs on loss and damage). 
 
Other interviewees in this research also noted the possibility of including a carbon levy, in the 
form of an international airline passenger levy, or a climate damages tax on fossil fuel 
companies. From their perspective such measures have the potential to target those directly 
responsible for climate change (as opposed to the idea of ‘insurance’, in which responsibility 
for damage can be overlooked). 
 
NGOs, CSOs and academics have been at the forefront in making demands for compensation, 
and continually raising these issues in different fora including the UNFCCC. P2 for example, 
explains that while these discussions are not happening within the official meetings of the 
UNFCCC, NGOs and CSOs work hard to create spaces in which these discussions might take 
place:  
 
“On this issue of finance, at the end of the WIM meeting where NGOs are allowed to 
sit in as observers, we on behalf of the NGOs, if you are not going to take finance onto 
your agenda, to talk about it. Then we the observers are offering to hold a workshop 
on this topic at the intersessional in June in Bonn. Where we would like you to come, 
invite others and have a discussion around this issue. This offer is now made, we from 
the NGO side are planning.” (Participant 2: Bangladesh Civil Society Member). 
 
It is pertinent that civil society, despite their frustration with inaction inside the official tracks 
of the UNFCCC, has a space within the COP, in which they can have more ambitious and 
productive discussions. The civil society side of the COP (the green zone) allows for a broader 
range of topics and perspectives to be heard, and increasingly they provide an opportunity for 
the voices of developing and vulnerable nations to be heard. I observed that the closing plenary 
session of the SBI of COP24 was dominated by contributions from developing nations and 
civil society representatives talking about their disdain for the lack of movement and lack of 
funding for loss and damage. 
 




It is clear that loss and damage is a particularly contentious issue at both national and 
international levels, and that political and economic forces have effectively undermined the 
need for this aspect of climate change impacts to be addressed. 
Bangladesh is the only country to have a draft policy on loss and damage. However, political 
issues have meant that progress on policy development has stalled. The policy itself still 
requires considerable research to ensure that it will adequately and effectively ensure that 
funding and support reaches those who need it in ways that are culturally appropriate and meet 
the demands of social justice, climate justice and human rights. 
Reasons cited by politicians for not supporting the ratification of the draft policy rest heavily 
on the claim that funding for refining the draft policy should come from international sources. 
NGOs and CSOs argue that unless the policy is developed and seen to exist in a substantive 
way, the case for funding by the international community will not be strong enough to garner 
the respect and attention that the issue deserves. Representatives of NGOs and CSOs also 
perceive the lack of progress on the part of the government as due to conflicting agendas on 
the part of government agencies in terms of who ‘owns’ loss and damage. They are concerned 
that a lack of a national policy will mean that support from the international community for 
those negatively impacted by climate change will be provided in ways that are not locally 
driven, and will not adequately address issues of climate justice, nor necessarily be appropriate 
to the cultural context. 
At the international level, some acknowledgement of loss and damage resulted in the drawing 
up of WIM and Article 8 of the Paris Agreement. However the refusal of the Global North to 
acknowledge liability, responsibility and accountability has effectively made progress on loss 
and damage in terms of really addressing the impact of climate change impossible. Essentially, 
the concept of compensation has been rejected (because it reflects underlying assumptions of 
cause/responsibility/blame). NGOs and CSOs have been proactive and consistent in raising 
issues of climate justice at international levels, despite the blocks that have been put in their 
way. 
The interplay between these national and international political contexts means that any 
progress for Bangladesh in terms of addressing loss and damage has come to a standstill. As 
participants in this research continually asserted: this lack of action is not an option, because 
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climate change is happening and its impacts are most felt by those who have least resources, 
and have done least to cause the current situation. 
 
6.7 Conclusion  
 
Despite these difficulties there is huge potential and willingness in Bangladesh (within the 
NGO, CSO communities) to make progress with the National Policy. There is also considerable 
support from the wider international community in terms of the potential for Bangladesh to 
provide leadership in how loss and damage might be used to address climate and social justice 
in other vulnerable countries. 
Moreover, through developing their own national level mechanism, Bangladesh has the 
potential to inform other countries and the UNFCCC of the processes and structures they have 
put in place at a national level to address loss and damage. These local level actions then tie 
into the international negotiations through the presence and representation of Bangladesh at the 
international level. This national level movement allows Bangladesh to develop their local 
level approaches, responding to their own needs and highlighting the needs and support they 
may need from the international level. Additionally, this prepares Bangladesh for the flow of 
technology, funding, guidance, support and international response structures for loss and 
damage, as they arise, as systems are already in place and support has been identified and then 
voiced at the international level. 
While Bangladesh at the national level has both strengths and obstacles to face, the potential 
to influence international negotiations alongside other developing nations is strong. Movement 
of a national level policy has vast potential to strengthen the success of loss and damage 
development and responses at the international level. Support from civil society both nationally 
and internationally is strong, and arguments of justice play a crucial role in the response and 
argument for loss and damage. The strength of the collective of developing nations will only 
proceed to push developed nations to respond to international demands and ultimately move 
loss and damage forward. This support and collective response allow those nations most 
affected by loss and damage to prepare themselves better when faced with further loss and 
damage at the national level. 
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CHAPTER 7: NAVIGATING THE STORM: DRAWING IT 





The previous chapter explored the varying perspectives of CSO members at the national level 
and international level, their opinions on national loss and damage policy development, their 
engagement at the international UNFCCC negotiations and the potential interplay between 
these two different areas. In looking to answer the research questions, this chapter now 
discusses these findings, supported further with participant voices, engaging also with loss and 
damage literature some of which was presented earlier in the thesis. Discussions of the 
development of compensation, liability, the role of CSOs and Bangladesh in the international 
climate negotiations will ensue and a summary discussion concludes this research.  
 
7.2 Bangladesh stakeholders negotiating the development of National 
Mechanism for Loss and Damage 
 
The following section responds to the first research question proposed in this thesis: How are 
key stakeholders within Bangladesh negotiating the development of a National Mechanism for 
loss and damage?  
 
7.2.1 Bangladesh National Policy  
 
The lack of an instituted loss and damage policy means that a mechanism for actions and 
practical steps within Bangladesh does not exist. The first draft for the National Mechanism 
for loss and damage was completed and presented in July 2017.  The development of the policy 
drew on the knowledge of many of the participants from this research. To date, the draft policy 
has not been accepted, formalised or implemented by the government and remains in limbo.  
 
The launch of a two-year work programme was announced in January 2019, but as of February 
2020 approval from the finance ministry was still pending, and no work has taken place (Huq, 
2020, Personal Communications). Clearly, if a policy is neither instituted or actioned, it will 
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have little impact on addressing the implications of loss and damage. On a practical note, 
without an instituted loss and damage policy, it seems futile to continue to speak of 
Bangladesh’s development of a national mechanism to address loss and damage. As described 
by P4, as long as the national mechanism remains something in theory, it has minimal impact 
on addressing the multitude of issues faced. Until there is a framework in place guiding 
procedures and processes that are channelling actions, providing money or support to those 
affected by the impacts of loss and damage, little will be achieved. The proposed policy, when 
raised four years ago, seemed progressive and proactive, now there are many examples of real 
experiences of loss and damage (Huq, 2020, Personal Communications). 
 
P4 among other participants, stated that until Bangladesh has implemented and has a 
functioning policy from which lessons can be learnt, there is little influence that the policy 
could have:  
 
“As long as the national mechanism remains a thing in theory then, not actually 
happening. I think most international folk don’t even think or are even aware that 
Bangladesh is even trying to create a national mechanism on loss and damage. That 
said if one were to be created and it led to any sort of framework I think in a real way 
because of the status as one of the most vulnerable countries in the world. I think it 
would be something the international community would pay attention to.” (Participant 
4: Researcher and advocate for loss and damage). 
 
There is hope, representation and a strong message at the international level from Bangladesh 
and other LDCs on will continue to show that there is a need to address loss and damage. Until 
there is a concrete policy or framework for addressing loss and damage in the wake of climate 
change impacts, the potential footprint Bangladesh can have as a leader on loss and damage is 
limited. 
 
Bangladesh has a broad range of climate change policies, including the Bangladesh Climate 
Change Strategy Action Plan, National Adaptation Programme of Action, Nationally 
Determined Contributions and the associated funds the Bangladesh Climate Change Trust Fund 
and the Bangladesh Climate Change Resilience Fund. These policies address a broad range of 
climate change-related issues (Pervin, Barua, Immam et al., 2019, MoEF 2005). However, the 
lack of a legislative, institutional and policy-related mechanism to address loss and damage 
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impacts, presents a significant divide in holistic climate change mandate (M. Haque et al., 
2018). The figure below outlines the three main pillars of climate change and links them with 
the associated national level climate change policies of Bangladesh. It also highlights that loss 
and damage has no established associated policy presently.  
 
 
Figure 7.1: International pillars of Climate Change under the UNFCC and related national 
policy                                               
Source: Author 
 
Developing nations, including Bangladesh, have long argued that loss and damage should be 
considered the third pillar of climate change approaches under the UNFCCC framework, and 
through the adoption of a climate justice approach, developing nations have been pushing for 
a compensation mechanism (Taub et al., 2016). The development of national policy would 
reflect this approach at the national level and would have the potential to tie into the UNFCCC 
framework proactively and responsively. P4 continued expanding on this idea. 
 
“I think it would be influential in shaping international agendas on loss and damage if 
it provided some sort of framework of it that could be based on. I think when it comes 
to climate change people look to Bangladesh or pay attention to what’s going on in 
Bangladesh as a place where it is really happening. If Bangladesh can figure stuff out 
on its own and tell the world how to do it even better.” (Participant 4: Researcher and 
advocate for loss and damage). 
 
Bangladesh has the potential to develop local, targeted solutions to loss and damage that are 
clear and efficient and appropriate.  
 
On a practical note, adaptation and disaster risk reduction policies are reducing some of the 
impacts of loss and damage. Bangladesh has a range of policies, and while not explicitly 
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addressing loss and damage, they are playing an essential role in avoiding some of the impacts 
of climate change. Bangladesh has put in advanced efforts to integrate and coordinate disaster 
risk reduction (DRR) efforts and climate change adaptation (CCA) (Puig, Calliari, Hossain, 
Bakhtiari, Huq, 2019). 
 
If  Bangladesh fails to address the vulnerabilities and impacts of climate change, both presently 
and in the future, it becomes more apparent that they will be unable to address issues and 
protect those who are vulnerable against future projected impacts (Awal, 2013; Coirolo, 
Commins, Haque, Pierce, 2013). Loss and damage can be addressed in some part through social 
safety net programmes. Expanding or improving existing social safety net programmes and 
frameworks, including elements of losses and damages posed by anthropogenic climate 
change, would enable those most vulnerable to cope with these effects at the community and 
individual level (Coirolo, et al. 2013). An integrated programme that includes traditional safety 
social nets, coordinating between Disaster Risk Reduction and Response, Social Safety Nets 
and Climate Change Adaptation would contribute significantly (Awal, 2014). Currently, social 
safety net programmes criteria and targeting criteria are homogenous across the country, 
thereby failing to account for the many dimensions faced by their target audience (Coirolo, et 
al. 2013). These social safety net programmes do not account for social circumstances or 
livelihood resilience; also, they fail to recognise the added impacts of climate change. 
 
As this research has highlighted there is a need for a coordinated policy response from the 
Government to address loss and damage. In order to do this, there is a need to improve targeting 
mechanisms, especially in the broadening context of climate change and its associated loss and 
damage. Targeting requires the consideration of geographic location, intensity of disasters and 
the consideration of slow-onset climatic events (Awal, 2014; Rahman & Choudhury, 2012). 
Disaster response activities in Bangladesh are currently positioned across roughly 20 agencies 
that include a variety of ministries and CSOs, and this means that the management of response 
efforts and distribution coordination is a difficult challenge when responding to disasters 
promptly (Coirolo, et al. 2013).   
 
This research has highlighted also the difficulties in coordination across ministries and across 
electoral cycles, and the current lack of engagement from Government on loss and damage. 
Therefore, without a coordinated effort to address loss and damage from the government, the 
role again will fall on civil society networks and NGOs to address loss and damage, through 
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associated programmes or social safety nets. While this is in some form an answer to loss and 
damage, as described above currently these programmes fail to distinguish between those who 
are vulnerable and between those who are vulnerable to the effects of climate change (Awal, 
2913). 
 
Social protection instruments theoretically can be used to support adaptation goals, thereby 
reducing the impacts of loss and damage. However, these frameworks need a massive overhaul 
to address the risks, shocks and vulnerabilities faced. The expected increase in loss and 
damages from intensifying effects of climate change will require social safety net programmes 
to be redesigned, including the development of targeting, administration and funding. This 
process would improve the government’s ability and capacity to manage, monitor and evaluate 
social safety net programmes in the light of climate change (Coirolo, et al. 2013). 
 
The process of developing social safety net programmes in order to address loss and damages 
will, however, require inputs from the government, including research, funding, and policy 
development. As this research has suggested throughout, without the resources to address loss 
and damage, whether from the Government at the initial stage or whether from international 
funding, there is little civil society can do to address loss and damage at the local level. The 
proposal of social safety net programmes is one new way of managing loss and damage, 
without replicating existing frameworks, allowing loss and damage to be incorporated into 
already existing programmes and tools. Building on an existing framework that has proven to 
in some part to address the vulnerabilities that exist in the country seems more productive than 
the alternative. Without addressing the long-term effects of climate change the government 
will by default undermine their current efforts of forwarding other human development and 
human rights outcomes in Bangladesh. A coordinated effort and recognition of loss and damage 
is needed by the government to bring in coordinated policy response. 
 
7.2.2 Bangladesh, a leader on loss and damage 
 
As highlighted in this research, Bangladesh has shown a remarkable level of leadership and 
has the potential through a national level policy to expand this leadership role and exemplify 
that they are not passive actors in climate change discussions by implementing a national level 
policy. P8 explains this here:  
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“It is remarkable for a least developed country like Bangladesh, to say hey we are 
going to do this. We are going to set up a mechanism and this is so important that we 
are just going to dive in and do that. It’s great that a country would do that it’s a great 
example and, in a way, that it sends to the international community is that a country 
like Bangladesh is doing what they can, it’s not waiting, it’s not passive. It’s really 
actively showing leadership. Both, moral leadership, intellectual leadership, as well as 
really practically getting it done. I think that’s really positive” (Participant 8: Member 
of UNFCCC). 
 
Bangladesh has emerged as a leader in climate change. As a vulnerable nation accustomed to 
dealing with the impacts of climate change, (Ali, 1996) Bangladeshis have a vast range of 
knowledge on the ground and at the policy level dealing with the impacts of climate (Haque et 
al. 2019).  In 2009 the Government developed a comprehensive climate change strategy and 
action plan, alongside a national fund for climate change using their own resources, the first 
country globally to do so (Haque et al. 2019).   This is an example of Bangladesh’s leadership, 
which has sent a message to the global community that despite being a developing nation they 
are willing to tackle climate change head on, despite governance issues and limited resources. 
The vibrant CSO community has greatly contributed to the expansion and success of the 
Governments actions around climate change and are now pushing for loss and damage policy 
development.  
 
The range of leadership displayed by Bangladesh is varied. From the perspective of the 
negotiations, Bangladesh delegates and the Government, have used different diplomatic and 
negotiation tactics and skills, setting the agenda on loss and damage and prioritizing this issue. 
From a CSO perspective, members have organised side events, given presentations, engaged 
in discussions and helped initiate the declaration of Bangladesh’s National Mechanism, 
shaping the framing and discussions on loss and damage within the COP (Corneloup & Mol 
2013).  This entrepreneurial or moral leadership has given voice to the perspective of 
Bangladesh on loss and damage, influencing the manner in which loss and damage is presented 
in the context of institutional bargaining, bringing a multitude of willing actors together 
(Young, 1991).  
 
Moreover, Bangladesh actors have also contributed greatly to the science and the framing of 
loss and damage concept, the knowledge generated has greatly influenced the movement of 
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loss and damage discussion within the UNFCCC as explored within the previous chapter.  The 
knowledge generated has informed the formation of new concepts and innovative solutions and 
has greatly influenced the perspectives of those involved and helped influence the positions 
countries represent in the negotiations (Andersson & Mol 2002). This intellectual leadership 
has had a strong impact on shaping the arguments for loss and damage, specifically from a 
climate justice perspective (Corneloup & Mol 2013).  
 
In terms of advancing the loss and damage discussion, Bangladesh could greatly improve their 
role as leaders if they developed a national level policy and associated practices. By doing so 
they would show their continued commitment to tackling climate change. It would also 
legitimize the position they hold as climate change leaders and specifically on tackling loss and 
damage within the negotiation position and thereby build greater leverage within the 
negotiations (Andersson & Mol 2002). This sort of environmental leadership would solidify 
the reality of loss and damage, build on the interests and ideas they have previously expressed 
and further the discourse on loss and damage (Corneloup & Mol 2013). 
 
Leadership is closely aligned with the idea of power (Baillat, 2018). Baillat (2018) describes 
Bangladesh as a “Weak Power Climate Leader”, by which she means the ability for Bangladesh 
to transform their vulnerabilities to climate change into a comparative advantage, by increasing 
their influence in the negotiations. The above described leadership style has contributed greatly 
to the increased presence of Bangladesh within the UNFCCC negotiations. Developing a 
national policy for loss and damage would respond to the currently excluded loss and damage 
elements within existing national climate change policy and further broaden the argument for 
loss and damage in the international arena and strongly support the continuation of the 
argument for climate justice, liability and compensation.  
 
7.2.3 CSO community and policy development 
 
The role of CSOs and civil society members as advocates has been pivotal in loss and damage 
policy briefing and development at the local level. Realistically the only pressure and activities 
keeping loss and damage relevant in this context have been performed by a small number of 
individuals from CSOs. The strength of these actions had kept some pressure on the 
government, maintaining awareness of loss and damage developments and awareness of the 
small movements that have taken place under previous ministers. While Bangladesh aligns 
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itself with LDCs and other developing nations on this issue within the international 
negotiations, locally, the internal politics means no one ministry has managed to take the 
drafted policy and turn this into anything of substance.  Until someone within the current 
relevant ministry recognises and responds to the challenges and obstacles and takes the role of 
forwarding the movement of this policy as a top priority, it will remain in the hands of CSOs. 
 
There have been huge difficulties in getting ministries to prioritise loss and damage. Nixon 
(2011) discusses the notion of politicians adopting environmental issues, including those of 
climate change, explaining that often these issues are added to Ministers’ portfolios when there 
are resources available and soon dropped when resources become tight. Preventative policies 
and legislation that address actions, what Nixon (2011) describes as “slow violence” such as 
loss and damage, do not deliver electoral cycle results, therefore they are often not prioritised, 
despite the long-term benefits of addressing preventative or remedial issues. Considering that 
loss and damage currently has no funding, this further impedes the political will to adopt and 
implement further actions. Functional policy again is limited by the lack of resources and the 
politics of short-term electoral cycles, which means that underfunded or overstretched 
ministries, who are best suited to implement this policy lack the political motivation to do so. 
 
Civil society organisations have long played an essential role in representing the most 
vulnerable, advocating for the rights of those people or communities. CSOs have a long 
tradition also of putting pressure on governments. While this has been the case regarding a 
national level mechanism to address loss and damage, it is difficult to maintain this pressure 
across many election cycles. In 2019 a new set of ministers came into power after the recent 
electoral cycle, the third cycle of ministers to now potentially engage with the drafted loss and 
damage policy. CSOs working on loss and damage again have to introduce these new ministers 
within the MOEFCC and the MDRR to the idea of loss and damage, again beginning the cycle 
of building their awareness of this issue and educating them on why this is something 
Bangladesh needs to be addressing. While many environmental issues, including climate 
change, are viewed as critical, they are not considered urgent. As noted previously, this then 
leads to generational cycles of politicians deferring action on specific issues, adding to a pile-
up of deferred actions (Nixon, 2011). 
 
The frustration displayed by civil society representatives’ comments on funding and state delay 
tactics was palpable during my interviews. This lack of movement has greatly impacted the 
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lack of movement on the agenda of loss and damage, and is due in part to the absence of 
exchange between CSOs and government, despite the efforts of CSOs. CSOs have been active 
participants in the areas of economic development, poverty alleviation, climate change 
planning and disaster management capabilities within Bangladesh. Despite this and the long 
history of CSOs engaging throughout Bangladesh’s history, CSOs involved with climate 
change issues are still at the early stage of engaging the wider CSO community and the 
government on the challenges of impacts. There are three potential contributing factors to the 
limited uptake of loss and damage action amongst CSOs that have been distilled from this 
research. Firstly, CSOs are largely funded by external donors, meaning they are resource 
dependent on foreign sources. As a result, this often defines the scope and agenda of the 
projects and the advocacy roles CSOs take on. Pointedly, climate change especially issues 
related to loss and damage planning, are not included in broader programmes and interventions, 
or given their own mandates within an organisation. Secondly, due to close donor ties and other 
contributing factors, CSOs are not aligned in their approach towards activities, often working 
along fragmented pathways. As a result, they lack networks among themselves and the public 
sector and as a result are less effective in knowledge sharing and building greater influence 
(Pervin et al., 2019). Thirdly, climate change issues, including adaptation and loss and damage, 
have not been mainstreamed into the agendas of CSOs across all sectors. Climate change is not 
being treated as a cross cutting issue, despite the fact most CSOs programmes and projects and 
the lives of those they seek to support will be directly or indirectly affected by climate change 
(Pervin et al., 2019). To truly address climate change impacts, mainstreaming of this issue is 
needed within the mandates of CSOs. Furthermore, there is a need for widespread financial 
and technical and technological support needed from the international community, for this to 
be implemented there are also the need for pre-conditions, of proper governance structures, 
financial mechanisms and well-functioning and coordinated CSOs. 
 
7.3 Bangladesh stakeholders negotiating the discourse of loss and damage at 
the global level 
 
This section now moves away from national level discussions, to answer the second research 
question which asks: How key stakeholders within Bangladesh [alongside other developing 
nations] are negotiating the discourse of loss and damage at the global level? 
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7.3.1 Alliances and climate justice  
 
Developing country delegates and civil society representatives have navigated the difficult 
discourse of loss and damage and have contributed significantly towards the framing of loss 
and damage as the third pillar under the Paris Agreement. Developing nations have framed loss 
and damage largely along ethical and legal lines, incorporating arguments of climate justice, 
fairness and equity (The Mary Robinson Foundation (2019). This framing has allowed for the 
conceptualisation of loss and damage within international discourse (Vanhala & Hestbaek, 
2016). Through the use of this framing, developing nations have highlighted that climate 
change threatens the survival of entire nations, those often with the least capacity and resources 
to cope with the impacts and those who will disproportionally suffer from the impacts of 
climate change. This has by no means been an easy pathway; the inclusion of Article 8 in the 
Paris Agreement and the development of the Warsaw International Mechanism has been a 
difficult and highly political process. Developed nations have attempted to subvert loss and 
damage arguments into adaptation, disaster risk reduction and humanitarian frameworks, 
pacifying the demands of the developing nations and attempting to frame developing nations 
as indigent passive recipients ready to receive yet another form of ODA funding (Calliari, 
Surminski, Mysiak, 2019).  
 
Alongside this, the use of scientific evidence specifically in relation to attribution issues has 
been employed by developed nations to negate both the ethical and legal arguments of 
developing nations (Calliari, Surminski, Mysiak, 2019).  As argued in Chapter two, developed 
nations have further politized the issue through claiming it is inappropriate to give market 
values to non-economic damages, including the loss of lives, livelihoods and other assets of 
the most vulnerable peoples. Despite this, developing nations have institutionalized loss and 
damage as something beyond adaptation both through the introduction of the Warsaw 
International Mechanism on Loss and Damage in 2/CP19 and as a separate Article under the 
Paris Agreement (Serdeczny, O., Waters, E., Chan, S. 2019). 
 
Power relations are an important consideration to make when considering the role of different 
actors within the climate change negotiations, as argued in chapter three. Those countries with 
more resources and who can send larger delegations to engage in the climate negotiations have 
a perceived sense of stronger negotiating power, seemingly resulting in achieved outcomes 
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mirroring levels of negotiating power. However, the ability of developing nations, despite the 
lack of resources and capacity to engage in the negotiations in the same manner developed 
nations, has been through the use of discursive or collective power (Calliari, Surminski, 
Mysiak, 2019). The strong ties and coalitions built between developing nations has contributed 
largely to the shaping of climate change arguments and the resulting Paris Agreement 
document and particularly in regard to loss and damage. Developing nations have worked in a 
manner that has allowed for significant outcomes (Calliari, Surminski, Mysiak, 2019). The 
outcomes of COP24 with the inclusion of loss and damage reporting within the Paris Rule 
book, at the last minute, once again shows the use of discursive power and developing nations 
ability to push for more equitable outcomes within the UNFCCC. 
 
Loss and damage under the Paris Agreement has never had an equal footing with mitigation 
and adaptation under the Paris Agreement, however COP24 saw the (mostly) finalised 
guidelines for the PA under the Paris Agreement rule book. The rulebook contains rules and 
guidelines detailing how the Paris Agreement will operate in practice, including individual 
countries Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs), and how they should review and 
communicate their NDCs moving forward, with the view of updating their NDCs every 5 years 
(Cogswell and Dagnet, 2019). Until COP24, Article 8 had no cross reference to any of the 
seemingly associated Articles of the PA, including the Purpose of the Agreement (Article 2), 
in reference to the need for ambitious efforts (Article 3) nor the transparency framework 
(Article 13) and the global stock take (GST/ Article 14).  
 
However, with vehement efforts by the LDCs and other developing nations in the final days of 
negotiations at COP24, loss and damage was included both in the GST and the transparency 
framework under the Paris Agreement rulebook. This framework will allow for the inclusion 
of official reporting on the impacts suffered both in the past and those expected in the future, 
furthermore, the planned actions to avert or minimize these losses and damages and the 
implementation mechanism for these activities. This allows for countries experiencing loss and 
damage, to disclose the support they need to address these impacts. This reporting will then 
contribute greatly to the five-year reports of climate change action through the reports of the 
GST (Serdeczny et al. 2019). 
 
The successes of developing nations to shape certain outcomes in the negotiations, evokes 
questions of how nations seemingly lacking in power and thought to be historically passive 
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(ref), manage to challenge asymmetric power relations in order to achieve desired outcomes in 
international climate negotiations. Power dynamics are hugely relevant when looking at the 
outcomes achieved within the negotiation setting(ref); they are complex, with asymmetric and 
multilayered attributes (Calliari, Surminski, Mysiak, 2019). CSOs have contributed greatly to 
levelling the power asymmetries often filling the void of specialist knowledge, capacity and 
resources of developing nations (Banks, E., & Hulme, D. (2012). Moreover, the legal and 
ethical argument used in framing loss and damage (which are further explored in the next 
section) are a means through which developing nations have accomplished sidelining some of 
the interests of certain parties, putting parties on a level footing in regard to loss and damage 
negotiations. This research has showed the power of collectives of developing nations, of 
communication within the Bangladeshi delegation and across the different delegations, and the 
commitment by CSOs and how these groups have worked collectively influencing the process 
of negotiations and forwarding climate justice arguments for loss and damage. The research 
suggests that developing nations, including Bangladesh, use the building of alliances, through 
LDCs and through broader networks from the global South, come together to negotiate on 
behalf of their given groups, but also strengthen their arguments through these broader 
networks. Arguments for justice tie these groups together and the strength in this negotiation 
style allows for those countries from the global South to challenge power asymmetries within 
the COP negotiating process.  
 
 
7.3.2 Loss and damage and traditional development aid 
 
Loss and damage challenges the traditional perceptions of Traditional Overseas Development 
Assistance (ODA). ODA has long described the relationship of financial transfers between the 
global North and South, measuring a narrow set of activities of project-based nature (Slater & 
Bell, 2002).  ODA has served a wide range of political, economic, social and cultural activities 
(Severino &Ray, 2010). However, the main force driving interventions has been geopolitical. 
It has been a means through which nations have maintained a say in former colonies in both 
economic and political realms (Severino & Ray, 2009). Developing countries have long been 
the recipients of funds, that have focused on a small set of development goals, functioning on 
a project by project basis, with the aggregation of development programmes aiming to address 
broader structural issues and promote convergence between colonisers and their colonies 
(Slater & Bell, 2002). ODA was initially designed to measure OECD contributions with little 
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input from recipient countries, resulting in a long association with patronising practices (Slater 
& Bell, 2002). Loss and damage and climate justice seeks to flip this traditional perspective of 
its head, recognising that loss and damage seeks compensation, and should be treated in a 
manner that changes the traditional perceptions of ODA. It is not at the will of the global North 
to give as much funding as they see fit, rather it is owed for the damages and losses they have 
directly caused. The research has shown different ways in which Bangladesh has done this, for 
example, as Bangladesh has built itself into a climate change leader.  
 
Today there is a recognition of the profound social divide and the interdependency between the 
global North and South. In a short space of time, the expansion of global challenges, (including 
and compounded by the demands of climate change), have come to the forefront of the 
international agenda. Moreover, the recognition that the current global system is ill-equipped 
to manage and cope with the set of challenges we are facing, that of loss and damage. A 
national-level development of a policy for loss and damage is only one example of how these 
former colonies are challenging the historical systems and the long association of developing 
nations as passive recipients. It exemplifies that developing countries are not only engaged in 
their development, but they are willing to challenge long engrained global narratives and the 
structures that these narratives perpetuate (Severino & Ray, 2009). 
 
Traditional ODA systems are still used to account for and stand as a “benchmark” for the 
official flows between the global North and global South. However, they fail to acknowledge 
the roles that the global South now participate both in its own and others development 
(Severino & Ray, 2009). Developing nations continually contribute to financing global policy 
and agendas. They are demanding to be heard, through developing their contributions towards 
global policy and through finance (Severino & Ray, 2009). Developing nations, often the most 
vulnerable to climate change impacts are no longer willing to sit by as passive participants. The 
production of hyper collective action against global challenges leaves no space to structure 
international policy of action around an outdated authoritative system. Collective thinking, 
discussion, negotiation and action is the only way forward. There is no more extended room 
for top-down decisions. 
 
The North-South divide created in the context of loss and damage, is perhaps a contributing 
factor to the stagnation and the politicization of loss and damage (Toussaint & Blanco, 2019). 
Those “most vulnerable” to the effects of loss and damage have been framed in two differing 
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ways. One is in the context of geographic locations, (those people from small island developing 
states and those in low lying coastal areas) and those from particular areas already effected by 
extreme drought as described by IPCC reports. These geographically aligned countries 
described largely fall into the categorisation of developing countries.  The other being those 
who are economically vulnerable, this categorization however, expands further than borders. 
Those in both the global North and the global South who come from economically 
disadvantaged communities will face the consequences of climate change and loss and damage 
at greater rates. Reframing loss and damage as a global issue, an economic issue as opposed to 
a geographic issue would further build collectivism on addressing loss and damage, as opposed 
to an issue purely affecting the global South (Toussaint & Blanco, 2019). 
 
While the ability to depoliticise arguments of loss and damage may be true, what it fails to 
acknowledge is the long-rooted histories that affect issues of attribution and compensation.  
Developing nations strive to gain acknowledgment of these issues through arguments of 
climate justice, particularly on the issue of loss and damage. Moreover, loss and damage 
arguments highlight the need to recognise developing nations as engaged participants active in 
their own development, following their own path of development into the future as those who 
are going to be most greatly affected by climate change’s loss and damage. The nations 
projected to experience and who are already experiencing loss and damage, have not followed 
the same development trajectory as their western counterparts who are largely to blame for 
anthropogenic climate change. These nations have not developed as a result of the consumption 
of fossil fuels, rather they have suffered from unfair resource extraction and now 
disproportionately face the effects of climate change. For decades the global South has been 
following the mandates and funding from western nations in order to achieve “Development”, 
in a manner that is no longer sustainable.  
 
Moving forward into the next section these issues of the dichotomy on the perspectives on loss 
and damage between North and South are further discussed. 
 
7.3.3 Evading responsibility 
 
The global North continues to evade responsibility for their contributions to the current climate 
change situation, through different actions they continue to perpetuate the current inaction in 
North-South climate negotiations. The use of constructed ambiguity is one of the many tactics 
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used to evade responsibility by the global North demonstrated throughout this research.  
Addressing issues of justice and inequality are central to addressing international cooperation 
on the development of climate change policy. Scholars have long argued the reasons why and 
how the global North continues to stall international negotiations, including self-interest, 
bargaining power, and coercive forms of power (Timmons, 2008).   However, an often less 
talked about perspective on this topic is the use of constructed ambiguity. The use of ambiguity 
is intentional, ‘it is not just a passive failure or a deficit in governance, but also a resource that 
is often constructed,’ (Khan, 2013, pg.75).  Ambiguity is often persistent within organisational 
structures, documents, and practices, due to unintentional or intentional introduction. While 
the intentional introduction of ambiguity allows for flexibility in policy, this often results in 
power struggles. Ambiguity allows for multiple parties to interpret given policy or interject 
meaning into or take meaning out of a given policy strategically, by those in the position to 
take advantage of this strategic power (Best, 2008).  The use and perpetuation of constructed 
ambiguity to evade responsibility by the global North, includes the use of stalling tactics within 
the negotiation room,  the dulling of wording in UNFCCC documents (specifically the Paris 
Agreement),  the exclusion of any reference to compensation and liability, and the limited 
linkages of Article 8 to other articles in the Paris Agreement Rule book. The use of constructed 
ambiguity has framed the portrayal of differing perspectives seen from the global North 
throughout this research. While ambiguity has been used to allow for the framing of loss and 
damage and its current existence within the Paris Agreement. It has also been used as a source 
of power through which the global North constructs a given interpretation of the meaning of 
loss and damage, and what their role in addressing loss and damage is according to the existing 
international frameworks, avoiding responsibility and arguments of climate justice.  
 
Loss and damage discussions and the use of constructed ambiguity in associated discussions 
has transpired in a lot of distrust between the global South and the global North, little 
reciprocity has been seen in loss and damage negotiations. Between Western nations there is a 
deep-rooted level of trust, western nations have a long history of joint collaboration on a wide 
range of policy and development ventures in the global South. However, no such history exists 
between the North-South, rather a relationship of colonialism and top-down development 
practices under the guise of partnerships. North-South relationships are often characterised by 
high levels of mistrust and significant power asymmetries, which is seen and reflected 
throughout this research (Slater & Bell, 2002). Those from the global South want to see a 
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recognition of liability from the global North as a reflection of them recognising their past 
wrong doings and as a change in the norm from traditional development practices.  
 
7.3.4 Liability and compensation 
 
Beginning by unpacking the perspectives of climate justice, my research highlights how 
important justice arguments are for demanding global North countries be held accountable. 
Several participants spoke of climate change as a moral and legal issue, a theme which is taken 
up in the work of climate justice scholars and activists. In this section, I outline keyways in 
which climate justice scholars suggest moving forward with mechanisms for loss and damage.  
 
Climate Justice frames climate change as both an ethical and political issue, using science as 
the background for its argument, and responding to scientific knowledge to further build the 
argument (The Mary Robinson Foundation, 2019). The need for liability in response to loss 
and damage is an argument that climate justice advocates seeks. Climate justice argues climate 
change is both a moral and legal issue, acknowledging that as a global issue, that needs a fair 
and equitable approach not solely an environmental or physical issue. Climate Justice brings a 
range of legal concepts to the forefront of climate change discussions, including environmental 
justice, social justice, human rights, collective rights and historical attribution (The Mary 
Robinson Foundation, 2019). Legal arguments of climate justice only continue to develop, 
using a broader range of legal arguments, and bringing international frameworks into the 
discussion, including international human rights law, the concept of No-harm and the Polluter 
Pays Principle. The expected impacts of climate change including loss and damage are to have 
on human rights is well recognised and is also included in the preamble of the Paris Agreement 
(Setzer and Byrnes, 2019).  
 
Climate change litigation continues to be viewed as an avenue to influence policy outcomes 
and private sector behaviour. These arguments are being used for litigation in two different 
manners, routine cases and strategic cases. Routine cases are exposing courts to climate change 
arguments, although these cases may have come in front of the courts regardless, the framing 
as climate justice cases are new. Moreover, strategic cases take a more visionary approach, 
challenging public and private accountability, aiming to seek broader influence through policy 
change. While these cases tend to focus on mitigation and adaptation efforts, loss and damage 
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cases against emitters are increasingly taking place, regarding compensation (Setzer and 
Byrnes, 2019). 
 
International law, whether based on a series of customs or a treaty has a different role to play 
in international climate litigation. Despite the lack of movement under the UNFCCCs Warsaw 
International Mechanism on loss and damage, CSOs are using international frameworks to 
initiate movement on loss and damage outside the UNFCCC framework, questioning how 
human rights issues can be applied in international law to address the issue of loss and damage. 
Moreover, the application of the no-harm principle and the polluter pay principle is relevant to 
climate change as it attempts to hold accountable the legal responsibility of developed nations 
for their GHG emissions and demand climate justice. 
 
Overall the impact of litigation strategies aims to seek some form of liability, pushing for those 
actors who have caused damage to be held accountable for their actions presently. While there 
are issues surrounding the forwarding of litigation action, what the overarching outcomes that 
litigation actions are asking for is recognition and ultimately forwarding climate change action 
around loss and damage, outside of the UNFCCC frameworks (Sands, 2016). 
 
Moreover, as litigation strategies push for liability, suitable financial instruments are needed in 
order to compensate those effected by loss and damage. Given this mandate of the WIM, the 
resulting list of financial instruments included in the work programme of the WIM resulted in 
the research into comprehensive risk management capacity with risk pooling and transfer; 
catastrophe risk insurance; contingency finance; climate-themed bonds and their certification; 
catastrophe bonds; and financing approaches to making development climate-resilient 
(FCCC/SB/2014/4). Each of these financial mechanisms raised issues of justice and equity, 
asking who would pay for the losses and damages and whether these approaches would help 
those countries facing permanent damages from climate change (Roberts et al. 2017). 
 
Most instruments highlighted for discussions focus on insurance mechanisms of different 
forms. Many CSOs argue that insurance is a type of band-aid and may not be an appropriate 
solution for slow onset events, ongoing occurrences, or non-economic loss and damage 
(Munich Climate Insurance Initiative, 2012). The idea that developed nations should 
acknowledge, “the global nature of climate change calls for the widest possible cooperation by 
all countries and their participation in an effective and appropriate international response, in 
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accordance with their common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities 
and their social and economic conditions, “ (UNFCCC 1992, pg. 1). By definition, developed 
nations with the economic potential to do so, should take on the costs of development and 
operating costs of varied insurance approaches (Roberts et al. 2017). 
 
Insurance mechanisms are the dominant means through which climate financing is discussed 
under the UNFCCC WIM, especially in the form of regional insurance pools and micro-
insurance structures. Funding inputs into these insurance mechanisms continue to be framed as 
humanitarian-based aid on the principle of solidarity, rather than about compensation (Bayer, 
Surminski, Bouwer, 2019). Insurance allows one party (a nation, region) to transfer risk, in this 
case, associated financial impacts as a result of loss and damage to another party, the insurer. 
This results in the transfer of financial risk ex-ante, guaranteeing payouts in the case of agreed-
upon losses and damages from disasters, or climate events after the fact, ex-post (Bayer, 
Surminski, Bouwer, 2019, Gewirtzmam, et al., 2018,) allowing those most vulnerable to 
transfer their risk to parties of a relatively stable financial basis, in exchange for an insurance 
premium (Gewirtzmam, et al., 2018). Three of the most dominant versions of this insurance 
coverage comes in the form of comprehensive risk management capacity with risk pooling, 
and transfer, catastrophe risk insurance and contingency finance, descriptions and relevance of 
their application are described below. 
 
Innovative financing for loss and damage, however, provides new combinations or adjustments 
to existing instruments and resources currently available, rather than new financial instruments 
aimed exclusively at addressing climate change. Innovative financing refers to a range of non-
traditional mechanisms to raise additional funds for climate financing through “out of the box” 
financial mechanisms. New innovative proposals such as the International Airline Passenger 
Levy, (Durand, Hoffmeister, Roberts, 2016., Chambwera,  Njewa, & Loga, D. 2018),  and the 
Climate Damages Tax (Richards, Hillman, Boughley, 2018 & Wewerinke- Singh & Salili, 
2019), alongside others can be designed, implemented and regulated to prevent climate change 
impacts felt by the most vulnerable to loss and damage. They have the potential to hold those 
liable for climate change damages accountable and provide much needed funding for loss and 
damage (ActionAid, 2019.)  
 
A recent study produced by ActionAid (2019) found that no current proposed market-based 
mechanisms account for or incorporate a human rights-centered approach towards finance for 
Page | 108  
 
loss and damage impacts. A market-based mechanism generally maintains the norm with the 
burden placed on developing nations. Moreover, market-based mechanisms lack transparency, 
accountability and participatory decision-making, failing to include those most vulnerable to 
the impacts of climate change in any real manner (ActionAid, 2019).  
 
The inclusion of non-insurance tools is also paramount, given insurance tool limitations to 
directly address losses associated with slow-onset events or non-economic loss and damage. 
Innovative tools for finance provide external sources of financing outside of traditional market-
based methods (Hoeppe, 2016).  However, there are currently still huge gaps around these 
mechanisms and tools. These gaps include but are not limited to how these mechanisms will 
be implemented and how they will support the initiatives that developing countries most 
affected have begun to develop and will continue to do so as loss and damage becomes more 
of a reality (CIGI, 2016). Moreover, innovative tools for financing are providing the burden of 
financing and managing the impacts of loss and damage away from those developing nations, 
back on to those countries who have contributed most to climate change and its impacts. 
 
As discussed, there is the need for the Global North to accept liability is crucial in moving 
practical responses to loss and damage forward. Moreover, loss and damage needs appropriate 
funding, generated in a manner that fairly compensates those affected by loss and damage.  
 
7.3.5 Mainstreaming loss and damage  
 
Mainstreaming loss and damage into national level policy is paramount. The ability to develop 
a framework and funding structure to tackle loss and damage would largely improve current 
climate change policy. While there is policy targeted at mitigation efforts and more pointedly 
at adaptation efforts, making local responses more suitable and bringing loss and damage into 
the fold of local climate change policy will further ready Bangladesh for loss and damage as it 
is mainstreamed internationally and impacts the country more. The recognition by Government 
and CSOs within Bangladesh of the expected impacts of climate change are well spoken about 
and understood, so it is essential loss and damage is addressed through policy.  
 
The potential interplay with the UNFCCC process and local level loss and damage policy has 
been spoken about broadly (section 7.1) in this research. The example of Bangladesh 
developing their own policy would firstly set an example of a least developed nation addressing 
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loss and damage head on. Through integrating this practice into existing social safety net 
programmes and disaster risk response practices, Bangladesh could give a specific example of 
the processes put in place and the level of funding required to do so. Again, Bangladesh has 
the potential to lead the way in developing more knowledge on loss and damage and furthering 
their leadership role within the UNFCCC.  
 
Moreover, the additional pressure and leverage that could be used would send the message to 
the international community that loss and damage is not to be relegated to the “too hard basket”. 
LDCs and other developing nations are not willing to sit by, they are fighting for climate justice 
as active participants in the development of loss and damage policy and its development in the 
UNFCCC. Bangladesh alongside other LDCs will continue to push for compensation and the 
liability and push for loss and damage to be viewed in the same manner in which mitigation 
and adaptation are viewed and addressed within the UNFCCC. CSOs are instrumental in this 
process, as they have been key players in driving loss and damage thus far, moreover, they are 
often those working at the community level and understand the national, and community level 
needs. CSOs have championed climate action and specifically action on loss and damage, 
because they understand the need to compensate those most affected.  
 
Mainstreaming loss and damage in policy is crucial, as climate change is mainstreamed into 
development practice, there needs to be clear considerations around, what communities and 
individuals experiencing loss and damage need (Awal, 2013). Solutions need to be relevant 
and not imposed and specific to the situation of loss and damage in the given country. However, 
the most important consideration in this is that loss and damage funding is not and should not 
come in the form of traditional development aid. Funding for loss and damages needs to be in 
the form of compensation and address the causation of these impacts, that being the 
anthropogenic climate change as a result of the emissions by the global North.  
 
 
7.4 Creating the climate for change: Summary 
 
This research has shown the crucial role civil society actors play in both the momentum of the 
loss and damage national policy in Bangladesh and also the role they play in the international 
negotiations. This research contributes to the limited literature available on loss and damage 
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particularly the role of stakeholders. The contribution adds the understanding of CSOs role in 
both climate change and development policy.  
 
At the National level, it can be concluded that a Bangladesh national policy is needed so that 
their case for compensation is strengthened. Bangladesh needs a national policy so that local, 
targeted solutions to loss and damage are transparent, efficient, appropriate and not imposed. 
Moreover, Bangladesh is in a prime position to become an international leader on loss and 
damage and developing a national mechanism would strengthen their current position 
significantly.  
 
The research found that CSOs have been instrumental in identifying the need for loss and 
damage both at the national and international level. Their experience is crucial in policy 
development within Bangladesh, and they will continue to play a vital role in advancing loss 
and damage discussions and responding to loss and damage on a practical level.  
 
At the international level, it can be concluded that the strength of alliances Bangladesh has 
formed with other vulnerable countries will continue to strengthen arguments for climate 
justice and challenge the current position of the global North. There needs to be the recognition 
that loss and damage cannot be addressed within a framework of traditional development aid. 
Also, compensation must not be just considered another form of ODA. Moreover, the global 
North needs to accept liability and contribute to the varied funding mechanisms for 
compensation.  
  
Lastly, loss and damage should be mainstreamed in both international and national discussions 
of climate change. CSOs are instrumental in this process of mainstreaming loss and damage 
into national level practices. It needs to be understood that loss and damage is at the heart of 
addressing climate change and cannot be relegated to the ‘too hard basket’.  
  
Loss and damage is an incredibly complex and contentious issue. Loss and damage requires 
more research, especially in areas less spoken about in the research, such as innovative finance 
and non-economic loss and damage. Climate change is such a changing field of research and 
policy, any policy that is developed in Bangladesh should be ever-evolving and responding to 
the needs of the current situation. There is no sense in a final concrete policy and any 
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implemented policy must be open to negotiation, renegotiation and reformulation, so it can 
respond to the ever-changing elements of climate change.  
 
On a personal note, although the process seems complex with many institutions and 
governments that are resistant to the issue of climate change, specifically loss and damage, it 
is easy to feel pessimistic engaging with the issue. However, there is strong evidence that CSOS 
and individuals are demanding that governments respond. The strength of CSOs has been 
leading the discussion and the discussion of loss and damage in Bangladesh accentuates the 
importance of civil societies, communities and individuals in the fight against climate change.  
 
Public opinion and outpouring for those experiencing loss and damage on a personal level is 
real. Climate change is at the forefront of the public domain, and the recent Australian bush 
fires, only highlight the reality of climate change and loss and damage. The awareness globally, 
particularly in the west, that loss and damage is a lived experience for many across the globe, 
is demonstrated in the outpouring of aid for those experiencing the consequences of the impact 
of climate change. It will be interesting, to follow the outcomes of the Australian bush fires 
and how a developed nation, (whose government is hugely opposed to loss and damage 
discussions within the UNFCCC negotiations) will manage the aid, how loss and damage will 
be addressed and how loss and damage as a concept will become relevant in this context.  
 
Clearly New Zealand will also have to address loss and damage and address the colonial 
relationship with Pacific countries as Small Island Developing Nations are also highly 
vulnerable to loss and damage. Recognising and having had the experience of witnessing how 
loss and damage and climate change threatens people’s lives and livelihoods has indeed 
highlighted my understanding of the importance of this research. We cannot sit by and let loss 
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